

# Joint Operations Execution

Joint Warfare Publication 3-00  
Second Edition

**JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 3-00**  
**JOINT OPERATIONS EXECUTION**  
**(SECOND EDITION)**

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The Joint Doctrine & Concepts Centre  
Ministry of Defence  
Shrivenham  
SWINDON  
Wilts SN6 8RF

Telephone number: 01793 314216/7  
Facsimile number: 01793 314232.  
E-Mail: doctrine.pubs@jdcc.mod.uk

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# PREFACE

## SCOPE

1. **Purpose.** JWP-3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*' describes the integration, co-ordination and synchronisation of deployed<sup>1</sup> multinational and national Joint<sup>2</sup> Operations. JWP 3-00 flows directly from JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*', and together with JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*', is the UK authority for the conduct of deployed joint operations. It is aimed primarily at those responsible for the execution of operations, specifically the Chief of Staff (COS) Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), and his staff and component HQ COS and their staff. It will be of use to those involved in the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) – particularly the Defence Crisis Management Centre (DCMC) and PJHQ, and is a key document in the delivery of joint command and staff training.

2. **Structure.** JWP 3-00 comprises 3 chapters:

a. **Chapter 1 - Context.** The purpose of Chapter 1 is to expand on the principles of joint operations contained in JDP 01, in order to provide context for the operation of the JTFHQ.

b. **Chapter 2 - Forming the Force.** The purpose of Chapter 2 is to describe the 2 broad models for UK operational level HQs, where the UK is in command (JTFHQ) and where the UK is a contributing nation (NCHQ). It sets out what staff and functional activity occurs and how these are integrated, including the relationship with the strategic level, components and national contingents, so the COS can bind together a robust and flexible headquarters necessary for the operation at hand.

c. **Chapter 3 - Campaign Execution.** The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe the key co-ordination and synchronisation activities which allow the COS to execute - that is implement and control - the Joint Task Force Commander's (JTFC) campaign plan.

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<sup>1</sup> Although many of the principles set out still apply, this publication is not primarily concerned with routine roulement overseas operations such as Op TOSCA, Cyprus. Furthermore, it is not concerned with joint operations at the UK home base.

<sup>2</sup> Joint operations are the synergistic effect of tactical activities in a campaign set at the operational level. Joint operations co-ordinate and integrate a range of single-Service capabilities, are multi-agency in character and are normally conducted within an alliance or coalition framework.

## LINKAGES

3. **Multinational Doctrine.** JWP 3-00 is consistent with the ideas contained in the following publications. However, where differences arise these are explained:
  - a. **Allied Doctrine.** While JWP 3-00 draws on Allied Joint publications, AJP-01(B) '*Allied Joint Doctrine*' and AJP-3 '*Allied Joint Operations*', the UK requires a separate publication, for 3 principal reasons. First, recent experience on multinational operations has highlighted important national points of emphasis. Secondly, the UK has decided to produce JDP 01 as a specific guide for JTFs and National Contingent Commanders (NCCs). Finally, the doctrine for the execution of operations has been separated out from planning.
  - b. **US Doctrine.** Although there are many similarities both in terms of tone and content with JP 3-0 '*Doctrine for Joint Operations*', JWP 3-00 makes particular points of UK national emphasis and importance.
4. **National Joint Doctrine.** The other capstone JWPs, such as JWP 2-00 '*Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*' and JWP 4-00 '*Joint Logistics*', provide important supporting detail on key functional areas. In addition, JWP 3-00 also links into a series of more detailed publications, such as JWP 3-45 '*Media Operations*' and JWP 3-80 '*Information Operations*'.
5. **Headquarters Standing Operating Procedures.** While JWP 3-00 provides generic J3 doctrine for deployed UK operations execution, potential operational level HQs are still required to develop their own detailed practices and procedures in order to function effectively.

# JOINT OPERATIONS EXECUTION

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### Glossary of Terms and Definitions

### Glossary of Abbreviations

## JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS

The successful prosecution of joint operations requires a clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine). Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or at all, by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of NATO doctrine. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

Interim Joint Warfare Publications (IJWPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened timescale, either in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive 'parent' publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is explained in a current JS DCI.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> DCI GEN 91 2003.



## CHAPTER 1 – CONTEXT

The purpose of Chapter 1 is to expand on the principles of joint operations contained in JDP 01 in order to provide a context for the operation of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ).

Section I – Introduction

Section II – The UK’s Approach to Joint Operations

Section III – The Joint Battlespace

### SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

101. Having explained the roles and responsibilities of the appointed Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)<sup>1</sup> in Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01, Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-00 focuses on the staff activities and processes led by the Chief of Staff (COS) within a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) to *integrate, co-ordinate* and *synchronise* activity within either a multinational, or a national task force in accordance with the intent of the JTFC. Chapter 1 sets the foundation for the remaining chapters, providing an expanded context for the conduct of joint operations.

102. Integration, co-ordination and synchronisation are critical to the successful execution of operations. Combined they are synergistic, an awkward word, but one that describes the achievement of the effect of the whole being greater than the sum of its 3 constituent parts. The following descriptions apply:

a. **Integration.** Integration is the process by which the capabilities of the entire force, together with other organisations and agencies,<sup>2</sup> are merged within the JTFHQ. The result is a HQ with robust linkages to the strategic and tactical levels, staffed by officers of all Services, with representation from all contributing nations, and forces merged into joint and multinational components. This results in an integrated approach to operations driven by mutual understanding, trust and a common purpose.

b. **Co-ordination.** Maintaining the operational level principle of decentralised command and decentralised execution, forces under command proactively consult, co-operate, and deconflict in order to achieve the JTFC’s intent in a co-ordinated manner.

<sup>1</sup> The term JTFC is used throughout this JWP when referring to the operational level commander and encompasses a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), Multinational JTFC, Combined JTFC (CJTFC) and National Contingent Commander (NCC). However, where a **specific** difference in their function arises this is explained.

<sup>2</sup> Including all on the diplomatic and economic lines of effort. When required representatives from external organisations can be embedded within military HQs, and may include other government departments (OGD), international organisations (IOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or others. For these issues, the JTFC might receive advice and assistance from a Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD), provided by the Department for International Development (DFID).

c. **Synchronisation.** Synchronisation concerns the focusing of resources and activities together for maximum effect and can only be achieved when there is excellent integration and co-ordination. It is usually governed by time and space dimensions and is assisted greatly by the foundation of a shared and in-depth understanding of the joint operational situation.

103. These activities do not happen by chance and getting them to work in harmony is largely the responsibility of the JTFHQ staff, led by the COS and assisted by the other senior staff. The common thread that binds them together is planning. Planning and operations are part of a continuous process. Planning flows into execution the outcome of which creates the conditions for subsequent planning. Both are inter-dependent and rely heavily on the drive of the JTFC. Planning shapes the execution of the Campaign Plan but equally the ongoing results of execution will cause the JTFC to have to review, adapt and modify the plan.<sup>3</sup> Although not a hard boundary, JWP 3-00 considers the activities and mechanisms used by the COS and the staff up to about the next 96 hours. The planning processes and techniques used beyond the 96-hour point, or for the next phase of operations are covered in JWP 5-00 ‘*Joint Operations Planning*’.<sup>4</sup>

## SECTION II – THE UK’S APPROACH TO JOINT OPERATIONS

### The Operational Level of War

104. The levels of war are explained in JWP 0-01 ‘*British Defence Doctrine*’ (BDD) and are expanded on in JDP 01 and elsewhere. There is significant overlap between the levels, not least, because there are more headquarters present than there are levels of war.<sup>5</sup> Also, tactical level activity can have strategic and operational effect and consequence, and *vice versa*. Conversely, the pursuit of strategic objectives will not, in all cases, require the deployment of large or heavily equipped forces, and nor does a Joint Task Force (JTF) necessarily have to be commanded by an officer of a particular rank. Furthermore, not all military assets engaged within the Joint Operations Area (JOA) will necessarily be commanded or controlled by the JTFC. Some assets (such as Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) and Special Forces (SF)) may be controlled at the strategic level. This complexity increases in multinational operations and on operations where there is a significant presence of non-military participants who are reluctant, even hostile to accept a unified chain of command, particularly one with military leadership. In all circumstances, the JTFC is placed at the centre of a 3-

<sup>3</sup> Vice Adm Clark USN, “*We plan because synergy does not happen by itself. Synchronisation does not happen by accident. For synchronisation, co-ordination and integration to take place, planning is required*”.

<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that these are not definitive. Another form of brigading is J3 - current phase, J 3/5 - current phase/next phase and J5 - subsequent phases.

<sup>5</sup> For example, in the UK, existing at the strategic, operational and tactical levels there are the MOD, PJHQ, JTFHQ/NCHQ, and the component HQs.

dimensional web that extends upward to the strategic level, downward to the tactical level and laterally to a range of military and civilian groupings and organisations.

105. **Freedom of Action.** The JTFC must quickly gain a deep understanding of the problem that faces him. Mission command allows him the latitude, as well as the means, to select and execute the most appropriate course of action necessary to achieve his objectives. However, reality dictates that the degree of freedom afforded will depend on the nature of the conflict; prevailing political and legal guidance has a major impact at this level. Where national survival is at risk, constraints are fewer, but where involvement is a matter of choice and objectives lean toward the humanitarian, the degree of political control will be greater, particularly as inappropriate military action could be politically self-defeating. The JTFC is guided in these issues by his senior staff, in particular his Political/Policy Advisor (POLAD) and Legal Advisor (LEGAD). Irrespective of the level of delegated freedom of action, it is implicit that the JTFC ensures the national chains of command of all participating nations are kept fully aware of his intentions.

106. **Principles of War.** The UK's 10 principles of war are described in BDD. All the principles need to be applied skilfully at the operational level of war, principally because they will have varying relevance depending upon the nature of the operation, its location and the stage of the campaign. A good example is the balancing of Economy of Effort with Concentration of Force. Because the JTFC is unlikely to have a surplus of forces it is important that he accurately identifies where he can be economical in order to permit concentration at the point of greatest impact.

107. **Legitimacy and Information Operations.** Information Operations (Info Ops) is critical in undermining an adversary's determination to persist with his unacceptable course of action, as well as supporting the legitimacy for UK involvement. It is an integrating strategy not a discrete capability. It permeates every level and, to be fully effective, must be conducted at the strategic level over the long term as part of integrated UK foreign policy and diplomacy; it is not just switched on and off in response to individual crisis or over the life of a specific campaign. Comprising a range of techniques and tools, it is directed at a wide audience of groupings (hostile, friendly and neutral) involved in the crisis inside the JOA, as well as a much wider global grouping of bystanders and spectators. At all times Info Ops conducted by the military are subordinate to and coherent with the overall Strategic Information Campaign determined centrally by HMG, allies and coalition partners.

108. **Public Support and the Media.** Without public support and favourable coverage by national and international media, political will, and possibly the morale of the JTF, could be adversely affected. In his relationship with the media, the JTFC seeks to cultivate a positive and open image of the JTF where they are seen to be resolute in pursuit of their mandate, credible and ultimately decisive, yet at all times striving to minimise collateral damage and casualties and operate within the rule of

law. In the UK, Media Operations<sup>6</sup> (Media Ops) will be politically guided, via the MOD Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) and the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ).

## The Joint Approach to Operations

109. **Componency.** The UK recognises that military success relies on a joint effort, usually with 5 components and other force elements brought together under a unified command structure. The 5 components routinely established by the UK are the Joint Force Maritime, Land, Air, SF and Logistic components (JFMC, JFLC, JFAC, JFSFC and JFLogC respectively.<sup>7</sup> Achieving an appropriate degree of control of the sea and air is normally essential in enabling the desired outcome which is usually achieved on land. The Land component succeeds by co-ordinating and synchronising with Air and Maritime components to overcome an adversary that controls ground, principally by causing surprise and shock.<sup>8</sup> The 3 environmental components are enabled by the support provided by the SF<sup>9</sup> and Logistic components and, in supporting each other, all elements are expected to exchange capability when either directed, or otherwise required to do so. Co-operation between them is only achieved through trust, good will, prior training and joint exercising, a clear understanding of the JTFC's intent,<sup>10</sup> and having clear relationships between them that will evolve in accordance with the circumstances as the campaign progresses. A joint approach ensures a sustainable and balanced force that offers the JTFC various options to achieve his objectives.

110. **Logistics.** At the operational level, the provision of logistics is the responsibility of a number of agencies. The PJHQ and the Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) are responsible for the preparation and deployment of the JTF in conjunction with the Front Line Commands (FLCs), whilst in the JOA the Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC)/National Support Element (NSE) is responsible for the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) of the JTF, and subsequent provision of logistic support. However, as the owners of integral logistic capability, the lower level of logistics support in the JOA, including any additional joint assets provided, will often naturally devolve to the component logistic organisations. Nonetheless, the JFLogC maintains an over-watch to ensure efficient co-ordination of component logistics in order to reduce duplication and to achieve economies of scale. The UK's joint logistic doctrine is detailed in JWP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*'. Within the JTFHQ, the co-ordination of logistics is a specific responsibility for the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS).

<sup>6</sup> The UK's doctrine for Media Ops is JWP 3-45 '*Media Operations*'.

<sup>7</sup> Not every nation recognises the same number of components. For example the US does not recognise a JFLogC. The UK may also form a Joint Force Amphibious Component if the scale/and or complexity of amphibious operations demands it and/or if amphibious operations lie on the main effort.

<sup>8</sup> More on this can be obtained from ADP '*Land Operations*'.

<sup>9</sup> Though under certain circumstances the JFSF CC can also be a JTFC.

<sup>10</sup> Having both explicit and implicit elements.

## Multinational Operations

111. Multinationality is the prevalent reality at the operational level of war<sup>11</sup> because it reflects the political necessity of seeking international consensus and legitimacy for military action. The UK must be prepared, not only in conceptual, moral and physical terms, to operate with traditional allies and partners, but also with others less familiar. While multinationality is politically attractive it does represent a significant dilemma for a JTFC as it brings with it increasing risk, proportionate to the number of nations involved. It therefore follows that the JTFC will only want to multinationalise to the extent it makes good operational sense, although the force structure may, ultimately, be outside his control. Coalition or alliance will be commonly assessed to be the operational, or even the strategic, Centre of Gravity (CoG), so as early as possible, the JTFC needs to know the terms and conditions under which national contingents have been provided and to gain a feel for the political effect his actions will have on the cohesion of the coalition. The most likely scenario for military action by UK forces at the medium and large-scale of operations will be as part of a coalition, perhaps under NATO or EU leadership, but increasingly US-led. Implicit in this statement is the recognition that the UK will provide a militarily coherent and capable force, self-standing and self-sustaining. Annex 1A provides more detail on the key themes underpinning multinational operations not discussed in context elsewhere in this publication.

112. **Interoperability.** The complexity of an operation will determine the appropriate level of interoperability and the composition of the force will determine the interoperability standards that are to apply (see Annex 1A). The demanding nature of deliberate intervention operations necessitates a greater degree of operational and tactical interoperability amongst allied partners than is required for peacekeeping or disaster relief missions and the most demanding challenges lie in achieving compatibility between Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and the intelligence gathered by other multinational assets. In the same way as it is important to know the adversary, it is equally important to have a similar level of understanding of one's allies too. Superficially, headquarters structures and the processes that go on within them might appear similar to how the UK does its business, but this can often hide fundamental differences in ethos, culture and understanding, all of which must be quickly mastered.

113. **Multinational Organisation of Forces.** The UK recognises 3 basic models for the multinational command and the organisation of forces, each one having varying degrees of multinationality:

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<sup>11</sup> Except on the occasions where the UK will choose to act alone at small and medium scales of effort.

- a. **Fully Integrated Forces.**<sup>12</sup> Fully integrated forces are based on a proportional shares basis with national components and a fully integrated headquarters, and often-fixed<sup>13</sup> infrastructure. Under these arrangements commanders tend to be appointed on either a rotational or *quid pro quo* basis.
- b. **Framework Nation.** Forces designed under ‘framework nation’ arrangements are commanded by an officer from the framework nation.<sup>14</sup> A significant proportion of the staff and headquarters support will also come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation and also its staff procedures. However in practice, once command and staff teams are established, procedures should evolve to incorporate best practice from all the contributing nations.
- c. **Lead Nation.** This model is based on one nation assuming lead responsibility for the planning and execution of an operation, particularly retaining ownership of the Campaign Plan and Info Ops. The JTFC, staff, command, control, Communications and Information Systems (CIS) structure, doctrine and logistic co-ordination of the force will be provided by one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force under a National Contingent Commander (NCC),<sup>15</sup> with liaison officers (LOs), and might even fulfil some staff positions in the lead nation’s staff.

## The UK’s Joint Operational Construct

114. **The Permanent Joint Headquarters.** All deployed global UK operations outside NATO are under the command of the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) at the PJHQ, located at Northwood near London. This important appointment bridges the gap between the operational and the strategic level. A basic construct for the UK’s command and control on deployed operations is shown in Figure 1.1 and many other allies and potential partners organise themselves in similar fashion. However, this fundamentally differs from the US model, which divides the world into a series of macro-regions, each allocated to a nominated unified Combatant Commander operating at the strategic level, with direct access to the US Secretary for Defence and the President of the USA (See Annex 1B).


<sup>12</sup> The norm for NATO Article 5 contingencies. This model is also found within the context of medium to large-scale enduring operations. Where an operation is conducted under ad hoc or European (non-recourse to NATO forces) arrangements sub-Paragraphs b and c are the norm.

<sup>13</sup> Such as the NATO ISAF HQ, Kabul, but the same is true for any standing NATO HQ, which has a permanent headquarters and set architectures for the key processes and activities that the HQ was set up to achieve.

<sup>14</sup> Detailed description is in AJP-3. A non-operational level example is HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). Under circumstances where 2 nations form a coalition then it is probable that the deputy will come from the non-framework nation.

<sup>15</sup> Unless numbers are very small, contributing nations will almost certainly maintain a National Support Element (NSE) for their own logistic support.

115. **The Joint Force Headquarters.** If a joint operation is to be UK led, the default operational level HQ is the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ), which is part of the PJHQ. The JFHQ is permanently focused on this role, is kept at very high readiness, has organisational stability, a joint ethos and structure, and is well placed as an integral part of the PJHQ. For medium to large-scale operations the JFHQ will normally form the core of the UK HQ, augmented as appropriate. A wider range of potential commanders and HQs are also held at short notice as alternatives to the JFHQ.<sup>16</sup>



**Figure 1.1 - An Overview of the UK's Joint Construct**


116. **Joint Rapid Reaction Forces.** The requirement for appropriately configured joint forces is met by having Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) consisting of a range of highly capable force elements maintained at high and very high readiness by the FLCs. They are trained to the required Joint Standards<sup>17</sup> and held ready to deploy to crisis of varying intensity, frequency and character. These are configured into 2 echelons according to their readiness and are capable of being deployed and sustained in force packages up to medium scales of effort.<sup>18</sup> The model is illustrated at Figure 1.2. The underlying principle of the JRRF relies on the inherent organisational stability of the single-Services, even accepting they largely prepare and train for joint

<sup>16</sup> The 5 basic models for a UK JTF HQ are explained in more detail in Chapter 2.

<sup>17</sup> The responsibility for JRRF training, readiness and standards rests with PJHQ J7.

<sup>18</sup> The UK recognises 3 scales of effort (Large, Medium and Small) which vary relative to the capability being provided. At any one time the UK has the capacity to undertake a set number of concurrent tasks with some ability to surge.

operations separately, yet being confident they can integrate quickly. Implicit in this is a shared understanding of what each component element is capable of, and mutual confidence in each other's ability developed through joint training.



**Figure 1.2 - Joint Rapid Reaction Forces**

117. **Component Contributions to Joint Operations.** The UK's JTF model recognises 5 component elements, which predominantly operate at the tactical level of war, and whose individual size and shape will be determined by the operation at hand. The 3 environmental Component Commanders (CCs) - maritime, land and air - will normally be nominated by their respective single-Service FLC (CINCFLEET, CINCLAND and CINCSTRIKE) in consultation with the Jt Comd. The Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC) will be nominated by Director Special Forces (DSF). The Joint Force Logistics CC (JFLogCC) will be nominated, again in consultation with the Jt Comd, by the CinC of the providing FLC. A guide to the contribution made by each of the 5 components as configured on UK lines is given at Annex 1C. Implicit in the component construct are 5 main principles:

- a. Unity of command.
- b. Decentralised planning and decentralised execution of tasks.
- c. Integration of effort.
- d. Consultation and co-ordination between the components.
- e. The synchronisation of tactical actions.

## The Operating Environment

118. **Defence Strategic Guidance.** Military operations generally resist all attempts to categorise them in precise terms. Risks and challenges tend to be global, multi-layered, simultaneous, non-linear and difficult to predict, with combat at the tactical level occurring across all tasks, but with intensity varying according to the individual operation. Only those Military Tasks contained in the UK Defence Strategic Guidance (DSG) having the potential to be expeditionary are considered further in this publication. They are:<sup>19</sup>

- a. **Standing Overseas Commitments.** Defence and security of the UK's overseas territories, with particular emphasis on the wider security of Cyprus.<sup>20</sup>
- b. **Contingent Operations Overseas:**
  - (1) Humanitarian Disaster Relief Operations (HDRO).
  - (2) Evacuation of British Citizens Overseas.<sup>21</sup>
  - (3) Peacekeeping.<sup>22</sup>
  - (4) Peace Enforcement.<sup>23</sup>
  - (5) Power Projection.
  - (6) Focused Intervention.
  - (7) Deliberate Intervention.

119. **The Adversary.** Regardless of level, a basic precept for military success relies on having a detailed knowledge of the threat posed, and finding the most effective way to overcome its underlying capability and intent. The operational level is no exception. Success is achieved only when an adversary believes himself to be beaten, and thus maximum effort must be applied in undermining his will to fight. Gaining an understanding of the adversary is achieved in many ways, including:

- a. **Long-Term Forecasting.** In broad terms, analysis of strategic trends, and their refinement through Defence Management Board Planning Assumptions, Defence Strategic Guidance and other forecasting tools, sets out

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<sup>19</sup> For completeness, the 4 generic headings for UK Military Tasks are: Standing Strategic Tasks, Standing Home Commitments, Standing Overseas Commitments, and Contingent Operations Overseas. Only the last category is within the full purview of this JWP.

<sup>20</sup> Only if steady-state conditions deteriorate are these likely to fall within the scope of this publication.

<sup>21</sup> Termed Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO). See JWP 3-51 '*Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*'.

<sup>22</sup> Prevention, deterrence, containment and stabilisation operations involving the consent and compliance of disputing parties.

<sup>23</sup> Where a mandate is in place, but where consent and compliance are uncertain.

to define the perceived long-term threats to the UK, thereby enabling the formulation of strategically led Info Ops and the evolution of Defence capability along Lines of Development.<sup>24</sup>

b. **Medium to Short-Term Monitoring.** Through diplomatic lines as well as via the instruments of state intelligence, overwatch and assessment is made of potential and developing crises.

c. **Operationally Specific Factors.** Deciding how best to overcome the opposition pitted against him is a key responsibility for the appointed JTFC. He achieves this principally through the successful exploitation of intelligence and the establishment of a comprehensive surveillance and reconnaissance network. This is fundamental because the knowledge gained allows the JTFC to assess:

- (1) What the threat is and how it might manifest itself.
- (2) What the challenges are to his authority, and to what extent does he have agreement to intervene.
- (3) Where the level of consent and compliance varies.
- (4) Whether the situation is likely to improve or deteriorate, and over what timescale.
- (5) The optimum times or locations for operations to take place.

d. **Application of Operationally Specific Factors.** The application of these operationally specific factors then help to determine:

- (1) The Force structures to be adopted, including command, combat and support elements.
- (2) What the acceptable level of multinationality is.
- (3) The force posture to be adopted.
- (4) The Rules of Engagement (ROE) required.
- (5) How, and in what timeframe might he to achieve his operational end-state.

120. **Non-Military Participants.** Increasingly there is a requirement to integrate closely the efforts of the JTF with those of non-military participants such as other government departments (OGDs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and other

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<sup>24</sup> Concepts and Doctrine, Training, Structures, People, Sustainment, Equipment and Technology.

international organisations (IOs) and groupings. Military success alone will achieve little unless it creates the conditions for the pursuit of civil objectives by civil authorities and these organisations. It is well-established practice to exercise joint civil and military control but this is insufficient to achieve a long-term solution. The actions and needs of the indigenous and/or displaced population are also likely to impact on the original mission. Military activity at all levels will be under constant media scrutiny and in many instances the media and civilian agencies have much greater access than the military.<sup>25</sup>

121. **The Contemporary Operating Environment.** The contemporary operating environment contains a complex web of participants and bystanders that influence operations.<sup>26</sup> It is not always possible to focus on a defined adversary in the conventionally understood military sense and it is widely accepted that military operations do not conform to a neat spectrum of conditions from combat through to benign humanitarian assistance. In this respect a key consideration is asymmetry, a concept at the heart of the manoeuvrist mentality, that seeks to apply disproportionate strength against weakness. In the case of the UK this is done by ensuring the totality of her military forces, supported by allies and partners, capitalises on their overwhelming strengths throughout the depth and breadth of the battlespace.<sup>27</sup>

## SECTION III – THE JOINT BATTLESPACE

### Battlespace Geometry

122. The area in which operations will be conducted is organised and labelled in such a way that all elements of the joint force have a common understanding of its principal boundaries. However, it is widely recognised that the battlespace is expanding, becoming more dispersed and non-linear in keeping with that of the maritime and air battlespace. Distinctions between forward and rear areas are becoming less clear-cut and the use of urban conflict, terrorism, and irregular forces with their inherent asymmetric characteristics are becoming more commonplace. By order of scale the 3 geometrical tiers are:

- a. **Theatre of Operations.** The Theatre of Operations (TOO) is a geographical area<sup>28</sup> defined by the military-strategic authority that encompasses and surrounds the JOA within which a JTFC conducts operations. The TOO may include countries with facilities or access of use to

<sup>25</sup> These themes are considered more fully in IJWP 3-90 ‘*Civil-Military Co-operation*’.

<sup>26</sup> Associated with the UK’s military expeditionary modus operandi are the myriad of regional and local multicultural issues that form the backdrop to operations. These include different values sets, customs, ethnicity, religion, culture, language and way of life, all of which have a fundamental importance on the conduct of operations and must be considered as early as possible in the planning process and kept to the fore as operations progress.

<sup>27</sup> It is a misnomer to assume that the employment of asymmetric methods is always associated with the ‘underdog’. The use of nuclear weapons on Japan to end WW2 being an obvious example.

<sup>28</sup> More accurately a ‘volume’ of space.

the JTFC<sup>29</sup> and territories or sea areas through, or over which, forces have (or have not) been given authority to transit. The TOO may include areas occupied by other JTFCs on separate, or even related, operations.

b. **Joint Operations Area.** The JOA is a set volume of land, sea and airspace, defined by higher authority, into which a designated JTF deploys in order to accomplish a specific mission for a period of time. Some characteristics of a JOA are:

- (1) A JOA may cut across national boundaries, but normally would not in order that an integrated diplomatic effort can be achieved.
- (2) The JOA should not restrict the JTFC's freedom of manoeuvre, but neither should it be so big that the JTFC is unable to monitor what is going on within it, or allow the adversary to have unobserved freedom of manoeuvre.
- (3) The JTFC has the responsibility of protecting all friendly forces within it.<sup>30</sup>
- (4) It is possible for the JOAs of forces on separate operations to overlap.<sup>31</sup> Where this situation occurs, then it is clearly vital for tight co-ordination and robust deconfliction procedures to exist between JTFs and the PJHQ to prevent interference and fratricide, and where appropriate to synchronise their efforts.

c. **Area of Operations.** The Area of Operations (AOO) is a geographical volume, defined by a JTFC and within his JOA, in which a commander designated by him (usually a CC) is delegated authority to conduct operations.

123. **Dimensions of the Joint Battlespace.** The boundaries of the battlespace are becoming increasingly blurred as rapid advances in technology open them up for exploitation. The JOA can be considered as having 6 overlapping and inter-related dimensions: the 3 conventional dimensions of the earth's surface, land and sea (including sub-surface) and air (including space), the Electro Magnetic Spectrum (EMS), time and computer generated space.<sup>32</sup> Within these dimensions, military capability is applied at the operational level to SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT and EXPLOIT the situation, as well as deny the adversary the opportunity to do likewise.

<sup>29</sup> Access, Basing and Overflight (ABO) is a more complete (and operationally focused) description, used extensively by the US, covering the range of support facilities that have traditionally been known as Host-nation Support (HNS).

<sup>30</sup> Including, through negotiation, all, most, or some of the Lines of Communication (LOC).

<sup>31</sup> An example is Afghanistan where the US Joint Task Force on Operation Enduring Freedom shared overlapping boundaries with the NATO International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) based in Kabul and elsewhere.

<sup>32</sup> Sometimes referred to as 'cyber space', virtual space, or the information domain.

124. **Battlespace Management.** To generate optimum operational tempo, all components within the JTF need rapid, flexible and uninhibited access to the battlespace. However, the battlespace requirements of each component differ considerably and often overlap, causing conflict of interests, inefficiency and introducing risk and the potential for fratricide. The procedures and processes that have to be introduced to deconflict component activity can adversely affect tempo. Moreover the adversary and neutrals also use the same battlespace. Ensuring friendly forces access to all of the battlespace is achieved by the process of Battlespace Management. Denying its use to the opposition, and thus disabling his will and capability to operate, is an essential part of executing a joint operation.

## A Framework for Operations

125. **The Operational Level Functions.** On receipt of the Jt Comd's Directive, the JTFC leads his staff in the production of the Operational Estimate, the purpose being to select the best course of action (CoA) necessary to succeed.<sup>33</sup> In executing his campaign he applies 4 key operational level functions derived from the manoeuvrist approach, which together form a framework for operations. They must not be viewed as separate and distinct activities, or even phases. They are briefly summarised below and are explained in more detail in JDP 01 and in Chapter 3:

- a. **SHAPE the Operational Environment.** Affect the will and resolve of adversary political and military decision-makers, in combination with other strategic activities to '*create the picture of defeat in the mind of the adversary*'.<sup>34</sup> Simultaneously, build and maintain support for action by UK forces, her allies and partners.
- b. **ATTACK the Adversary's Will and Cohesion.** Make his strengths irrelevant. Attack critical assets using synchronised firepower and manoeuvre while harmonising with attacks on his will to continue the struggle.<sup>35</sup>
- c. **PROTECT the Force's Centre of Gravity.** This is particularly important in multinational operations, especially those comprising ad hoc coalitions.
- d. **EXPLOIT the Situation by all Direct or Indirect Means.** The ability to exploit successfully relies on accurate risk analysis and management to identify and create opportunities beforehand, the agility to seize unexpected and fleeting openings and make permanent the temporary effects already achieved.


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<sup>33</sup> This process is covered in detail in JDP 01 and JWP 5-00.

<sup>34</sup> Richard Simkin, '*Race to the Swift*'.

<sup>35</sup> In a situation where there is no clear adversary, this might be the object of the mission, i.e. the thing which provides the greatest resistance to the mission, and in that sense is 'Affect the situation' rather than 'Attack'.

126. **The Fundamentals of Joint Operations.** Figure 1.3 shows the fundamental elements of joint operations. It illustrates the principal activities of a commander and his staff, irrespective of the nature of the problem at hand, the scale of forces involved, or the technical assistance provided by CIS. The JTFC applies his experience and judgement to assess intuitively the key constituents to mission success, enunciated as the most appropriate CoA. His staff, working on clear direction from him then works up the detail of this course of action into the campaign plan. Both commander and staff then become involved in the detailed management of the campaign.<sup>36</sup> Thus, within this model exists a combination of operational art, design and management, which are grouped together under the term of campaigning, and when properly combined form the foundations for a successful campaign.



**Figure 1.3 - The Fundamentals of Joint Operations**

### Stages of a Joint Operation

127. The use of terms like operational or tactical should not be taken to imply a particular scale or size of effort, nor, indeed, the exact nature of the operation; the terms are more related to how an effect is achieved and where its consequence is felt, and applies to a wide range of techniques, and not just to combat. The nature of the crisis, and the military outcome sought, will determine the size and shape of the JTF, the command arrangements necessary to support them, and the nature of the area in which they operate.

<sup>36</sup> A campaign is a set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces.

128. A joint operation consists of a number of idealised stages, during which operations to SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT and EXPLOIT are enacted.<sup>37</sup> Although considerable overlap exists, they are:

- a. Receiving strategic direction and resources.
- b. Conducting an Operational Estimate, deciding on a CoA, developing a Campaign Plan and taking operational level decisions.
- c. Force preparation, including reconnaissance and liaison, force assembly and build-up, and pre-operations training and initial integration.
- d. The build-up of logistic sustainability, establishing regional support, deploying enablers and, when applicable, gaining multinational logistic support.
- e. Deployment of forces into the JOA, followed by a period of intense integration and battle preparation.
- f. Co-ordinated and synchronised joint operations to achieve operational and tactical level effects in order to secure the operational end-state. This will probably be followed by a period of transition and the building of a civil/military partnership.
- g. Achievement of an enduring strategic end-state acceptable to all participating nations.
- h. The recovery, roulement or re-deployment of forces, leading to exit from the JOA.
- i. Post-operational reporting and the processing of Joint Lessons Identified.

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<sup>37</sup> This is covered in more detail at Chapter 3.

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## ANNEX 1A - MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

1A1. This annex summarises the key principles and themes present in multinational operations. It is an important subject because of the central position of multinationality in the UK's deployed joint operations *modus operandi*. Participating nations are likely to be disparate in political orientation and culture yet have '*temporarily merged their capabilities and submerged any differences in the interest of a common goal*'.<sup>1</sup> A coalition will only remain in being as long as sufficiently strong political mutual interests exist, including the willingness to use lethal force if necessary. UK participation in multinational operations will be conducted under the auspices of a mandate<sup>2</sup> using forces allocated to NATO,<sup>3</sup> or under different alliance arrangements, or on an ad hoc basis. When the operation does not involve leadership by NATO or the EU,<sup>4</sup> the individual member states are termed coalition partners, the campaign itself being categorised as a 'Coalition Operation'.

1A2. **Multinational Co-operation.** Confidence in multinational partners stems from the following intangible principles:

- a. **Rapport.** Senior personnel will strive to engender a rapport with each other. The personal relationships developed between senior politicians and military leaders will pervade all aspects of multinational co-operation and all levels of command.
- b. **Respect.** Mutual respect for the professional ability, culture, history, religion, customs and values of participants strengthens relationships. The Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) has an important part to play in ensuring that praise is given where praise is due, and always at the expense of public criticism however justified.
- c. **Knowledge.** Time taken to understand the doctrine, capabilities and aspirations of partners will pay dividends, not least because no one nation has a monopoly on best practice. It is important that all nations are given a role commensurate with their ability to deliver real effect. This is an area where the Chief of Staff (COS) can be particularly useful in the early days of building a Joint Task Force (JTF).
- d. **Patience.** Effective co-operation may take time to develop. Differences of opinion, perspective and in the understanding of joint operations will require patience in smoothing them out; frustration will lead nowhere.

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Blumenson and James L Stokesbury, '*Masters of the Art of Command*', 1975.

<sup>2</sup> The mandate will be derived from international law, not exclusively from a UN Security Council resolution.

<sup>3</sup> The option of first choice for the UK.

<sup>4</sup> Only under these limited Alliance situations (NATO and EU) would an operation be termed a 'Combined' operation.

1A3. **Advantages of Multinational Co-operation.** Whilst national reasons for involvement will vary, co-operation normally reflects the fact that given the nature of the problem no single nation either wishes to, or can, achieve a solution unilaterally. Nations embark on operations for nationally advantageous political and military reasons, including the sharing of political risk, credibility, demonstrating economic, diplomatic, military or political support to other regions and influencing national and international opinion. Merging the capability of different military forces adds both depth (strength in numbers) and breadth (additional capabilities) as well as perhaps providing additional access to national and/or regional infrastructure and, in some circumstances, access to logistics, information and even intelligence. Herein lies the synergy of multinationality.

1A4. **Risks in Multinational Operations.** The more apparent risks are:

a. **Mission Development and Mission Creep.** A subtle but important difference exists between mission development and mission creep. Mission development is the development of the mission as a result of a logical review of the campaign plan, perhaps as a result of political direction altering the original end-state. Mission creep is involvement in activities that are not directly related to the achievement of the end-state because both the ability and spare capacity appears to be available to support (usually misplaced) good intentions. The consequences of mission creep are likely to be greater in multinational operations, because variations in national political and military aims are likely to prompt a variety of interpretations of the underlying intent.

b. **Deficiencies in Standardisation.** Differences in operating procedures, technical incompatibilities and lack of standardisation will undoubtedly occur:

- (1) Procedural and tactical differences present the force with situations where different units from different services may not be able to work effectively together.
- (2) Language differences present communications problems that may result in differences in interpretation about intent or assigned tasks.
- (3) Lack of weapons systems standardisation can cause technical and/or logistical difficulties.
- (4) Inability to exchange information, intelligence, technical data, or communications can result from equipment or software incompatibilities and/or national security concerns.
- (5) Logistic co-operation can be degraded by an inability to make use of replenishment and maintenance support from common sources.

c. **Tempo.** The tempo of operations that can be achieved is likely to be inversely proportional to the level of multinationality and the degree of integration achieved. High tempo will be particularly difficult to achieve in the early stages of a campaign, and where a coalition consists of partners who are unfamiliar with each other

d. **Rules of Engagement.** Locally, all elements of a multinational force operating in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) should ideally adhere to a single set of Rules of Engagement (ROE). However, nations can impose restrictions on the employment of their forces at any time.<sup>5</sup> The agreement of common, harmonised ROE prior to the beginning of an operation pays huge dividends for any later possible disagreement at a time when it could be critical.

1A5. **Other Factors.** A number of additional factors can affect the execution of multinational operations:

a. **Decision-Making.** The JTFC will recognise the need of all participating nations to be regularly briefed and involved in decision-making, particularly regarding the nature of their employment. The JTFC must be resolute in seeking to make the correct decision and not to take the ‘course of least resistance’.

b. **Language.** Different languages within a multinational JTF challenge unity of understanding. The lead and/or framework nation will decide which language will be spoken, although it is usual for English to be the language of first choice. The early identification of interpreter support and augmentation with multilingual liaison personnel will ameliorate most language difficulties. Appropriate security measures need to be taken to ensure that contracted linguists and local knowledge experts are accorded the minimum appropriate access. All in the JTF must be constantly alert to attack, espionage or subversion.

c. **Culture.** Seemingly minor cultural differences can have a significant impact. Commanders should be sensitive to, and strive to accommodate, religious practices and other unique cultural traditions important to the various participants, but at all times ensure consistency with the operational situation.

d. **Sovereignty Issues.** Sovereignty issues will need to be considered at an early stage in the planning process. Issues include assistance and basing, overflight rights, air and seaports of disembarkation, information/intelligence gathering and general access to areas adjacent to the JOA.

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<sup>5</sup> Further guidance on this specialised subject is covered in JWP 3-46 ‘*Legal Support to Joint Operations*’ (due for publication 2004).

## Standardisation Mechanisms

1A6. Achieving and implementing agreed levels of standardisation in doctrine, procedures and equipment with Allies and other friendly nations has already been mentioned as key to achieving the closest practical co-operation among military forces. There are 3 levels of standardisation in descending order, Commonality, Interchangeability and Compatibility.<sup>6</sup> The UK participates in several international standardisation programmes aimed at merging doctrine, procedures and equipment for the benefit of the common good.

1A7. **NATO.** The NATO standardisation process encompasses the development, ratification and subsequent promulgation of Standardisation Agreements (STANAGs) and Allied Publications (APs) which are based on Standardisation Objectives derived from the NATO Standardisation Programme (top-down), and on Standardisation Proposals which are, in most cases, generated by specialised NATO Working Groups (bottom-up). Within NATO HQ, the Director of the NATO Standardisation Agency (NSA) co-ordinates the NATO Standardisation Programme, the production of STANAGs and the publication of NATO doctrine. Within NATO, nations have agreed to commonality of doctrine and procedures, with stated exceptions, but in most other areas the agreed level of standardisation varies at levels below commonality.

1A8. **American-British-Canadian-Australian Armies.** The American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) Armies organisation (which also includes New Zealand) is instrumental in exchanging information, establishing ABCA Standards (formally known as Quadripartite Standardisation Agreements (QSTAGs)) and promoting exercises with the aim of establishing areas of mutual standardisation between participating nations. ABCA is actively seeking to align its own standards with NATO STANAGs, many of which are direct equivalents.

1A9. **Air Standardisation Co-ordinating Committee.** The Air Standardisation Co-ordinating Committee (ASCC) is the American - British - Canadian - Australian - New Zealand Air Forces standardisation organisation equivalent to the ABCA Armies organisation. ASCC establishes its own Air Standards and where appropriate adopts NATO STANAGS

1A10. **AUSCANNZUKUS Organisation.** In 1978 the navies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and the United States created a Naval Command and Control Board to ensure a seamless information infrastructure that would enable commanders at any level access to information to accomplish their assigned tasks. To that end, the organisation's primary task was to promote interoperability between member nations by exchanging information, adopting standards and agreeing

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<sup>6</sup> For definitions see JWP 0-01.1 'United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions'.

minimum operational capabilities. In 1996 the Organisation shifted its principal focus from communications issues to that of Information Management (IM).


**1A11. Combined Communications-Electronic Board.** The Combined Communications-Electronic Board (CCEB) is composed of senior Communications and Information Systems (CIS) staff from each of the member nations: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. The purpose of the CCEB is to examine military CIS issues to ensure allied interoperability; the majority of current Allied Communications Publications (ACPs) have been developed by the CCEB and subsequently endorsed by the NSA for NATO use. The CCEB is committed to maximising the effectiveness of multinational operations by the definition of a Combined Information Environment.

**1A12. Multinational Interoperability Council.** The Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC) is composed of senior operations, doctrine and Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) officials from each of the member nations: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, United Kingdom and the United States. The purpose of the MIC is to provide a multinational forum for identifying information interoperability issues and articulating actions which, if nationally implemented, would contribute to more effective coalition operations. It serves as the senior coordinating body for the member nations to resolve C3I interoperability issues.

**1A13. Quadripartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference.** The Quadripartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference (QCJWC) is a one-star grouping comprising Australia, Canada, UK, and the USA, which meets once a year. The function of the QCJWC is to facilitate coalition interoperability within the 4 nations, and it focuses on joint doctrine at the operational and strategic levels. It achieves this by producing papers on key issues in order to inform the work of other environmental coalition-focused interoperability fora involving the same nations.

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# ANNEX 1B - US COMBATANT COMMANDERS



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# ANNEX 1C – COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO JOINT OPERATIONS

## SECTION I – THE MARITIME COMPONENT

### Characteristics

1C1. **Application of Maritime Power.** BR 1806 '*British Maritime Doctrine*' (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) provides high-level UK maritime environmental doctrine and supports the capstone source of Allied maritime doctrine, AJP-3.1 '*Allied Joint Maritime Operations*'. Maritime forces possess a number of inherent characteristics, including access, mobility, versatility, sustained reach, resilience, lift capacity, forward presence, poise and leverage.<sup>1</sup> The sea is a valuable strategic medium and is a manoeuvre space for Power Projection (including deterrence and coercion), theatre entry and the application of combat power in support of joint campaign objectives. Thus, whilst UK's maritime forces retain a 'blue water' capability, the focus for their operations has shifted into the littorals in support of joint operations whose main effects will be on land. In this context, maritime forces (and particularly amphibious forces) can provide manoeuvre from the sea, where mobility is used to best effect (a maritime force can move up to 400 nautical miles in a day).

### Maritime Contribution to Joint Operations

1C2. Maritime power provides the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) with an enduring and flexible fighting capacity that can be employed from the open ocean or in the littoral environment, in benign to combat conditions, across the range of standing and contingent Military Tasks. The maritime contribution to joint operations consists principally of sea control, sea denial and maritime power projection, supported by a maritime Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability and sea-based logistics:

- a. **Sea Control.** Sea Control is the freedom of action to use an area of the surface, sub-surface and above-water environments for one's own purposes over a given period and, if necessary, to deny its use to an opponent. The early achievement and retention of a desired level of Sea Control will most likely be a prerequisite of a joint campaign.
- b. **Sea Denial.** Sea Denial is the condition, short of full Sea Control, that exists when an opponent is prevented from using an area of sea for his

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<sup>1</sup> The ability of maritime forces, through suitable positioning and force packaging, to exploit access and to have influence on events ashore disproportionately greater than the scale of force applied (BR 1806).

purposes.<sup>2</sup> At the operational level, this may be used to provide outer or flank defence for a force or area, or as a means of containing an adversary's capabilities. At the strategic level, sea denial may be used to deny an adversary his own ability to reinforce by sea or operate in certain areas.

c. **Maritime Power Projection.** Maritime Power Projection is the threat or use of maritime combat capabilities, at global range, to achieve effects in support of national policy objectives. It exploits sea control to achieve access to the littoral in order to deter or coerce an adversary or, if necessary, to project force ashore directly. Maritime fire power can be delivered ashore in the form of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) and Naval Gunfire Support. Maritime forces can also deliver Special Forces and can conduct Information Operations (Info Ops). Maritime forces may provide critical contribution to a joint campaign through their ability to project sea-based firepower in areas that are less accessible to land forces.<sup>3</sup>

## Functions

1C3. Sea control is the enabler for all aspects of maritime operations. However, a distinction can be made between the functions of maritime power *from the sea*, which broadly equate to power projection operations, and those *at sea*, to which sea control operations are focused. Power projection operations have an inherent relationship to joint operations, whereas some aspects of sea control may be purely naval in nature, but might contribute to joint operations.

1C4. **Types of Maritime Operations.** The Maritime Component will be task-organised to undertake the various types of maritime operations required for the conduct of a given mission, each encompassing and contributing to the full range of joint operations envisaged in the campaign plan (see Figure 1C.1). These types of maritime operations are described in detail in maritime tactical doctrine, and are inherently linked to the composite warfare functions discussed below; however, they can be drawn into 3 groups:

- a. **Military.** Armed force is used or threatened and pre-supposes a combat capability.
- b. **Constabulary.** Maritime forces used to enforce law or to implement a regime established by international mandate.

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<sup>2</sup> Mining is a classic application of sea denial.

<sup>3</sup> Amphibious operations are an important part of maritime power projection. There are 4 types of amphibious operations: Amphibious Assault, Amphibious Raid, Amphibious Withdrawal and Amphibious Demonstrations.

- c. **Benign.** Maritime forces can contribute specialised capabilities to a range of tasks in which violence has no part to play, nor is a necessary backdrop.


## Task Organisation

1C5. **Composite Warfare Commander.** Prosecution of maritime Military operations is undertaken through an applied combination of distinct Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) areas<sup>4</sup> or functions, the degree of effort in each depending on the size and scope of the operation (analogous to Teeth Arms within the Combined Arms approach in the Land Component). Elements of these Warfare Areas may be applicable to Constabulary Operations (such as the conduct of Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOPS)). Although warfighting skills are unlikely to be required in a benign situation, specific capabilities inherent to a particular warfare area can still be of critical benefit.

1C6. **Multinational Aspects.** The task organisation inherent in the Maritime Component, and widespread adherence to standardised maritime tactical procedures amongst Allied navies, permits integration of multinational naval and amphibious forces down to unit level. Standing naval forces, such as NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) may provide the nucleus of a larger multinational Naval Expanded Task Force (NETF). Other bilateral arrangements, such as the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force (UKNLAF), provide multinational maritime forces in being.

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<sup>4</sup> Anti-air Warfare, Anti-submarine Warfare, Anti-surface Warfare and Strike Warfare constitute the principal warfare areas. The other functional areas are: Naval Mine Warfare; Amphibious Warfare; Electronic and Acoustic Warfare and Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS).



NOTES:

1. TG 999.4 under OPCON the submarine operating authority, who may delegate TACOM to the MCC.
2. Logistics shipping is likely to be temporarily assigned throughout the Task Force elements for replenishment purposes.
3. The above Operational Task Organisation is also the basis of the Maritime Components TF/TG broadcasts and Strategic Communications Structure. Thus; when units are re-assigned their broadcast support structure will be re-configured accordingly

Figure 1C.1 - The Organisation of the Maritime Component

## Maritime Component Command and Control

1C7. Mission Command involving delegation of composite warfare functions to designated Principal Warfare Commanders (PWCs) is central to maritime Command and Control (C2). For a small naval Task Force, the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) may elect to perform certain functions directly through his own Maritime Component Headquarters (MCHQ) battlestaff,<sup>5</sup> but it is more likely he will delegate certain functions, with appropriate levels of tactical command or control, to the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC) of each selected Task Group or Task Unit making up a larger maritime force. With reference to Figure 1C.2, an OTC may then employ the following options for delegating specific warfare functions to subordinate PWCs:

- a. The OTC delegates to one subordinate PWC one or more warfare functions.
- b. The OTC delegates to more than one subordinate PWC several warfare functions.
- c. The OTC delegates to subordinates within geographic areas or sectors warfare functions relevant to that area.

Level of Command (TACOM)	<b>OFFICER IN TACTICAL COMMAND</b>				CWC Function
Warfare Command (TACON)	Composite Warfare Commander				CWC
	Principal Warfare Commanders				PWC
	Anti-Surface Warfare Commander ASUWC	Anti-Air Warfare Commander AAWC	Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander ASWC	Strike Warfare Commander SWC	
Tactical Control (as assigned by PWC)	Designated Functional Commanders E.g. Underway Replenishment Group (URG)				Functional Commanders
Assigned Co-ordination Function	Designated Co-ordinators E.g. EW Co-ordinator (EWC), Helicopter Element Co-ordinator (HEC)				Co-ordinators
Assigned Control Function	Designated Controllers E.g. Individual unit EW Controllers, Helicopter Controllers etc.				Controller

**Table 1C.2 - Maritime Composite Warfare Functions**

<sup>5</sup> The Fleet 2\* Battlestuffs (UK MARFOR and UKAMPHIBFOR) are standing HQs designed to execute comcomancy command.

1C8. **Command and Control of Amphibious Forces.** The command and control arrangements for amphibious forces may be based on one of 3 models:

- a. The Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and Commander Landing Force (CLF) are under the Operational Control (OPCON) of the MCC. This is the conventional model.
- b. The CATF is also the MCC. This may occur when the sole or primary maritime task is an amphibious operation.
- c. The CATF is under the direct OPCON of the JTFC as a component commander in his own right. This may be the case when the employment of the amphibious task force is considered to be of specific influence to the successful execution of the joint campaign. This might be as a result of the scale and/or complexity of the amphibious operations or the fact that amphibious operations lie on the main effort. In this case, C2 arrangements between the CATF and other component commanders must be clearly defined.

## SECTION II – THE LAND COMPONENT

### Characteristics

1C9. The UK doctrinal authority for land operations is ADP '*Land Operations*'. The number and variety of combatants, factions, non-combatants and other involved and interested parties, together with the potential for confusion, error and friction, is the dominating feature of operations on land. In most cases the object of the joint campaign will depend ultimately on an outcome on land. Thus the degree of complexity in the tasks allocated to Land forces demands an approach that is reliant on and positively encourages mission command, freedom of action, and initiative at every level.

1C10. An enemy is defeated primarily when he believes himself to be so. The core of British land doctrine is based on the premise that when violence is applied, it is applied suddenly, unexpectedly and in concentrated form. This creates shock and surprise which convinces local commanders that they have lost, or will lose. This effect is transient, though if exploited rapidly can have impact across the whole campaign.

1C11. Land forces must be equipped, trained and prepared to provide, on an independent or integrated basis, formations capable of tactical manoeuvre with the necessary combat power, to defeat or destroy the enemy. The UK believes that the minimum level of combined arms capability that can operate independently and

deliver these requirements is the division. In addition, it is recognised that a UK division will be supported by a Corps level framework.<sup>6</sup>

## Land Contribution to Joint Operations

1C12. The land contribution to joint operations consists principally of forces configured to conduct:

- a. **Ground Manoeuvre.** Ground manoeuvre is the combined effects of ground forces that enable the land commander to achieve tactical success across the spectrum of conflict.
- b. **Air Manoeuvre.** Air manoeuvre comprises those land elements that contribute directly to surface operations against an adversary using the air environment as their medium of employment or deployment.
- c. **Firepower.** Firepower's purpose is to destroy, neutralise, suppress and demoralise the adversary under all conditions, contributing to the undermining of his will, the shattering of his cohesion and denying him freedom of manoeuvre. It can achieve both lethal and non-lethal effects and will be closely tied to Joint Fires and to the Joint Effects Meeting (JEM) process that is operated within the JTFHQ. At the tactical level firepower is inextricably linked to manoeuvre, although precision weapons with increased range are increasing the scope to employ firepower to inflict selective destruction of key enemy capabilities before they can affect friendly forces.
- d. **Finding the Adversary.** Finding encompasses the effort taken to understand the adversary as well as those neutral actors present in the Area of Operations (AOO). This is achieved through the employment of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) linked to Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems and units.
- e. **Logistics.** Logistics provides combat service support to land forces, and other components and possibly agencies beyond the military. The provision of medical support is a key land logistic capability given the manpower intensive nature of land operations.
- f. **Mobility and Counter-mobility.** The requirement to enable mobility or to disable mobility (counter-mobility) can have a fundamental impact on the progress of operations and has varying relevance largely dependent upon the terrain and the nature of the operation.

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<sup>6</sup> Currently residing in the UK's command of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

g. **Protection.** While many of the force protection functions are satisfied as either a function of individual and team effort, or at the operational level, through the provision of capabilities such as Theatre Missile Defence (TMD), land forces also employ force elements to provide intimate protection. Examples include, Close Air Defence, protective Electronic Counter Measures and NBC Defence.

## Functions

1C13. The Land Component uses 4 core functions: to Find, to Fix, to Strike and to Exploit in a framework of Shaping, Decisive and Sustaining operations.<sup>7</sup> These may be consecutive or simultaneous, and apply across the full range of operational activity. Finding endures throughout operations and spans locating, identifying and assessing the adversary. Fixing is to deny the adversary his goals, or to distract him and thus deprive him of freedom of action, while ensuring one's own. Striking involves having the freedom of action to manoeuvre into a position of advantage from which force can be threatened or applied. Exploit operations express the ability to rapidly respond to a changed situation, probably not anticipated, which so long as the risk is deemed acceptable, can bring unexpected results.

1C14. The land environment demands, above all, a deployed presence that can be resource heavy, particularly in terms of manpower. Land forces, by their nature, have a limited stand-off capability, and their most enduring feature is their persistent ability to conduct close combat and to dominate ground.

## Task Organisation

1C15. The prosecution of land operations is characterised by its combined arms nature. That is, a mix of combat forces (such as infantry or armour), combat support forces (such as artillery or engineers) and combat service support forces (such as logistical or medical), held within a hierarchical command and control framework enabled by Communications and Information Systems (CIS). The Land Component Commander (LCC) will normally be organized by task, with combat, combat support and combat service support assets allocated as required.

1C16. **Multinational Aspects.** It is generally accepted in constructing Land components that the lowest level at which it can be multinationalised is brigade level, although greater multinationality is acceptable, where:

- a. A high degree of interoperability and/or confidence pre-exists such as with NATO Response Forces (NRF).
- b. Niche capabilities are being provided.

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<sup>7</sup> Deep, Close and Rear are now only used to refer to geographical areas.

- c. The assessed threat level and/or mission complexity is low.

### **Land Component Command and Control**

1C17. Mission command is an essential element of UK doctrine, which particularly lends itself to the command and control of land operations. Mission command requires a modular C2 structure which can allocate missions or tasks and provide resources, but does not micro-manage how the task is executed. However, this does mean that when required, commanders might have to impose constraints because of the operational situation, or to concentrate force and to synchronise combat support. Mission command negates the requirement for all but essential information to be passed up and down the chain of command so allowing appropriate decisions to be made rapidly on the spot under conditions of confusion and uncertainty.

1C18. **States of Command.** An important enabler for the effective command of land forces is the states of command.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, within the UK Land Component<sup>9</sup> **only**, a commander can re-designate the term Operational Command (OPCOM) as his higher level of command, thus enabling him to delegate OPCON, Tactical Command (TACOM) or Tactical Control (TACON), as appropriate, to subordinate commanders, who in turn, can delegate an appropriate tactical command state to lower formations and units.<sup>10</sup> Before a commander determines how he can employ subordinate formations he will wish to consider the following:

- a. Can he use them for any purpose or are there any caveats on their use (such as for a specified duration, task, or location)?
- b. Can he give them a mission?
- c. If the mission (the purpose of their employment) is not within their capability, can he give them other tasks within the given mission and can he direct its execution?
- d. Can he attach or detach units or sub units within the formation or unit or must he retain its integrity?

1C19. States of command must not be interpreted too narrowly or rigidly; a positive 'can-do' attitude by all concerned is paramount. During operations local commanders may have to use their initiative and could even break both the chain and states of command to ensure timely and effective action in unexpected circumstances. Their

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<sup>8</sup> See also Chapter 2, Paragraphs 202 – 205.

<sup>9</sup> Or UK contingent.

<sup>10</sup> Although the use of these terms by the UK Land Component/Contingent Commander (LCC) for tactical employment is outside NATO authority defined by NATO, it is made to work, and must not be prejudicial to the higher command arrangements or to inter-component relations.

only guidance will be their training, experience and understanding of their commander's intent.

## SECTION III – THE AIR COMPONENT

### Characteristics

1C20. The UK doctrinal authority for joint air operations is IJWP 3-30 '*Joint Air Operations*'. AP 3000 describes British Air Power Doctrine whilst Joint Force Air Component Headquarters (JFACHQ) Concept of Operations (CONOPS) describes the JFACHQ processes in detail. The air power characteristics of reach, ubiquity, speed of response and flexibility provided by the Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) give the joint force a potent capability. It is these very broad capabilities that require not only a good understanding of their employment attributes but also a different, more centralised command philosophy to maximise air power's impact across the whole of the joint battlespace. Air power:

- a. Usually encompasses forces drawn from all three Services and from other nations who share a very high degree of interoperability.
- b. Is concerned with effective exploitation of air power assets.
- c. Is supported by national and commercial resources.
- d. Is influenced by, and in turn influences, the land, maritime and space environments.

### The Air Contribution to Joint Operations


1C21. The JTFC will normally assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of air assets and the ability to effectively plan, task and control joint air operations. Dependent on the scale of the operation, the JFACC will vary from a 3\* at large scales of effort to an OF-5 for minor operations. The nominated JFACC will need an equipped and trained staff and this is usually the UK JFACHQ, a HQ Strike Command (HQ STC) unit, that is a standing cadre of air C2 experts ready to provide the core of a deployable air component HQ. As well as providing experts on the processes and execution of air power, the JFACHQ staff will be fully conversant with the 5 basic core air power missions:<sup>11</sup> Air Reconnaissance and Surveillance, Air Defence, Counter Land/Sea Operations, Air mobility and Combat Support Air Operations.

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<sup>11</sup> Developed in detail in AP3000 (3rd Edition) '*British Air Power Doctrine*'.

**Functions**

1C22. The structure for the JFACHQ is illustrated at Figure 1C.3 and shows the HQ’s five functional elements: Strategy, Intelligence, Combat Plans, Combat Ops and Support. Short-term planning is undertaken by Combat Plans, Combat Ops and Intelligence. Collectively these divisions combine to form the Joint Air Operations Centre (JAOC). Long-range planning is undertaken by the Strategy Division and includes the production of the Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP), which describes the JFACC’s contribution to the joint campaign, and the Air Operations Directive (AOD) which gives regular detailed guidance and focus to the JAOC. The remaining elements conduct support and management functions. Key liaison with the other components occurs by 2 means: JFACC representation within other components is provided by airmen within an Air Operations Coordination Centre (AOCC), e.g. AOCC (Land) for JFLCC, and AOCC (Maritime) for JFMCC. Other component representation to the JFACC is provided by similar liaison elements e.g. Battlefield Coordination Detachment (BCD) from the JFLCC, and Maritime Co-ordination Element (MCE) from the JFMCC (see Annex 2F). Also, each component commander provides a personal representative to other Component Commanders (CCs) to assist senior liaison.



**Figure 1C.3 - JFACHQ Core Structure**

## Task Organisation

1C23. The JFACHQ sits centrally within a dispersed structure. Flying squadrons (usually between 6-24 aircraft) are normally brigaded into Wings located on supporting Deployment Operating Bases (DOBs). Tasking is direct to the Wings thereby maximising the benefits of centralised planning. Air assets from various Wings/DOBs will form a task-orientated group in order to fulfil a specific mission(s) in accordance with the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Each 24 hour period will see different combinations of air assets configured to best fulfil the tasks as emphasis and demand on air assets changes across the battlespace; this demands maximum flexibility from air assets and joint standardisation.

## Air Component Command and Control

1C24. The characteristics of air power, already described, impact on the leadership style within the air environment. Although all personnel involved in air operations may be attacked, only a small minority (aircrew) directly and regularly engages in combat or are placed in harms way. Therefore these tactical air commanders must be able to lead ground-based support personnel, and must be capable of inspiring aircrew by demonstrating technical skill and personal courage in the air. At more senior levels of command, air leaders are isolated from the immediate air action by the centralisation of planning that the efficient use of air power demands, fostering what can be perceived as a '*remote style of leadership*'.<sup>12</sup>

1C25. **The Air Planning Cycle.** The principal air control mechanism is the ATO supported by the associated Air Co-ordination Order (ACO) developed and published by the JACC. The cycle can be anything from 48 hours (UK JFACHQ SOP) to 72 hours (for large-scale operations). Although it is a formal planning cycle, it is designed to accept and cope with alterations and changes at any stage, including Time Sensitive Targeting (TST) tasks. The ATO represents a single day's snapshot of the long-term plan and must, therefore, reflect the JAOP, the current situation, the JTFC/JFACC's latest guidance, and the immediate needs of the other components. It is critical that the JAOP is aligned to the JTFC's Campaign Plan and is fully co-ordinated with the other components through proper representation at the Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB) and the Joint Effects Meetings (JEM).<sup>13</sup> Great emphasis is placed on liaison staffs to represent their respective commanders at the various stages of the cycle. The ATO captures in one document all air activity down to the lower tactical level by detailing units to tasks and targets. Such in-depth deliberate centralised planning best enables the effective and efficient delivery of air power. Air force assets are not generally held in reserve although sortie capacity may be intentionally restrained to allow surge as well as flexibility and response to the unexpected though

<sup>12</sup> A G B, Vallance, '*The Air Weapon*'.

<sup>13</sup> See Chapter 3.

modifications to tasking to be made at any stage of the process, including airborne re-tasking.

## SECTION IV – THE SPECIAL FORCES COMPONENT

### Characteristics

1C26. The UK doctrinal authority for Special Forces (SF) is JWP 3-40 '*Special Forces Operations*' (RESTRICTED UK EYES ONLY). UK SF conduct operations in peace, tension or war, in order to support the achievement of strategic and/or operational objectives. They are specially selected, trained, equipped and organised to be inserted by sea, land or air and operate in hostile territory and can be isolated from the main combat forces.

### The Special Forces Contribution to Joint Operations

1C27. The SF Component generally has greater agility (having some integral force projection assets) than the other components and can deliver precision actions, with extended reach and endurance, in order to achieve military, political and economic objectives of the highest value. SF forces can have a direct influence at all levels of war. The SF Component will provide appropriate headquarters, units and liaison Staff to plan and conduct operations either as a part of the Joint Force or discretely, and will establish and maintain inter-agency relationships with other government departments (OGDs). SF operations are by their nature complex and potentially high risk but can offer disproportional gains if appropriately tasked and employed. They can also generate their own bespoke command and control, intelligence, legal and Rules of Engagement (ROE) requirements, dependent on tasking. When operating with main combat forces, they are best employed in support of a main effort, either to enable main forces to achieve a result or to extend the capability of these forces.

### Functions

1C28. SF have 3 principal functions, which are equally applicable in any theatre, conflict or confrontation. Each can be used in isolation or to complement another:

- a. **Surveillance and Reconnaissance.** SF conduct covert Surveillance and Reconnaissance (SR) by land or sea in a static or mobile role. They can provide timely information to political and military decision-makers and commanders. This contributes to the overall intelligence picture and may provide collateral for information from other Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systems or be used to cue ISR systems to confirm technical intelligence or to trigger interdiction. SF may provide a more appropriate means of obtaining information due to hostile terrain or climate and by developing information from human contact. Where ambiguity exists

SF can provide 'ground truth'. SF have the ability to reach and communicate with civilians and indigenous forces in order to gather information.

b. **Offensive Action.** Offensive Action operations are designed to achieve a tailored and precisely focused effect with minimum collateral damage. The effect can be physical or psychological. Actions are directed against high value strategic or operational targets, which may be well protected and will therefore require covert infiltration or special techniques to gain access. Offensive Action operations may be conducted by SF units varying from patrol to multiple squadrons in strength, either independently or supported by conventional forces. Offensive Action includes Counter Terrorist (CT) operations conducted in support of the civil power.

c. **Support and Influence.** Support and Influence (SI) operations are often conducted in support of the work of OGDs, or as part of a wider initiative to achieve political or military objectives. The role encompasses: training tasks in support of Foreign and Defence Policy; the support and/or influence of 'third parties' within the operational environment (e.g. forward presence, training and liaison with allies and other relevant parties); 'hearts and minds' support for and influence of indigenous populations; raising, training and supporting indigenous forces; and Information Operations (Info Ops). Although SF operations are normally conducted covertly the product may be used to support the Government's Information Campaign. The SI role also includes any other tasks that support Government objectives and the JTFC's Campaign Plan.

### **Special Force Component Command and Control**

1C29. The limited number of SF means that they would normally only be employed on high value tasks where the use of regular forces would be inappropriate. Command of SF will always be retained at the highest appropriate level to ensure best use of available resources. Regular elements of the 3 Services are also earmarked to support SF operations. Where assets are assigned to SF for operations, OPCON, TACOM or TACON may be delegated to the Special Forces Component Commander (SFCC) by the JTFC, as appropriate. If C2 were not transferred to the SFCC, then Direct Liaison Authority (DIRLAUTH) would normally be given between SF and earmarked units to ensure close co-operation during mission planning and execution.

1C30. **Command of Special Forces.** In Joint Operations SF C2 will be conducted at one of 2 levels. Operations may be mounted by the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) using SF assigned by Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) or a SF Component may be assigned

to a JTF.<sup>14</sup> OPCOM of assigned SF will normally be delegated to the Jt Comd (normally Commander Joint Operations (CJO)) in accordance with the CDS Directive and exercised through Director Special Forces (DSF) as Comd SF. Where appropriate, OPCON may be delegated to a designated national, NATO or UN SF Commander and exercised through a SFCC. OPCON will normally be delegated to the JTFC when SF tasks fall within his JOA. In turn, the JTFC would normally delegate TACOM or in certain circumstances OPCON, to the Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC) who is responsible for all aspects of SF Operations.

**1C31. The Responsibilities of the Special Forces Component Commander.** The responsibilities of the JFSFCC include, but are not limited to planning, co-ordination, allocation, and tasking SF based on the JTFC's CONOPS. Specific JFSFCC responsibilities include:

- a. Acting as a JTFC in his own right drawing together elements from other components in undertaking a primarily SF operation.
- b. Contributing to the JTFC's estimate and develop, maintain and implement SF operations to best support the JTFC's campaign plan.
- c. Act as a supported or supporting commander as directed by the JTFC.
- d. Provide functional advice to the JTFC on the correct employment of SF and contribute to the Joint Operations Planning Group (JOPG), JCB and JEM process.
- e. Co-ordinate with the other CCs to ensure unity of effort.
- f. Exercise C2 of assigned SF and other assets assigned by the JTFC.

**1C32. The Joint Force Special Forces Component Headquarters.** The JFSFC HQ would normally be deployed alongside a JTFHQ either embarked or ashore. In UK joint operations it is likely to collocate with the JTFHQ. In multinational operations, it would form part of the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF),<sup>15</sup> normally with a liaison party at the JTFHQ. Although the JFSFC HQ could be deployed independently it would require logistic support and has only a limited step-up capability. The specific responsibilities of the JFSFC HQ include:

- a. Deploying, sustaining and recovering SF TGs.

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<sup>14</sup> In certain circumstances SF may conduct operations, under the direct control of MOD, which will be conducted under OPCOM of DSF who is responsible to CDS through DCDS(C).

<sup>15</sup> The JFSFC HQ is a joint SF HQ established to control SF in a specific JOA or to accomplish a specific mission. When a JFSFC is formed or augmented by one or more foreign SF units, the designation becomes CJSOTF. UKSF have the ability to act as the framework nation for a CJSOTF.

- b. Issuing planning guidance, analysing course of action (CoA), developing CONOPS, identifying and securing SF supporting assets.
- c. Ensuring ROE are appropriate to the mission and request changes where necessary.
- d. Approving, controlling, de-conflicting and monitoring the execution and sustainment of SF operations and evaluating the results.
- e. Placing co-ordinating teams in the requisite headquarters and nominating LOs to serve on the JTFC's staff.

1C33. **Task Organisation.** The UK JFSFCC can command up to 3 SF Task Groups (SFTG) within the JOA. Each SF TG is led by a SF unit commander supported by his HQ and consists of a number of SF sub-units task-organised for the mission.

## **SECTION V – THE LOGISTIC COMPONENT**

### **Characteristics**

1C34. The UK doctrinal authority for Joint Logistics operations is JWP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*'. A Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) is a command and control headquarters, normally, but not exclusively, based on an existing framework HQ charged with executing the Joint Logistic Plan (JLP) on behalf of the JTFC to achieve maximum logistic efficiency in common areas for all components, in order to optimise the logistic footprint, prevent undue stress on the Coupling Bridge and guarantee logistic capability in the JOA'.<sup>16</sup>

### **The Logistic Component Contribution to Joint Operations**

1C35. The requirement for a JFLogC is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. However a joint approach to logistics provides the best opportunity of achieving flexibility and balanced support with limited UK logistic assets thinly spread between the Services. Fundamentally, a JFLogC provides a means of co-ordinating logistic activity into and within the JOA. A JFLogC also provides a joint logistics staff, who can assist tactical level requirements across the JTF, and also a HQ that can command units allocated to it, forming a component. On the one hand, the staff is in a position to co-ordinate the 3 separate Services logistic systems and on the other hand, can plan joint logistic operations such as Reception, Staging, Onward Movement (RSOM), or logistic realignment in the context of redeployment or changes tasks. For these

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<sup>16</sup> Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense it is those aspects of military operations that deal with: design, development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposal of material; transport of personnel; acquisition, construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; acquisition and furnishing of services; medical health and support. (AAP 6)

reasons, a key logistic principle is that joint assets are controlled at the highest appropriate level.

## Functions

1C36. The Joint Force Logistic Component Commander (JFLogCC) has responsibility for:

- a. Producing logistic input to the campaign plan.
- b. Controlling intra-JOA logistic support in accordance with the JTFC's priorities by activation, and maintenance of a robust distribution and control web within the JOA.
- c. Maximising logistic efficiencies and economies of scale. Increasingly, the value of Joint Sea Based logistics is gaining in importance because of its inherent flexibility and scale.
- d. Exercising OPCON/TACOM of any AOO<sup>17</sup> allocated to him by the JTFC (including the maintenance of security).
- e. Contributing to the JTFHQ J1/J4 staff's operational estimate process where necessary.
- f. C2 of all APOD/SPOD within the JOA.
- g. Co-ordinating 3<sup>rd</sup> line resources within the JOA.
- h. Managing the medical infrastructure.
- i. Providing strategic MEDEVAC for the JTF.

## Task Organisation

1C37. Figure 1C.5 illustrates a typical structure for a 'large-scale' JFLogC, encapsulating the scope of its responsibilities:

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<sup>17</sup> Subject to a rear area threat assessment, the JFLogCC could be allocated an AOO but will require sufficient forces to satisfy both his security and his support functions.



## Logistic Component Command and Control

1C38. The UK does not maintain a dedicated standby JFLogC HQ. Therefore the requirement for, and composition of a JFLogC, including its commander, must be determined early in the planning cycle. The JFLogC HQ might be selected from a range of existing headquarters such as, on the smaller side, the Commando Logistic Regiment HQ, extending up to, for large operations, a Logistic Brigade HQ, another Service logistic HQ, or a bespoke organisation put together specifically for the operation.<sup>18</sup> Whatever structure is chosen requires substantial augmentation from tri-Service logisticians and it must remain focused on JOA-wide activity, and should not be drawn into the provision of support to one component to the detriment of others. Where risk exists of this occurring, the Joint Force Element Table (JFET) should be adjusted to provide additional component support.<sup>19</sup>

1C39. **The Selection of a Joint Force Logistic Component Commander.** Ideally a JFLogCC will have had previous experience of working in a JFLogC. However, it is likely at small and medium scale that he will be picked by virtue of his present command appointment in one of the stand-by logistic units or headquarters. However, at large-scale, the choice will reflect a combination of his availability, the type of operation and what seniority is required commensurate with the logistic effort being provided. On multinational operations, the JFLogCC is also likely to assume the role of head of the UK National Support Element (NSE).

1C40. **UK Logistics within a Multinational Context.** When undertaking logistic planning the default is to consider how the UK will support its deployed force elements alone. In most multinational operations, even alliance operations, it is always assumed logistic support is a national responsibility. However, pragmatism dictates that opportunities to exploit economies of scale will soon materialise, particularly as a multinational operation containing many nations would be correspondingly logistically excessive. Contributions to multinational logistics could be standardised, perhaps by following NATO models, but are more likely to be ad hoc.<sup>20</sup> For this reason, it is one of the key considerations at early force provider meetings for the DCOS or the JFLogCC if he has been chosen, to seek maximum opportunity to find economies and reduce duplication.<sup>21</sup> The commander of the JFLogC/NSE will need to determine precise logistic command relationships externally with coalition partners and internally between the UK components, as well as with any deployed contractors.

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<sup>18</sup> Increasingly, the PJHQ is being used to form the nucleus of a JFLogC.

<sup>19</sup> For example, a JFLogC should not also be expected to undertake a full Land component 3<sup>rd</sup> line support role without the proper resourcing of staff and assets.

<sup>20</sup> **Role Specialisation.** The responsibility assumed by one nation to procure a particular class of supply or service for all or a part of the multinational force, subject to agreements between the parties involved on compensation and/or reimbursement.

<sup>21</sup> Without compromising Fully Integrated, Framework or Lead Nation status.

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## CHAPTER 2 – FORMING THE FORCE

The purpose of Chapter 2 is to describe the 2 broad models for UK operational level HQs: where the UK is in command - a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and where the UK is a contributing nation - a National Contingent Headquarters (NCHQ). It sets out what staff and functional activity occurs and how these are integrated, including the relationship with the strategic level, Components and national contingents, so the COS can bind together a robust and flexible Joint Task Force (JTF) necessary for the operation at hand.

Section I – Foundations for Command and the Headquarters

Section II – The UK Generic Joint Task Force Headquarters

Section III – UK as a Contributing Nation

Section IV – Joint Enabling and Operations Support Activities

Section V – Integrating the Components

### SECTION I – FOUNDATIONS FOR COMMAND AND THE HEADQUARTERS

*‘The joint forces’ application of doctrinal fundamentals facilitates an operational and tactical environment that reduces self-induced friction and fosters inventiveness and creativity. Joint doctrine frees commanders from having to negotiate basic ground rules every time joint forces are assembled for combat. When participants understand and adhere to the fundamentals, the result is a cohesive fighting force’.*<sup>1</sup>

201. The UK has international responsibilities that might mean having to take unilateral military action under a stand-alone UK Joint Task Force (JTF). A more complex situation would be the formation of a multinational JTF led by the UK. While both of these models are valid, recent experience, as well as UK Defence Planning Assumptions, recognise the UK is more likely to provide a significant stand-alone force to a JTF led by another nation. This will either be through existing alliance arrangements or increasingly, at large scale, led by the US, with a senior UK officer as a National Contingent Commander (NCC). Nevertheless, and because it covers the widest remit, the example of a UK Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) leading a multinational force will be used as the principal model throughout JWP 3-00 ‘Joint Operations Execution’. Where significant variations occur with respect to other options, these are explained.

<sup>1</sup> A non-attributed expression of the value of operational doctrine.

## Command Architecture

202. **The NATO Model.** The UK and many of her potential military partners adhere to the standard ‘default’ NATO model for command, and its definitions; Operational Command (OPCOM) (which is held by the Joint Commander) and Operational Control (OPCON) referring to the operational level, and Tactical Command (TACOM) and Tactical Control (TACON) to the tactical level.<sup>2</sup> Annex 2A provides a comparison of the different command authorities using NATO and US terms. However, interpretation over the degree of authority implied by each state of command in the NATO system differs markedly between nations and services and, like any aspect of doctrine, it is subject to flexible interpretation by the key personalities in the Chain of Command at the time. What matters is that both superior and subordinate commanders need to be absolutely clear about any restrictions on the use of allocated force elements and to be pragmatic about what needs to be achieved to realise the commander’s intent. It should be noted that for NATO Article 5 operations, OPCOM of UK forces will be passed to the nominated NATO commander.<sup>3</sup> For NATO non-Article 5 operations only, OPCOM of UK forces will usually be retained by the UK and held by the Joint Commander (Jt Comd). Although dependent on the nature of the operation, in most cases OPCON or TACOM/TACON of UK forces will normally be passed to the appropriate NATO commander.

203. **Non-NATO Command Arrangements.** For national operations, and non-NATO multinational operations where the UK is in command, the general Command and Control (C2) architecture and doctrine will mirror the NATO model, with the UK JTFC or NCC being selected from the Joint Force Command Group (JFCG).<sup>4</sup> These commanders will, in turn, normally pass TACOM to the multinational or national Component Commanders (CCs).<sup>5</sup> It should be noted that, when a National Contingent Headquarters (NCHQ) is deployed, the division of responsibilities with the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) can become complicated, and can best be illustrated through the drawing up of a matrix (An example is at Figure 2.1). When working under US command, further constitutional complications arise because of the direct strategic links that US Combatant Commanders have with their National Command

<sup>2</sup> At all times, the UK retains Full Command of UK forces. For the definition of these command states refer to JWP 0-01.1 ‘UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions’.

<sup>3</sup> Although not identical, the EU model has considerable similarities with the NATO system. For more information on both models refer to JWP 5-00 ‘Joint Operations Planning’.

<sup>4</sup> In the UK there are 22 officers permanently earmarked on the Joint Force Command Group (JFCG). This is maintained to provide a pool of potential JTFCs/NCCs, component or contingent commanders, with the final selection of a UK JTFC or NCC being made by CDS.

<sup>5</sup> However, within the UK Land Component/Contingent **only**, it is considered that its hierarchy of command (from component, through corps, to division and down to sub-units) makes the tactical level NATO command states of TACOM and TACON too restrictive. Therefore, the UK Land Component or land Contingent Commander (LCC) re-designates the term OPCOM as his higher level of command, enabling him to delegate OPCON, TACOM or TACON, as appropriate, to subordinate commanders, who in turn can delegate an appropriate tactical command state to lower formations and units. The use of these terms by the UK LCC for his specific purposes must however, be in no way prejudicial to the higher command arrangements.

Authority,<sup>6</sup> making it important the UK identifies early where influence needs to be applied in order to match responsiveness in decision-making. However, the major considerations when deciding on, and subsequently adjusting, the command and control architecture both external to and within the JTF are explained in Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (JDP 01) ‘*Joint Operations*’ and are listed below. They are interlinked and are not necessarily exhaustive:

- a. **The Problem.** The scale, nature, range and likely duration of the operation, including the number and status of other concurrent operations.
- b. **Influence.** Where and how best to apply influence, to allies but also to key decision-makers at home.
- c. **Command.** Where and how best to exercise command of the JTF or the UK’s contribution, within the UK’s command philosophy.
- d. **Communications.** What the capacity of the available Communication and Information Systems (CIS) assets is. Whatever is decided, communications should enable, not emasculate, the exercise of command.

PJHQ		NCHQ
Strategic.....Operational.....Tactical <sup>7</sup>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The Joint Commander commands all UK forces.</li> </ul>	<b>Command and Control</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National command of UK forces in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) in the execution of authorised tasks within the Joint Commander’s intent.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planning for the deployment, sustainment and recovery of UK forces.</li> <li>• Brief Mil Strategic authority.</li> <li>• Obtain agreement to changes in agreed UK tasks.</li> </ul>	<b>Planning</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Influence Coalition activity and integrate national effort into campaign planning.</li> <li>• Identify changes to agreed UK tasks.</li> <li>• Scope change and confirm with the Joint Commander.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fusion with all intelligence agencies.</li> <li>• Analysis of JOA assessments.</li> </ul>	<b>Intelligence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integration with JTFC J2</li> <li>• JOA analysis.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Operational logistic direction.</li> <li>• C2 of the coupling bridge.</li> <li>• Complete the detailed deployment plan.</li> </ul>	<b>Logistics</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implement the logistical direction set by PJHQ.</li> <li>• Provide the Joint Desired Order of Arrival Staff Table.</li> </ul>

<sup>6</sup> The President of the USA and the US Secretary of Defense. This is explained in JWP 5-00, Annex 1D.

<sup>7</sup> On a multinational operation, the tactical command of UK forces will normally be passed to the coalition CC.

<b>PJHQ</b>		<b>NCHQ</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Direct the FLCs and DLO to deploy the JTF according to the Joint Desired Order of Arrival (JDOA) as specified by the JTFC.</li> </ul>		(JDOAST) as specified by the JTFC to PJHQ. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>During the sustainment phase of the operation, direct priorities for the use of the coupling bridge.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interpret MOD policy.</li> <li>Issue overall J1 direction.</li> <li>Interface with MOD and FLCs.</li> </ul>	<b>Personnel</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Implement personnel policy.</li> <li>J1 Direction to UK forces.</li> <li>Staff JOA issues.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Merges MOD clinical policy with operational medical support policy.</li> <li>Hold operational clinical governance and clinical audit policy.</li> <li>Interface with FLCs.</li> </ul>	<b>Medical</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Responsible for health of deployed UK force.</li> <li>Staff JOA issues as they arise.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Co-ordinates all JOA bookings.</li> </ul>	<b>J8</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Manage budget for NCHQ.</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Routine direction and guidance.</li> <li>Listening watch.</li> <li>Longer term media strategy.</li> </ul>	<b>Media</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Nexus of operational level media.</li> <li>Release authority.</li> <li>Work directly to MOD in parallel with PJHQ (high profile consequence management only).</li> </ul>
<i>DEPLOY, SUSTAIN and RECOVER FORCES</i>		<i>EMPLOY FORCES</i>

**Table 2.1 - Comparison of Responsibilities between the PJHQ and NCHQ**

**204. Multinational Integration within a Joint Task Force Headquarters.**

Chapter 1 explained that a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) could be formed from any deployable UK headquarters. Whilst modifying a selected headquarters should only be done where it makes good operational sense, having a multinational JTFHQ is often politically essential. However, the unfamiliarity this brings has inherent risk, introducing inefficiency, reducing tempo and potentially exposing opportunities for exploitation by a potential adversary. It should not be underestimated that multinational operations present significant challenges for a JTFC and to succeed, there needs both to be an effective command system and an

intelligence network that can securely share appropriate information between all partners.

205. **Supported and Supporting Command Relationships.** The principal way a JTFC expresses his requirement for broad order tactical level cross-component coordination is by designating CCs as either supported or supporting commanders:

a. **Supported Commander.** A supported commander has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by higher authority.<sup>8</sup> The commander of the supported component will indicate in detail to the supporting CCs, through the JTFC, the support he needs, taking account of the normal operational procedures of the supporting component. He will provide the information needed for complete co-ordination of the supporting action with the action of his own component.<sup>9</sup>

b. **Supporting Commander.** A supporting commander provides capability or other support to a supported commander, or develops a supporting plan. In particular he will:

- (1) Provide support to the supported component as directed by the JTFC and in accordance with the main effort.
- (2) Ascertain the requirements of the supported component and take such actions to fulfil those that are within his capabilities.
- (3) Advise the JTFC and supported CC on:
  - (a) The availability and most appropriate employment of his own component assets.
  - (b) The capabilities and limitations of his own component.
  - (c) The priorities for the accomplishment of competing tasks.
- (4) The supporting CC would normally direct the operational tactics and associated activities of the supporting elements of his component.

Supported/supporting relationships have a dynamic nature and the majority will change during the campaign or even during the course of an operation. In a non-contiguous battlespace, a CC may, on different Lines of Operation, be the supporting commander to several other CCs and act as a supported commander concurrently.

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<sup>8</sup> AJP-01 'Allied Joint Doctrine'.

<sup>9</sup> The JTFC will decide which activity being undertaken by the JTF is his Main Effort (ME). This then allows the COS to make the correct decisions concerning the allocation of resources.

206. **The Commander.** The JTFC is a selected commander, vested with the ultimate responsibility for the success of a nominated multinational or national operation. While a NCC does not share this same degree of responsibility, he nonetheless has a vital national role to perform, particularly in influencing the JTFC. The JTFC, his role, his responsibilities, and where he derives his direction from are explained in JDP 01. UK operational level commanders will, at least, have held previous appointments as CCs, or as commanders of a UK contingent element of another nation's component.<sup>10</sup> They will almost certainly have held several joint and/or multinational posts in command, be graduates of the Higher Command and Staff Course (HCSC), be in command appointments, and have been specifically trained for the role when selected. All those subordinate to the JTFC need to appreciate the nature of the operational level, particularly in multinational operations, which will almost certainly mean the JTFC will spend considerable periods away from the JTFHQ. The force of the commander's personality, leadership, command style and general behaviour will have a direct bearing on the morale, sense of direction and performance of his staff. Thus the JTFC should:

- a. Set standards and be clear as to what is expected from their staff. The duty of the staff, at any level, is to state the truth and to propose practical solutions.
- b. Create and maintain an environment that encourages his staff to think independently as well as laterally, to take the initiative, and to ensure they understand that they also serve those in subordinate headquarters.
- c. Create a climate where there is mutual loyalty and respect rather than one which is sycophantic and unquestioning. In other words, have the ability to tolerate 'loyal opposition'.
- d. Foster a sense of involvement in decision-making and shared commitment, empowering when appropriate. The JTFC should pay particular attention to the delegated authority and responsibility within the core team (Chief of Staff (COS), Deputy COS (DCOS), Political/Policy Advisor (POLAD) and Deputy Commander if one is present).

207. **Deputy Commander.** The UK military command model does not routinely recognise the requirement for deployable deputy commanders,<sup>11</sup> relying instead on selecting another commander within the JTF when required. However, some nations do appoint them, and they have the following characteristics:

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<sup>10</sup> Depending on the size and importance of an operation a UK JTFC can be anything in rank from 4\* to 1\*, even, potentially, OF5.

<sup>11</sup> Less some tactical level formations with specialist roles (3 Commando Bde and 16 Air Assault Bde).

- a. The deputy will not have the same executive power or decision-making ability as the JTFC, thus needs to remain in regular contact with him. What authority the deputy is given must be clearly delineated by the JTFC, and be known to the staff.
- b. A deputy provides continuity and a senior focus for when the JTFC is away from the HQ. This necessity increases in accordance with the size of the operation,<sup>12</sup> the degree of multinationality, and the number of non-military participants involved.
- c. The deputy should be senior in appointment to the CCs. Often the US selects the next incumbent to the senior post to fulfil the role of the deputy for a while to ease transition prior to his appointment.
- d. The deputy should attempt to hold no other conflicting responsibilities, and thus is in an ideal position to advise the JTFC.
- e. The deputy will not necessarily be from the lead or framework nation. In these circumstances, and when the opportunity presents itself, the UK would seek to fill this influential appointment.

### **The Purpose of the Staff**

208. The purpose of the JTFHQ staff is no different from that of the staff in any other headquarters, in that they are principally an aid to command, ensuring the co-ordination of forces allocated to the JTFC.<sup>13</sup> They also have an important role in keeping higher command authorities informed of what is going on, as well as representing the interests of the components. It is a binding principle, even on multinational operations, that all activity across the JTF is undertaken on behalf of the JTFC. In more detail the role of the staff, through the COS, is described below.

209. **Role within the Joint Task Force Headquarters.** The staff provides informed advice to the JTFC, allowing him to make properly informed decisions, and in exercising his command. The staff effort is focused on 4 primary functions:

- a. **Assisting Integration.** Through the COS, the staff assists the JTFC by proactively enabling the integration process. In this respect, the permanent members of the HQ have particular responsibility for instilling unity of effort from multinational and augmentation staff.

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<sup>12</sup> For example a US 4\* Combatant Commander (COCOM) might have several JTFs in his regional area, perhaps the most important of which he will be the JTFC for, but all requiring his involvement.

<sup>13</sup> The UK makes a fundamental distinction between the responsibilities held by staff officers and those held by commanders. For example the heads of Jt Force Communications and Information Systems (JFCIS) and Jt Force Engineers will give JOA-wide advice to the JTFC but will not command forces within the components.

- b. **Planning.** Although planning will be focused around the J5 Division, all of the staff have a planning responsibility, either by directly assisting in the formation and development of the Campaign Plan or in conducting specialist planning within their discrete areas of responsibility.
- c. **Monitoring and Co-ordination.** The staffs monitor the implementation of orders and provide feedback to the JTFC in order to enable timely decision-making and planning, whilst keeping higher and parallel<sup>14</sup> headquarters abreast of the situation. The staff gathers, processes, and presents information to the JTFC, allowing him to make properly informed decisions. The Staff then produce and disseminate the necessary co-ordination measures, normally in the form of the orders and instructions that control the execution of the campaign.
- d. **Taking Decisions.** While the JTFC is not the sole decision-maker in the JTFHQ, the staff must have clear guidance about what decisions have been delegated, and to whom. By devolving authority and aspects of decision-making, the JTFC can concentrate on the essential decisions appropriate to his level, and be shielded from routine business.

### The Standing Joint Force Headquarters

210. **Elements.** The standing UK JFHQ, which provides a basic model for the nucleus of a JTFHQ/NCHQ, comprises the following elements:

- a. **Command and Staff Element.** A permanent staff cadre of about 55 joint staff officers, clerical and admin support staff, led by a 1\* Chief of Joint Force Operations (CJFO).
- b. **Command Support Element.** The command support element provides strategic communications, command and information services, as well as the expeditionary portable life support infrastructure and Force Protection for the JTFHQ.
- c. **Intelligence Support Element.** The intelligence element provides a secure intelligence facility with an analysis capability and access to strategic intelligence sources.

### The Selection of UK Joint Task Force Headquarters

211. **Models.** The possible concurrency of operations demands a flexible approach when selecting JTFHQs, ensuring that reliable back filling arrangements are in place. The UK recognises 5 principal models:

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<sup>14</sup> National Contingent Headquarters and any contingent provided.

<b>Model A</b>	A small, stand-alone headquarters comprising some or all of the standing JFHQ.	This is the default HQ model for small-scale operations, such as that used for East Timor.
<b>Model B</b>	The standing JFHQ augmented as necessary from PJHQ, the Commands and/or the JFHQ Augmentation Manning List (AML). This model is usually regarded as the default setting for a UK operational level HQ.	The model used for the NCHQ for Op TELIC, based in Qatar. (If circumstances dictate the deployed HQ might take on the functionality of PJHQ (Forward)).
<b>Model C</b>	A single-Service deployable HQ with integrated JFHQ staff and reinforced with augmentees as necessary.	The example used for 3 (UK) Div as HQ ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan.
<b>Model D</b>	A single-Service HQ capable of adapting into a JTFHQ/NCC, principally of a single-Service nature, or where concurrency considerations dictate the need for backfilling the JFHQ.	As used for the 19 (Mech) Bde deployment on Op KEELING, Sierra Leone.
<b>Model E</b>	A bespoke HQ specifically designed for one operation, drawing staff from all 3 Services as required.	Such as HQ IMATT in Sierra Leone.

**Table 2.2 – JTFHQ Models**

212. **Types of UK Joint Task Force Headquarters.** The size and shape of the headquarters will be largely defined by the mission, as well as reflecting the preference of the nominated JTFC/NCC, advised by his COS. The speed of deployment will be balanced against the staff effort required to cope with the situation. This often results in a phased deployment. Multinational and joint operations create a plethora of routine staffing issues easily capable of distracting the principal staff. Thus, a fine balance exists between the attractions of leanness and the necessity of size. There are 2 broad types of HQ:

- a. A generic UK led multinational or national JTFHQ. An illustrative template is at Annex 2B and is described at Section II.
- b. The UK as a participating nation, providing a NCHQ. An illustrative template is at Annex 2C and is described at Section III.

## SECTION II – THE UK GENERIC JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

213. The following section describes the first of the 2 broad options for the design of a UK JTFHQ, the one where the UK is in command. Except for the final paragraph it assumes the HQ will be multinational.

### The Basic Structure

214. **Location of the Headquarters.** A JTFC will clearly exercise command from the place he feels he can best influence events. Usually this will be in the vicinity of the region that operations will take place, namely in the JOA. NCCs from contributing nations will place themselves alongside the JTFC, who will consider a list of factors in determining the optimum location of his HQ, including:

- a. The nature of the operation.
- b. The need to influence regional political leadership.
- c. The ability to reach-back to higher HQs. In principle, so long as sufficient capacity exists as well as a robust information management capability, then reach-back from a smaller forward headquarters offers potentially significant economies in HQ footprint and consequently wider choice in selecting a suitable location.
- d. The protection of his HQ.
- e. The need for routine contact with a variety of important locally based international and military agencies including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (IOs).
- f. Local Infrastructure and Facilities.<sup>15</sup> The JTFC may have to establish the JTFHQ on a suitably equipped warship for those occasions when the operation is essentially maritime or amphibious in nature, or when the infrastructure ashore is unsuitable. The JTFHQ may also be established afloat as a preliminary measure in advance of other elements of the JTF arriving and establishing a secure environment ashore.

215. **Categories of Staff Officer.** A JTFHQ is comprised of 4 main types of staff officer:

- a. **Joint Staff Officers.** Joint Staff Officers form the core of the HQ and generally occupy the key positions. They are required to raise their

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<sup>15</sup> Such as local contractors, road/rail/sea/air links, food, water, power.

understanding and involvement above tactical business, yet still appreciate the implications of developments at that level. By definition these officers should be joint trained, be experienced at working in an operational level HQ, and preferably also have had multinational experience.

b. **Multinational Staff Officers.** Multinational Staff Officers, sometimes termed ‘embedded staff’, have national and/or professional expertise within functional areas and are fully integrated into the HQ. They are not principally liaison officers for their nations (it is up to their NCC or empowered liaison teams, to discharge this authority), and should possess the ability to play a full role in planning, integrating, co-ordinating and decision-making.<sup>16</sup>

c. **Personal Staff.** The JTFC has a small number of personal staff who work exclusively for him. They include his Military Assistant (MA), his Aide de Camp (ADC) and his Personal Assistant (PA). There is also likely to be a requirement for close protection and interpreter support.

d. **Liaison Officers.** The contribution made by high grade, well motivated and suitably empowered Liaison Officers (LOs) from the contributing nations, and from the components significantly enhances integration and co-ordination across the JTF (this issue is covered in more detail at Section V). Interpreters may be essential in order to enable LOs to function effectively, particularly when working alongside Host Nation (HN) organisations.

216. **Principal Staff Officers.** The JTFC usually has 3 principal advisers: the COS, the DCOS and the POLAD.<sup>17</sup>

a. **Chief of Staff.** The COS will be an experienced commander in his own right and, with the understanding he possesses, he co-ordinates the work of the staff divisions by giving clear direction and setting priorities, in effect acting as a master of ceremonies. He has particular responsibility for Operations, Operations Support, Plans, Intelligence and the legal functions of the Staff. He also co-ordinates and fuses the work of the wider HQ including the Joint Force Elements (such as Joint Force CIS (JFCIS) and the Joint Helicopter Force), assisted by the DCOS. It is his role to ensure the staff pull together as a team and has good esprit de corps, making the headquarters feel more like a family than a large impersonal organisation. In a multinational JTFHQ, this role is

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<sup>16</sup> See Para 227.

<sup>17</sup> **Senior Mentors.** The US has also formalised a system of senior mentors, who are retired senior military commanders personally selected by US JTFCs, to act as their advisors as they wrestle with the complex issues of a Campaign. However, the decision whether to have a mentor or not is entirely a matter of personal choice. While mentors are principally engaged in this role and do not appear in the formal Chain of Command, they are nonetheless an additional way to exert indirect influence over the JTFC.

particularly important, and the COS will complement the JTFC's specific multinational responsibilities explained in JDP 01.

b. **Deputy Chief of Staff.** The DCOS co-ordinates the logistic and personnel functions within the JTFHQ and often a large proportion of the financial functions as well. Although normally of equivalent rank to the COS, the COS is *primus inter pares*. For practical purposes, the J1, J4 (including medical and joint force movements) and J8 divisions will normally be collocated.

c. **Political/Policy Advisor.** POLADs are MOD civil servants<sup>18</sup> selected to advise the deployed UK commander but they rarely form a cell or branch within the JTFHQ.<sup>19</sup> Principally they advise on:

- (1) UK Government policy.<sup>20</sup>
- (2) Local, national, regional and international political issues.
- (3) Political issues specifically related to multinational partners.
- (4) The relationship with IOs such as the UN as well as NGOs. Increasingly POLADs are receiving specialist assistance on these issues within the HQ from an Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD) appointed by the Department for International Development (DFID)
- (5) In cases where civilian agencies are brought into the JTFHQ, the POLAD will naturally assume the role of co-ordinator, assisted by the HUMAD if appointed.

217. **Key Relationships.** Inter-personal relationships are a vital though largely intangible factor underpinning the moral component of Fighting Power. Achieving the high degree of trust and understanding necessary at the operational level clearly relies on selecting individuals with wide experience and proven competence. The COS occupies the central position within the JTFHQ's internal hub, ensuring a smooth Campaign Rhythm. His interaction with the JTFC, and his empathy with his opposite numbers - the POLAD and the DCOS, his staff, and the Component COS is fundamental to successful integration and co-ordination across the force.

<sup>18</sup> Other nations tend to employ diplomats. The POLAD is invariably the senior civilian within the JTFHQ.

<sup>19</sup> Exceptions do occur, for example where the involvement with civilian agencies in terms of profile, complexity of issue or numbers present, dictates that more support has to be provided.

<sup>20</sup> Primarily this will be MOD policy but will also include advice on other government departments (OGDs).

## How Joint Task Force Headquarters are Organised

218. The complexity of the issues facing a JTFHQ naturally lends itself to the NATO J1 to J9<sup>21</sup> staff divisions' structure. The size and shape of each division will be dictated by the requirements of the operation at hand and could be enlarged, amalgamated or even vestigial. Larger divisions may be sub-divided into branches, and other specialist branches or cells could be added. In large JTFHQs, such as those operated by the US, each division is usually headed by an Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) with subordinate branch chiefs.

a. **J1 - Personnel and Administration.** The J1 division's principal role is to advise on Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA) and set the policy for the management of Prisoners of War (PW).<sup>22</sup> Responsibilities encompass policies for the sustainment of manpower for a JTF and of the personnel that constitute the force. This involves manpower accounting including casualty reporting, PW management, management of the welfare enablers including the Operational Welfare Package, discipline, and honours and awards.<sup>23</sup> For enhanced synergy, the J1 cell is usually located near to J4.

b. **J2 - Intelligence.** The JTFC's J2 staff integrates information and intelligence from the PJHQ, the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), national and multinational agencies, with that from its own organic resources and from other partners within the JOA. J2 receive their direction and tasking from the JTFC, ensuring that their effort is tuned to his precise requirements. They, in turn, task the various collection sources and agencies to gather the information and process it into intelligence. The J2 staff is also responsible for producing the Force Protection Threat Assessment, which acts as a defence against adversary deception efforts.<sup>24</sup>

c. **J3 - Operations.** The J3 division is the focal point of the JTFHQ. It is the lead staff branch and is responsible for the production and issue of directives and orders and the co-ordination of liaison and operational reporting. The J3 division will be organised into functional branches appropriate to the operation at hand, which may include:

(1) **Current Operations Cell.** The Current Ops Cell monitors the immediate situation. This is usually taken to be the last, and the next, 24 hours, though might extend up to the end of the present phase of activity, about 96 hours hence. It also compiles routine reports and

<sup>21</sup> AJP-3, Chapter 2, Section IX.

<sup>22</sup> The 'handling' of PWs from point of capture, through segregation and interrogation and onto PW cages is a J3 function.

<sup>23</sup> JOPA and PW handling are explained in JWP 1-00 'Joint Operational Personnel Administration' and JWP 1-10 'Prisoners of War Handling', respectively.

<sup>24</sup> The role of J2 is explained more fully at Annex 2D as well as in JWP 2-00 'Intelligence Support to Joint Operations'.

returns and manages incidents<sup>25</sup> through the auspices of a Joint Operations Centre (JOC). In some JTFHQs a J3 co-ordination cell is established within the JOC to act as the COS's personal staff branch to enhance the co-ordination and synchronisation of operations.

(2) **J3/5 - Current Plans Cell.** The J3/5 Current Plans Cell bridges the gap between J3 and J5 and is primarily responsible for the development of the OPLANs and CONPLANs produced by J5 into Op Orders for release to CCs. It is usual to try and divide the responsibility between J3, J3/5 and J5 in a logical way, for example by blocks of time from the present; for example, J3 current operations up to 96 hours, J3/5, 96 hours to 7 Days, and J5, 7 days and beyond.<sup>26</sup>

(3) **Operations Support Cell.** The Operations Support Cell acts as the focus for a grouping of specialist J3 Joint Operations Support activities. The core of Ops Support is the Joint Effects Meeting (JEM) process, aimed at co-ordinating Information Operations (Info Ops), targeting (including Joint Fires), Media Operations (Media Ops)<sup>27</sup> and Civil-military Co-operation (CIMIC). The Branch also includes Force Protection. Other specialist J3 capabilities, such as Environmental specialists<sup>28</sup> or Joint Force Engineers may also form up under the Cell, and in time may grow to become semi-autonomous organisations reporting directly to the COS. Their characteristics are explained at Section IV.

(4) **Specialist J3 Capabilities.** Some force elements, usually highly specialist in nature, provide cross-component capabilities that are not generally delegated to the CCs. Referred to collectively as Force Troops, they include:

(a) **Joint Force Engineers.** The co-ordination of operational level engineer functions under a specialist J3 cell, outside the normal J1 to 9 structure, ensures a pan-JOA view, particularly in being able to re-balance engineer resources across components, and for wider benefit to other government departments (OGDs) and NGOs. It is probable that Engineer Infrastructure experts might be collocated with J4.

<sup>25</sup> See Chapter 3.

<sup>26</sup> The J5 responsibilities are covered in JWP 5-00. For the relationship between J3, J3/5 and J5 refer to JWP 5-00, Figure 3.1.

<sup>27</sup> PJHQ Media Ops is grouped with J9. JTF/NCC HQ Media Ops is part of J3 Ops Sp.

<sup>28</sup> Geography, hydrography, oceanography and meteorology forecasts, reports and assessments.

- (b) **Joint Helicopter Force.** Similar in purpose to Joint Engineer capabilities, the Joint Helicopter Force apportions the allocation of scarce battlefield helicopters in accordance with the JTFC's priorities.
- (c) **Other Scarce Capabilities.** The option is in place to accommodate other capabilities, usually scarce, which are not subordinate to components but that interface at the operational level.<sup>29</sup>
- d. **J4 - Logistics.** The J4 branch sets priorities for the overall logistic effort and movements within the JOA, and acts as the direct interface with the JFLogC if one is deployed. It is responsible for setting the logistic and medical and health<sup>30</sup> service support policy and ensuring this is met throughout the campaign.<sup>31</sup> The J4 branch is usually large in size and contains within it J1/4 Coord, J1, J4 Supply, J4 Equipment Support (ES) and J4 Medical.
- e. **J5 - Plans.** The J5 division is responsible, primarily for developing the JTFC's campaign plan, producing the Campaign Directive and Force Instruction Document, the ongoing review of the operational-level Estimate, and planning for future operations through the development of OPLANs. It co-ordinates these planning efforts within the JTFHQ, with both higher and subordinate formations as well as with civil authorities. The J5 division is also responsible for developing contingency plans, especially branches and sequels for the current campaign phase and works particularly closely with the Current Plans Cell (J3/5).<sup>32</sup>
- f. **J6 - Communications and Information Systems.** The J6 division, normally led by Comd JFCIS (OF-4 to OF-6), ensures adequate CIS support is provided for the operation. J6 is responsible for enabling the Information Exchange Requirement (IER) across the JTF, for planning and controlling JOA CIS architectures, including integration at both the strategic and tactical levels, and will be supported by a Joint Network Centre (Joint NETCEN) to co-ordinate all CIS network engineering. Usually at medium scale and above, a JFCIS Element, by default drawn from within PJHQ J6, will be set up to co-ordinate the CIS effort across the JOA.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> For example Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal (JEOD). An operational EOD capability is maintained by all 3 Services for use in their respective core environments. However, enhanced synergy is achieved when they are assigned to the JTFC, who exercises co-ordination and control through the JEOD Cell, which forms within the JTFHQ. For comparable reasons the Joint NBC Regiment and Joint Search are other examples.

<sup>30</sup> The casualty estimation for Disease and Non-battle Injuries (DNBI) is prepared by J4. Battle Casualty estimation is prepared jointly by J2/J3/J5 and Operational Analysis (OA).

<sup>31</sup> The role of J4 in support of joint operations is explained in JWP4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*'.

<sup>32</sup> The role of J5 in a JTFHQ is explained in detail in JWP 5-00.

<sup>33</sup> The composition and roles of the JFCIS element are explained in detail in JWP 6-00 '*CIS Support to Joint Operations*'.

g. **J7 - Doctrine and Training.** The J7 division acts as the doctrine focus, organises operational level joint individual<sup>34</sup> and collective training, and validates standards across the UK Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF). For joint exercises or the lead into operations, J7 conducts special-to-JOA and/or in-theatre training to assist the JTFC in the preparation of his HQ and force, and will run the After-action Review process. On operations, J7 draws together the Joint Lessons Identified (JLIDs), post operational reporting, and progresses doctrine in association with the UK's Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC).

h. **J8/J9 – Finance/Civil Secretariat.** The scale and complexity of the operation will determine whether a separate J8 division (Finance) is required. J8 staff acts as the focus for setting up contracts and conducting budgetary oversight of all financial activity, even though some budgetary aspects may be delegated to the DCOS or CCs. Regardless of whether J8 is split from the Civil Secretariat (J9), it will still fall within the purview of the POLAD.<sup>35</sup>

219. **Augmentation.** The requirements for specialist and/or expanded branches, as well as 24 hour manning, are largely fulfilled through a process of augmentation. In the UK the system is managed through the Defence Augmentation Cell (DAC), which maintains an Augmentation Manning List (AML) of posts to be filled in the various HQs. The following broad principles apply:

a. There are 2 broad categories of augmentee: primary augmentees, who are normally specialists at high readiness, individually identified and pre-nominated to fill specific posts, and secondary augmentees, usually general staff officers with less prescriptive job specifications and lower readiness.

b. Availability, as well as specific qualifications or recommendations, will often dictate who is selected. Augmentees need to be integrated as soon as the requirement is identified, ideally having been trained well in advance. If possible, it is highly desirable to select individuals who have recently served within the nominated HQ.

c. The operational imperative must be carefully balanced with the requirement to maintain important non-operational routine activities such as recruiting, which cannot simply be switched off and on.

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<sup>34</sup> Only for JTFC/NCCs and other key HQ staffs, usually through the auspices of the Joint Ops Planning Course run by PJHQ J7.

<sup>35</sup> Although the budgetary responsibilities will be managed by a deputy with the necessary experience.

## **Joint Task Force Headquarters Infrastructure**

220. **Life Support.** The physical JTFHQ infrastructure needs to provide a secure and stable environment from where a commander can exercise command and the occupants can work in safety and a degree of comfort. A deployed operational level headquarters has the same life support requirements as any other HQ; the staff must have somewhere to work, eat, and sleep, and preferably it should be modular in order to enable adaptation. The fixed nature of strategic and operational communications infrastructure means it will probably not be mobile in the sense of having to move rapidly but options should be planned for its relocation if necessary (for example the transition from a ship to shore based JTFHQ). It is likely that a dedicated force will be required for protection and security.

221. **Communications and Information Systems.** CIS offer the principal means of passing information between HQs. Commonality of both systems and applications greatly aids tempo, increasing the rapid promulgation of decisions and the sharing of information. Nevertheless CIS systems have limitations which include:

- a. The ready accessibility to information that CIS provides can lead to ever-greater demands for information from higher headquarters. If unchecked, this can erode the principle of unity of command.
- b. The need for a management function to prevent staffs being subject to unnecessary and unwelcome information overload.
- c. Any CIS, no matter how technically advanced, will be vulnerable to attack by an adversary or equipment failure. Despite its usefulness, CIS must not be relied upon so heavily that it becomes a critical vulnerability. Contingency plans should be developed to guard against failure or compromise.
- d. The passage of large amounts of data will be constrained by bandwidth limitations of the bearer systems.

## **A UK Stand-Alone Operation**

222. Almost all of the principles previously mentioned in Section III apply in equal measure for a JTFC who commands a stand-alone UK national operation. However, significant differences are:

- a. International acceptance for military operations may be more difficult to achieve because there is no burden sharing.
- b. National JTFHQs will be smaller because there is no requirement to include multinational LOs or other multinational staff.

- c. National joint operations should in theory be the least complex to conduct.
- d. Operational tempo should be enhanced.
- e. This is the default model for joint force logistics as the UK is normally responsible for its own logistic support.
- f. The range of military capabilities readily available to the JTFC is likely to be reduced. For example, the UK does not have a complete Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) or Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) capability.

## SECTION III – THE UK AS A CONTRIBUTING NATION

### The National Contingent

223. **National Contingent Commander.** The second model deals with the situation where the UK elects to participate in an operation that it does not command. Under these circumstances the UK will usually place a senior NCC into the Multinational JTFHQ. This situation is increasingly the norm, even at medium scales of effort, and the UK will also seek to provide significant, capable and self-sustaining contingents to the multinational components with contingent commanders placed within the component HQs.<sup>36</sup> While a NCC can still be regarded as a fighting commander, this is not in the same sense as the JTFC.<sup>37</sup> Although he is a key decision-maker and plays a pivotal role alongside the JTFC in building the coalition, he does not share the same command responsibility or authority in the multinational force as the JTFC. However, he must have the same level of understanding as the JTFC in order to provide effective advice, and will be required to make rapid and authoritative binding decisions on behalf of the UK.

224. **UK Concept of Command.** The NCC ‘directs’<sup>38</sup> the employment of UK forces in the execution of allocated tasks. Of key importance is the responsibility to keep the MOD informed of developments that may affect national political objectives, changes to ROE, or the tasking of UK forces. Proposals for change are authorised and resourced by the MOD, through PJHQ, informed by the advice given by the NCC.

225. **The Responsibilities of a National Contingent Commander.** The NCC’s primary roles are to exercise (a minimum of) OPCON of UK forces and to influence, support, and inform (see Table 2.3). *Inter alia* he will:

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<sup>36</sup> The land contingent commander should be in the JFLCHQ, where he can influence the employment of forces. He should not be a tactical commander upon whom the additional responsibility has been placed.

<sup>37</sup> For example by exercising delegated targeting responsibilities.

<sup>38</sup> The NCC is responsible for the delivery of capability from the UK to the CCs. The CCs being actually responsible for the prosecution of operations.

a. **National Responsibility**

- (1) Direct the use of UK forces in accordance with the PJHQ Directive. He also has a major role to play in representing the interests of the UK CCs.
- (2) Advise the multinational JTFC on the specific capabilities of the UK force, their C2, any practical and/or national constraints on their employment,<sup>39</sup> and ensures they achieve the best role commensurate with their capabilities.
- (3) Monitor and keep the MOD informed of the situation in the JOA that could affect national political objectives and/or require changes in ROE or the commitment of additional resources.
- (4) Direct Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSOI).
- (5) Enact his national JEM responsibilities within delegated authority.
- (6) Co-ordinate UK Media Ops in the JOA.<sup>40</sup>
- (7) Facilitate the integration of national intelligence and C2 architecture into the JTF and co-ordinate effective national intelligence gathering efforts throughout the JOA.
- (8) Ensure that (through the national chain of command) administrative, medical and logistic support is delivered.
- (9) Determine and co-ordinate UK Force Protection policy and posture in the JOA, and co-ordinate Force Protection measures to the deployed UK force.
- (10) Ultimately hold a veto over the employment of the national contingent, the so-called 'red card'.<sup>41</sup> However, this power, which the NCC may delegate, is exercised only with considerable discretion as it could have profound implications for the cohesion of a multinational force. Potentially significant and/or damaging action will usually only take place under political direction.

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<sup>39</sup> National constraints, restrictions, legal issues, political nuances and sensitivities must all be clearly articulated, ideally during work-up training, well before operations commence. It follows the fewer of these there are, the better.

<sup>40</sup> Local, regional, national and global.

<sup>41</sup> National 'red cards' are essentially vetoes over possible or actual aspects of the operation in which a nation will not agree to participate.

b. **Multinational Responsibility**

(1) Exert influence at the maximum point of impact to influence the JTFC's plan to ensure national objectives can be achieved,<sup>42</sup> particularly in areas of potential high risk. The NCC has to gain credibility quickly; the advantage of appointing a NCC on the basis of ongoing, or previous relationships with the JTFC is obvious. The degree of influence a NCC wields will be largely related to 4 principal factors: the relationship that exists between his political leaders, his personal relationship with the JTFC, the capability being provided by his nation and his nation's record on recent operations.

(2) Support the JTFC in building and maintaining the coalition, with the focus on strengthening component cohesion. The NCC will seek to ensure issues are resolved at the lower levels to minimise the impact on cohesion.

(3) Identify risk to the campaign.

Influence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shape the coalition based on personal relationships</li> <li>• Advise, encourage and warn allies</li> <li>• Apply rigour to planning based on command and staff input</li> <li>• Watch the levels of risk</li> </ul>
Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Approve the use of UK forces (within delegated powers)</li> <li>• Act as a figurehead</li> <li>• Practice mission command</li> <li>• Build contingent cohesion</li> <li>• Provide logistics, CIS, and other aspects of national responsibility</li> </ul>
Inform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ask for Military Strategic support</li> <li>• Report tactical incidents and operational developments</li> <li>• Monitor and manage media interest</li> </ul>

**Table 2.3 – The Role of a NCC**

226. **Emphasis within a National Contingent Headquarters.** The campaign planning responsibility of a NCHQ is considerably reduced. However, integrating the NCC's J5 planning staff into the JTFHQ's planning is essential. This activity is likely to focus on specific branches and sequels, in tracking the overall campaign plan and by being alert to the potential mis-employment of UK forces or in detecting significant deviation away from national aims and objectives.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, the emphasis for the J3

<sup>42</sup> The JTFC is likely to be open to advice, principally because NCCs are able to give an alternative perspective from that offered by his formal Chain of Command.

<sup>43</sup> See JWP 5-00.

Operations division might also be smaller as its role is to monitor, rather than execute, operations. Not all staff functions found in a JTFHQ will necessarily be replicated but there is still the overriding requirement for sufficient capacity to match all the requirements of the Campaign Rhythm and maintain robust 24 hour links up, down and across national and international networks.

227. **National Liaison Officers and Embedded Staff.** There are 2 broad types of national representation in a multinational JTFHQ:

a. **National Liaison Officers.** A National Liaison Officers (NLOs) network will be set up within the JTFHQ, whose role is to be omnipresent and support the Joint Comd<sup>44</sup> or the NCC (who may be locally detached from the JTFHQ), in ensuring the UK's interests are constantly being taken into account.

b. **Embedded Staff.** If time, and mutual agreement allow, there might also be embedded staff within the JTFHQ. This, and the NLO role, are different. The primary role of the embedded staff officer is to use his expertise in his appointed functional area and ensure the activity in the multinational JTFHQ is conducted with a comprehensive understanding of the capabilities, limitations and constraints of UK forces, thereby ensuring their potential is maximised in accordance with the Jt Comd/NCC's direction. This type of staff arrangement - in UK terms based around a small national contribution under a Senior British Military Advisor (SBMA) - works particularly well on prolonged operations.<sup>45</sup> The SBMA will act as the principal link to PJHQ unless his role becomes subsumed into the NCC's HQ. At this point he is likely to revert to being the key local LO for the NCC, and his staff will plug directly into the relevant NCHQ Staff Branch, in effect acting as their immediate conduit into the multinational JTFHQ.

228. **Small-Scale Multinational Operations.** Situations may occur (particularly in small-scale operations) where UK forces might be assigned to an operation where no NCHQ exists. In these circumstances there is still a requirement for a senior UK officer (COMBRITFOR) to represent a possibly dispersed group of discrete units. Choices include: the commander of the UK National Support Element (NSE)<sup>46</sup> (who is the commander of the national joint logistic support organisation within a formal multinational construct), or the senior UK commander of a Sea Port of Disembarkation (SPOD) or Air Port of Debarkation (APOD), or a specially nominated commander.

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<sup>44</sup> Where a NCC has not (yet) been appointed.

<sup>45</sup> Such as the No Fly Zone enforcement operations over Iraq 1991 - 2003.


<sup>46</sup> In all circumstances where a NCC is deployed then a NSE is subordinate to it.

## SECTION IV – JOINT ENABLING AND OPERATIONS SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

229. There are 2 broad groups of activities that characterise and underpin joint operations. These are divided into Joint Enablers and Operations Support activities. Both groups are so important as to have a profound influence across and throughout the campaign, as opposed to the phased nature of component activities. They are generally pan-JOA activities and as such cannot be delivered in isolation by a component through supported/supporting arrangements and therefore must be led and co-ordinated at the operational level. Their profile and importance will vary with time, the operating environment, and the nature of the mission, and will change as the operation unfolds. Figure 2.4 portrays Joint Enablers and Operations Support as a single group of mutually supporting activities. However, it is important that they are not viewed as either a discretionary list to pick and choose from, or indeed a hierarchy; they will invariably be present on all operations. At times activities may even migrate from one category to another.

230. **Joint Enablers.** Joint Enablers are a group of activities which, while fundamentally important, can best be viewed as not having an end unto themselves in the sense they are unlikely to be discrete lines of operation in the achievement of the end-state. Rather, their principal purpose is to enable other activity to take place (See Annex 2D).

231. **Operations Support Activities.** Operations Support Activities do have an end unto themselves, in that they are capabilities or techniques that are likely to be essential to the achievement of the end-state and will usually, though not always, form specific lines of operation. They are underpinned by the Joint Enablers (See Annex 2E).



**Note:** Each activity will usually have a specific staff focus or branch in a JTFHQ (supported by bespoke doctrine); the operations support grouping being gathered in under the Ops Support Branch.

**Figure 2.4 – The Joint Enabling Activities and Operations Support Activities**

## SECTION V – INTEGRATING THE COMPONENTS

232. Optimum co-ordination of maritime, land, air, special forces (SF) and logistic forces is only achieved when each CC knows the intentions and capabilities of the other components and also understands the impact of his actions on them. Currently, this is enabled through resource heavy liaison and communications networks being set up. Each component has evolved its particular way of conducting its tactical business and these differences are accentuated cross-nation.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup> An operational level guide to the contribution made by the 5 components, and their C2, is to be found at Annex 1C.

233. **Location of the Component Commanders.** The JTFC should not regard his CCs as a 'set' and should ensure that each CC has necessary access to him and that he displays no national or single-Service preference. In their turn, the CCs must strike the balance between the advantages of face-to-face contact with the JTFC and the need to exercise their tactical responsibilities which may be somewhat detached from him. For the Air and SF components, the balance generally lies in favour of collocation with the JTFC. For the Maritime, Land and Logistics components, this is not so clear-cut; the judgement will depend entirely upon the circumstances, though the LCC will almost certainly be located adjacent to his forces. CIS enablers such as Video Teleconferences (VTC) have, to some extent, mitigated the disadvantages of separation but these do not replace the quality of understanding that arises through personal contact.

234. **Component Representation in the Joint Task Force Headquarters.** Each CC will have a senior representative, vested with authority to make decisions at the main Joint Force Planning Group (JFPG) and Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB).<sup>48</sup> At the working level CCs may also need specialists to represent their interests at the various sub-boards, meetings and other co-ordination mechanisms that make up the Campaign Rhythm. In the case of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander (JFSFCC), this remit is reduced because of collocation with the JTFHQ. However, the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) and Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) will almost certainly require dedicated staff permanently placed within the JTFHQ. This liaison function has to be met by high quality LOs, selected for the appropriate and authoritative level.<sup>49</sup>

235. **The Liaison Link between Components.** In addition to the liaison link up to the JTFHQ, the liaison web between all components is absolutely vital. Inter-Component Co-ordination and Liaison (ICCL) Staff teams act as the principal method of co-ordination in ensuring critical information is rapidly assessed and disseminated up and down the chain of command. They also have an essential role to play in their host component's plans and execution, particularly regarding the synchronisation of overall component activity. While ICCLs should be fully integrated into their host HQ structure, they are nonetheless ultimately responsible to their parent CC. The requirement for LOs is likely to soak up large numbers of high quality individuals, and at present is only partially offset by advances in CIS. A basic construct for component ICCL teams is shown at Annex 2F.

236. **Inter-Agency Co-ordination.** Increasingly, military operations must be co-ordinated and synchronised with those of other agencies, including UK and allied

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<sup>48</sup> When it is not the CC himself.

<sup>49</sup> It is a key principle that, to be properly effective, all LOs should be personally selected by the commander who sent them.

OGDs, NGOs, IOs and regional authorities. Shared endeavour at the onset of operations can be a powerful catalyst in ensuring effective co-ordination is established. This is especially pertinent for Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations and operations with a peacekeeping mandate. There is a requirement to develop agreed cross-agency doctrine and procedures although it must be recognised that many agencies will resist any encroachment on their own freedom of action. The JTFC and the COS will take a close personal interest in the establishment of close relationships with all the agencies, and to establish what, in terms of assistance, the JTF is able to provide. The POLAD, LEGAD, CIMIC Cell, with the assistance of any HUMAD, will all have key supporting roles.

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## ANNEX 2A – COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT COMMAND AUTHORITIES USING NATO AND US TERMS

Authority	Most control <span style="float: right;">Least control</span>						
	US COCOM	US OPCON	NATO OPCOM	NATO OPCON	CSC/USFK COMBINED OPCON	NATO TACOM	US & NATO TACON
Direct Authority to deal with DOD, US diplomatic missions, agencies	X						
Coordinate CINC boundary	X						
Granted to a Command	X		X				
Delegated to a Command		X		X	X	X	X
Set chain of command to forces	X	X					
Assign mission/designate objective	X	X	X				
Assign tasks	X	X	X			X	
Direct/employ forces	X	X	X	X	X		
Establish Maneuvre control measures	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Reassign forces	X						
Retain OPCON	X	X	X				
Delegate OPCON	X	X		X with approval			
Assign TACOM	X	X					
Delegate TACON	X	X	X	X	X		
Retain TACON	X	X	X	X			
Deploy forces within theatre	X	X	X	X			
Local direction/control designated forces	X	X					X
Assign separate employment of unit components	X	X	X				
Directive authority for logistics	X						
Direct Joint Training	X	X					
Excercise command of US forces in MNF	X	X					
Assign/reassign subordinate commanders/officers	X	May suspend or recommend reassignment					
Conduct internal discipline	X						

X -has this authority

-denied this authority or not specifically granted

Legend

COCOM - Combatant Command

OPCOM - Operational Command


OPCON - Operational Control

TACOM - Tactical Command

TACON - Tactical Control

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## ANNEX 2B – BASIC ILLUSTRATIVE TEMPLATE FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL OF A UK LED NATIONAL OR MULTINATIONAL JOINT OPERATION




Component	Commanded by	Abbreviated Title
Maritime	Joint Force Maritime Component Commander <sup>1</sup>	JFMCC
Land	Joint Force Land Component Commander	JFLCC
Air	Joint Force Air Component Commander	JFACC
Special Forces	Joint Force Special Forces Component Commander	JFSFCC
Logistics	Joint Force Logistics Component Commander	JFLogCC

<sup>1</sup> A Joint Force Amphibious Component may be established if the scale and/or complexity of amphibious operations demands it and/or if amphibious operations lie on the main effort.

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# ANNEX 2C – ILLUSTRATIVE TEMPLATE OF MULTINATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS WITH UK AS A PARTICIPATING NATION



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## ANNEX 2D – THE JOINT ENABLERS

### Operational Intelligence

2D1. Intelligence<sup>1</sup> is an essential component of capability for all military operations. It provides a timely and accurate warning of developing crises and is the starting point for all operational planning. Intelligence informs almost every area of the Commander's decision-making process, and it makes a major contribution to his assessment of how and when he will achieve his end-state.<sup>2</sup>

2D2. Operational intelligence (OPINTEL) should provide commanders, their staffs and the Components with a coherent and full understanding of the adversary and of the operational environment, in order that they can plan and execute operations with the benefit of the most timely and relevant information and intelligence to hand. In addition to supporting the estimate and decision-making process, intelligence acts as a key enabler for the Operations Support Activities, particularly the Joint Effects Meeting (JEM) process. OPINTEL focuses on two overlapping and complementary subjects, the adversary (his characteristics, culture, capabilities, location, and intentions), and the operational environment (geography, climate/weather, and demography).<sup>3</sup> Intelligence helps to identify relevant and attainable military objectives by producing estimates of adversary capability, intent, and exploitable vulnerabilities. In drawing in all available and appropriate providers of information a bespoke intelligence architecture will be constructed to furnish the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)/National Contingent Commander (NCC) with the intelligence service he needs.

2D3. As the operation unfolds the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) requires as accurate a picture of the Joint Operations Area (JOA) as possible. But in the same way he seeks this advantage, so too does his adversary, thus maintaining information superiority<sup>4</sup> gives him a critical edge. Environmental data will include meteorology (weather and climate), oceanography, hydrography (sea bed and beach gradients etc) geography (terrain and vegetation), ephemeris (sun rise and sunset, moonlight and phase etc) and imagery. Where data is lacking, this will feature early as Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs). The JTFC's outline course of action

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<sup>1</sup> The product resulting from the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organisations engaged in such activity (AAP-6). The UK's operational level intelligence doctrine is JWP 2-00 *'Intelligence Support to Joint Operations'*.

<sup>2</sup> That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable terms. See JWP 5-00 *'Joint Operations Planning'*, Chapters 2 and 3. The analysis importantly determines critical capabilities and their associated vulnerabilities.

<sup>3</sup> At the operational level the weather can have a major impact on the progress of the campaign particularly on the sequencing of component activity.

<sup>4</sup> Possessing a greater degree of information about the battlespace, being able to exploit that information more rapidly and preventing the adversary from obtaining or exploiting information which would give combat advantage. JWP 0-01.1 *'UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions'*.

(CoA) and intent will need to be clear in the mind of the staff tasked with obtaining, analysing and compiling the detail in order to correctly focus staff effort.

### **Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance**

2D4. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) is defined as ‘The co-ordinated and integrated acquisition, processing and provision of timely, accurate, relevant, coherent and assured information and intelligence to support effective decision-making. The effective conduct of ISR requires the collection of information from a wide range of sources and agencies and its subsequent interpretation to inform key decision-makers in the intelligence cycle. This is achieved through the close co-ordination of assets and the delegation of control of these assets to an appropriate level of command. The co-ordination of scarce ISR assets is a complex and multi-dimensional activity that requires disciplined tasking.

2D5. The practical implementation of collection involves the integration of the surveillance and reconnaissance assets that perform much of the collection effort, into the collection plan and then into operational planning and execution. Whereas direction, processing and dissemination are largely conducted by the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) J2 staff, collection requires the co-ordinated efforts of sources and agencies, not all of which are integral to the JTF, leading to the construction of a bespoke ISR architecture. Whilst J2 are ultimately responsible for designing the collection plan, they have no direct control over the majority of sources and agencies who actually conduct the information gathering process. This has led to the emergence of the ISR process, which operates within the Intelligence Cycle.


2D6. The aim of ISR is to co-ordinate the requirements of the demanders of information, i.e. the JTFC/NCC, and the component commanders (CCs), through the J2 staff, with the operational capabilities and tasking of the providers of that information, i.e. the surveillance and reconnaissance assets normally, but not exclusively, controlled by J3. It draws together the three elements of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance into a coherent whole, providing a framework for selecting, tasking and co-ordinating the collection assets. At the same time, it provides the links through which time-sensitive information and intelligence can be relayed direct from the surveillance or reconnaissance system to those assets, tasked by the JEM, that can make immediate use of it.

## Combat Identification

2D7. **The Elements of Combat Identification.** The UK doctrinal authority for Combat Identification (Combat ID) is JWP 3-62 '*Combat Identification*',<sup>5</sup> which deals with the process in detail. An effective Combat ID process directly contributes to:

- a. Enhanced effectiveness and harmonisation across the JTF. This is the principal purpose of Combat ID not, as is commonly assumed, solely to prevent fratricide
- b. Situational awareness and the avoidance of the engagement of non-vital targets or the disproportionate application of force, so further enhancing combat effectiveness.
- c. The reduction of 'blue-on-blue' engagements caused by fratricidal action. However, it should be recognised that fail-safe Combat ID is impossible to guarantee. Fratricide incidents most often occur because of mis-identification, usually caused by human error.

2D8. The elements of Combat ID (Figure 2D.1) can be portrayed as a triangle, the apexes of which are Situational Awareness (SA), Target ID, and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP). A Combat ID solution will rarely be found in the centre of the triangle, rather it will be skewed in favour of one or two elements. For example, combat techniques, using the full range of military capability will generally rely heavily on an electronic means of SA, whereas military operations requiring only basic techniques can be acceptably performed using procedural means:



**Figure 2D.1 – The Elements of Combat Identification**

<sup>5</sup> Due publication in 2004.

- a. **Target Identification.** Target ID aims to differentiate between friendly, adversary, and neutral individuals and systems. Target ID measures employ largely, though not exclusively, electronic means that need to be unambiguous, robust to countermeasures and exploitation, and interoperable between Services and multinational partners. Electronic Target ID systems fall into 2 categories, those that are co-operative and those that are non co-operative.<sup>6</sup>
- b. **Situational Awareness.** SA adds the richness to basic identification by showing where in time and space a 'target' is as well as its relationship with others.<sup>7</sup> The value of SA extends equally across all of the components of the force, whether individual aircraft, logistic vehicle or unit, though not all participants will have access to the information provided. An important aspect of SA is the education and training required to support commanders in allowing them to properly interpret the picture presented to them. The widespread friendly use of Tactical Data Links, Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) and Target ID systems, is improving SA and significantly reducing the identification problem.
- c. **Tactics, Techniques and Procedures.** TTPs constitute the third element of Combat ID. Very few weapons are fired without any recourse to human judgement and guidance appropriate to the use of weapon systems constitutes a mix of tactics, techniques and procedures. TTPs must be robust enough to account for the possibility of Combat ID systems failing and should also be directed at exploiting the opposition's Combat ID vulnerabilities.

#### 2D9. **Combat Identification Factors for Consideration at the Operational Level.**

There are two distinct aspects of Combat ID that regularly come to the fore at the operational level:

- a. **Fratricide.** The emotion surrounding incidences of failure in combat ID leading to fratricide can clearly have unwelcome side effects: trust may be eroded within the force; the incidents will attract negative media attention; and could lead to the introduction of extra, and unwelcome, regulation of activity that may in turn reduce operational tempo. Consequently, the prevention of fratricide is likely to be a significant Force Protection (FP) issue requiring careful and detailed planning. The focus within the JTFHQ for this issue is the FP staff, part of the Ops Support Cell, which is discussed further at Appendix 2E2.
- b. **Interoperability.** An additional factor in multinational coalition warfare is likely to be the varying levels of Combat ID sophistication amongst

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<sup>6</sup> Employing either active or passive technologies.

<sup>7</sup> Shared SA is discussed more fully in Chapter 3.

partners. Significant differences may lead to a requirement for physical separation of areas of operation and limitations on tasks that can be allocated to certain elements of the force.

## **Logistics**

2D10. **The '4 Ds'**. The provision of logistics is a principal issue for the JTFC for it ultimately dictates what he can, and what he cannot, achieve. It both enables, and constrains, manoeuvre into and throughout the JOA. The priorities for resource allocation are ultimately the JTFC's decision, and are where some of the biggest compromises are to be found. The Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) will enable the reception, sustainment and recovery of the JTF by ensuring all 4 elements of the logistic requirement are met. These being Demand (Scales of Effort and Intensity), Destination, Distance (along Lines of Communication (LOCs) and Duration (Endurance) - the '4 Ds'.

2D11. **Multinational Logistics**. Multinational logistics presents special challenges. Multinational forces will have different logistics doctrine, stock levels, and equipment and there will be a myriad of important interoperability issues. The UK's logistic doctrine for multinational and national operations, particularly the JFLogC's responsibilities to act as the focus for International Co-operative Logistic Support (ICLS), can be found in JWP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*'.

## **Political and Policy Advice**

2D12. In addition to interacting with international political leaders and diplomats, the JTFC requires an intimate knowledge of the political situation regionally and within the JOA. In addition, his decisions will be bound within the constraints of UK policy. He is assisted and advised on these issues by his personal Political/Policy Advisor (POLAD), who does much of the necessary liaison. On multinational operations the POLAD's role will be extended to fostering harmony across the force specifically by maintaining a close relationship with the political advisors from the other nations and with civilian organisations. The relationship between the JTFC and his POLAD is key in ensuring that political and military lines of operation are integrated and that operational decisions are in accordance with the political direction. The POLAD will look to PJHQ J9 to keep him or her apprised of relevant information and developments in the UK and, when the urgency of the issue demands it, the POLAD will deal directly with the MOD keeping the PJHQ informed in parallel.

## **Legal Advice**

2D13. Guidance to both commanders and the legal adviser (LEGAD) on arrangements for the provision of operational legal advice is to be provided in JWP 3-

46 'Legal Support to Joint Operations'.<sup>8</sup> A LEGAD will be available within the JTFC/NCCs staff to assist with early legal advice on the legal issues arising during the planning and conduct of operations. All operations will conform to a legal framework drawn from international law, national domestic law and host nation law that determines the nature of the operation and sets the parameters within which a commander can operate. Central to this framework will be a mandate<sup>9</sup> from which will flow the mission. The mandate is the legal authority for the operation and therefore a commander must always act within it, as well as within any other political constraints placed on the mission.

a. **Law of Armed Conflict.** Whilst mandates will be mission specific there are aspects of the legal framework that will be similar from one operation to the next. The Law of Armed Conflict<sup>10</sup> (LOAC), which consists of treaties, conventions and customary international law, seeks to provide protection for those involved in,<sup>11</sup> or on the periphery of, armed conflict, and to regulate its conduct. Its detailed provisions are grounded in 4 fundamental principles, namely: military necessity, humanity, proportionality and distinction. Commanders bear a responsibility to plan and conduct operations in accordance with LOAC and to ensure compliance with LOAC by those under their command. In fulfilling this requirement, commanders will be assisted by their LEGAD.

b. **Rules of Engagement.**<sup>12</sup> Joint Force activities and the use of force during operations will be governed by Rules of Engagement (ROE), which reflects domestic law, political and military guidance, and operational and diplomatic considerations. ROE are dynamic, changing with the evolving nature of the operation. While ROE are intended to promote legal compliance, it does not follow that compliance with the ROE ensures that actions taken are legal. The commander's responsibility is to seek to ensure that actions by those under their command comply with the law although it is a fundamental principle that ROE cannot undermine the right to self-defence. In multinational operations, as interpretations of ROE between states may differ, it will be essential to ensure that a commander understands the limitations that national interpretations may place on assigned forces in order to cater for this in force structures or dispositions. It is equally important for a commander to understand the opportunities that differing ROE can create.

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<sup>8</sup> Due publication late 04.

<sup>9</sup> The mandate may be derived from international law and not exclusively from a UN Security Council resolution.

<sup>10</sup> JSP 383 provides detailed guidance on LOAC.

<sup>11</sup> JWP 1-10 'Prisoner of War Handling' details procedures in respect of PWs.

<sup>12</sup> Full instructions and detail on ROE are contained in JSP 398.

## Information Management and Communications and Information Systems

2D14. On deployed multinational and joint operations, effective Information Management (IM) (to enhance the JTFC's knowledge superiority) cannot be achieved without properly deployed and managed Communications Information Systems (CIS).<sup>13</sup>

a. **Information Management.** IM is a vital staff discipline, key to effective C2. It involves the acquisition, storage, access, manipulation, dissemination, presentation and reuse of information and knowledge. Without it critical information can be lost, commanders and staff can be subject to unnecessary data deluge, and poor security of information may result in the betrayal of plans and intent. In most circumstances there will be more information available to commanders and staffs than can be assimilated. In order to maintain tempo and protect commanders and key staff from having to deal with unnecessary, dated or inaccurate information it is important to develop an Information Management Plan. Although led by the J6 staff,<sup>14</sup> the key principle is that the C2 requirements must drive the IM plan, rather than *vice versa*.

b. **Communications Information Systems.** CIS are an essential enabler for military operations that provide commanders at all levels with the means to exercise C2 and disseminate vital information.<sup>15</sup> They enhance Shared Situational Awareness, which in turn leads to better and quicker decision-making; this quickening of the decision-action cycle<sup>16</sup> contributes to increased operational tempo.<sup>17</sup> It follows therefore that CIS should be robust and the best available. The effective employment and control of CIS is a core responsibility for the COS, who relies on the Comd JFCIS and his staff to influence planning and ensure systems and processes work for the full duration of the operation.

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<sup>13</sup> Obeying the principles of: Capacity, Economy, Interoperability, Flexibility, Security and Resilience.

<sup>14</sup> See JWP 6-00 'CIS Support to Joint Operations', Annex 1A.

<sup>15</sup> The role of CIS and how it is integrated and co-ordinated across the JTF is explained in JWP 6-00.

<sup>16</sup> Relative to the adversary.

<sup>17</sup> **Network Enabled Capability.** A primary function of command and control systems is to link sensors, decision-makers and the tools used by Info Ops so that information can be acted upon appropriately within a more responsive cycle than that operated by an adversary. Modern technology can better integrate all composite elements in the process than was ever possible in the past by digitally linking different data networks, so that all units involved have simultaneous access to the same information. The UK is striving to develop a Network Enabled Capability (NEC), which focuses on the ability to replace hierarchical communication with a system that also incorporates horizontal co-operation, allowing conclusions to be drawn spontaneously, which can: sense what is going on by linking multiple diverse sensors to give better shared situational awareness and collaborative C2, communicate and better understand the JTFC's intent and priorities by building a shared perception and awareness of the battlespace and allow for better, more responsive as well as distributed decision-making.

## **Integrated Mission Support**

2D15. Integrated Mission Support (IMS) is bespoke (by equipment type, operation and theatre) packages of information, largely but not exclusively electronic, prepared by a variety of agencies that gives the information essential for the execution of tasks particularly for maritime and air platforms. Examples include threat profiles, terrain data and aerial photographs. The COS needs to know about this apparently tactical level issue because the provision of IMS is critical to the effectiveness of certain strategic assets (such as the Nimrod R1 ISR platform or Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM)) that may be operating within the JOA in support of the JTFC. Because these are high value assets it is natural the COS will want to be informed about any restrictions in their employment.

## **Budgets and Accounting**

2D16. For understandable reasons, non-operational financial practices are characterised by the tight accountancy procedures necessary to prevent fraud and provide an audit trail for the expenditure of allocated resources within devolved budgets. Bidding for additional sums is traditionally an uncertain and bureaucratic activity, usually involving adequate forecasting and detailed justification. It follows therefore that under operational conditions, more flexibility and responsiveness needs to be passed to the J8 Branch, and also to the component or contingent commanders, to allow them to respond appropriately to a fluid situation and support the JTFC's overall intent. A number of financial shortcuts might need to be taken to ensure this important aspect does not impede the efforts of the JTF. Nevertheless, if shortcuts have to be made, it is important they can be justified as operationally essential at a later date.

## ANNEX 2E – THE JOINT OPERATIONS SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

### Joint Effects

2E1. The purpose of the Joint Operations Support activities is principally to achieve Joint Effects that is to influence the complete range of adversary, neutral and friendly target audiences to adopt an attitude or courses of action which support the Joint Task Force Commander's (JTFC's) objectives. With regard to the adversary, targets selected in this context can, within legal and political constraints, be any element of his will or capability and can therefore vary from physical structures and organisations to more cognitive aspects such as mindset and behaviour. The purpose in combining the Operations Support activities in one cell and in one process (the Joint Effects Meeting (JEM<sup>1</sup>)) is to co-ordinate their separate strands of activities such that the Joint Effect sought is consistent, credible, efficient and, as a whole, greater than the sum of its parts. Whilst Information Operations (Info Ops), deliberate targeting (including Joint Fires), Media Operations (Media Ops) and Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) combine to secure effects, Force Protection seeks to ensure that the endeavours of the Joint Task Force (JTF) are neither lessened, nor even negated.

### Information Operations

2E2. Increasingly, the contemporary operational environment requires the JTFC to take account of wider strategic matters. Nowhere is this more evident than in the area of Info Ops, which permeates all the Levels of War and is increasingly integrated into the conduct of contemporary military operations. Info Ops activity is directed from the highest levels and can be best viewed as the expression of political intent. The military contribution to the strategic Info Ops line of activity, which is enacted by the JTFC via the MOD, must be consistent with the themes and messages derived from cross-government, co-ordinated strategy. JWP 3-80 '*Information Operations*' provides a detailed description of the fundamentals and tools used in Info Ops and gives guidance to all personnel involved in the planning and execution of Info Ops.

2E3. Info Ops are co-ordinated international and cross-government actions generally undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining, principally, his will, but also his cohesion and decision-making ability, through affecting his information, his perceptions and his systems, while protecting one's own decision-makers and decision-making processes. They also seek to influence a wider audience, particularly within the region where operations are taking place. Info Ops, which ideally should be conducted over a prolonged period to be properly effective, comprises 3 elements: Influence Activity,

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<sup>1</sup> Previously the Joint Fires Element, which still exists as a sub-element of the JEM to co-ordinate the kinetic aspects of targeting.

Counter Command Activity and Information Activity. Info Ops are essential to the successful achievement of the campaign. They must be planned and conducted as part of the Joint Effects process described at Paragraph 2E1.

**2E4. Supporting Capabilities for Information Operations.** Info Ops must be able to draw on any capability that contributes to the achievement of the desired objectives. The following is an expanded, though not exhaustive, list of supporting activities, sometimes referred to as Info Ops tools:

a. **Psychological and Media Operations.** PSYOPS are directed at specific target audiences in the Joint Operations Area (JOA) with the aim of influencing attitudes and thus behaviour. They frequently share the goals of Media Ops, but these two distinct functions must be kept separate in order to ensure the ‘purity’ of the Media Ops message. PSYOPS delivers its message direct to the intended recipient, using the force’s own means of dissemination.

b. **Electronic Warfare.**<sup>2</sup> Electronic Warfare (EW) comprises Electronic Counter Measures (ECM), Electronic Warfare Support Measures (ESM) and Electronic Protective Measures (EPM). Each of these can make a valuable contribution to Info Ops as part of the JEM. In particular, ESM is a source of intelligence within an ISR framework that can also monitor the effectiveness of Info Ops. Military forces rely heavily and increasingly on EW which is ‘*military action that exploits the electromagnetic spectrum*’<sup>3</sup> (EMS). EW is used universally on operations and offers the following broad order benefits to the JTFC and to the Component Commanders (CCs):

- (1) Electronic attack (physical and non-physical).
- (2). Electronic protection (including survivability and area, force and platform protection).
- (3). Electronic surveillance (including situation awareness).
- (4). Spectrum dominance, management and control.

Freedom to operate within the EMS is central to military operations. The advantages include greater awareness, precision in the control of operations

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<sup>2</sup> It is increasingly recognised that EW has much wider utility than purely as an Info Ops ‘tool’. For example it greatly contributes to the formulation of OPINTEL, is used for force protection, and to maintain freedom of action for the JTF. However, for the purposes of this publication EW continues to be grouped under Info Ops to reflect 2 key practicalities. First, any EW staff in a JTFHQ is likely to be small in number, and secondly EW conducted at the operational level is likely to focus on its contribution to Info Ops, most of the other aspects of EW being delegated to the components to conduct. However, if EW expands in importance within the JTFHQ then, like Jt Force Engineers, it may grow into a Joint Force EW Co-ordination Cell (EWCC), and report directly to the COS.

<sup>3</sup> The UK does not have a standalone EW JWP, the doctrinal guidance being provided by AJP-3.6 ‘*Allied Joint Electronic Warfare Doctrine*’.

and application of force, rapidity of effects, better measurement of effectiveness and increased survivability. EW directly contributes to knowledge superiority and also may enable attacks on the decision-making ability of an adversary.

c. The following are important EW principles:

(1). **Ubiquity.** The ubiquity of EW is illustrated by the increasing reliance on modern battlefield weapons and systems that require the EM spectrum for their use. EM energy does not respect territorial or military boundaries; it is near instantaneous and carries increasingly important information. It can be transparently intercepted, subtly modified and almost endlessly modulated. As the medium for sensors, communications, navigation and increasingly weapons guidance and Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), it enables, for example, the rapid attack of targets as well as contributing to Info Ops success.

Conversely, critical capabilities that rely on EW are vulnerable to an opponent who can skilfully bring the same effects to bear against the UK and/or her partners.

(2). **Selective Targeting.** EW permits or may be used to restrict use of the EMS and can therefore control radio, telephone and television broadcasts on which Command and Control (C2), PSYOPS and media systems rely. It assists in the building of the intelligence picture and, through novel technology and EW attack, is able to inflict damage where it is most effective with minimum casualties. Electronic Deception and Operational Security (OPSEC) can also be used in support of Info Ops goals.

(3). **Electronic Warfare Support to a Joint Task Force Headquarters.** EW operational support (EWOS), underpins the JTFC's use of EW effects by providing threat briefs, advice on tactics and countermeasures, the electronic order of battle, assessments and access to EW databases as part of Integrated Mission Support. The Defence EW Centre (DEWC), which operates as part of the Air Warfare Centre, is a joint organisation responsible for delivering EWOS. In concert with the DEWC, the Front Line Commands (FLCs) provide the EW capabilities required. In support of coalition operations, EW Mutual Support (EWMS) is a long-term means of ensuring that when operating in a coalition, EW effects are complementary and not fratricidal.

(4). **Deconfliction.** Many EW mechanisms are built into systems and procedures to allow use of the spectrum by friendly forces and deny it to opponents. Examples include EPM built into satellites and

communications devices and tactical data links such as Link 16. Similarly, ECM are designed into new aircraft and ships to defeat enemy EW systems, such as those that guide missiles. Increasingly wide and sophisticated use of the EMS by all users, not just the military, means there is less ability to exploit the full range of frequencies.

Consequently, battlespace spectrum management is an essential part of EW spectrum dominance; it is conducted by the J6 community with support from the J2 and J3 staff who advise on frequencies that must not be attacked either because they are being used by friendly forces or exploited. Suitably equipped EW forces can deliberately attack other users of the EM spectrum and there is potential for inadvertent interference. When this is coupled with the increasing reliance placed on use of the EMS, great care, planning, training and experience are required to avoid ‘electronic fratricide’ including; disrupting communications and navigation systems, weapon delivery systems, network integrity, situation awareness, C2 and Combat Identification (Combat ID). The mechanism available to the JTFC to ensure that EW is directed, controlled, assessed and co-ordinated correctly is the EW Co-ordination Cell (EWCC). At each level and within each organisation a EWCC or a suitable element of one is required. The functions of a EWCC are set out in Allied Joint Publication AJP-3.6 ‘*Allied Joint Electronic Warfare Doctrine*’ with detail for specific environments in subordinate Allied Tactical Publications (ATPs).<sup>4</sup>

c. **Neutralising an Adversary’s Command and Control.** The physical destruction, or neutralisation, of enemy C2 and counter C2 assets is likely to be a central objective as part of the JEM process and Joint Fires described at Paragraphs 2E1-2E3. However, total destruction of an adversary’s C2 functions is generally not attainable or even desirable. Destruction may only be effective for a relatively short time. Given resources, redundancy and time, the adversary may be able to recover. The key is the selection of the critical and vulnerable nodes to attack and how this ties into the overall Info Ops plan as well as the aims and objectives of the JEM process.

d. **Deception.** In the military context deception is defined as ‘*those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests*’.<sup>5</sup> Deception is a natural corollary to the manoeuvrist approach as it seeks to lead the adversary to expect, and thus prepare to meet, one particular friendly course of action, before he is struck elsewhere, or in a different manner

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<sup>4</sup> ATP-1 includes ‘*EW in Maritime Operations*’. ATP 44 – ‘*EW in Air Operations*’ and ATP 51 – ‘*EW in Land Operations*’.

<sup>5</sup> AAP-6.

or timescale causing shock. Deception forms an integral part of Info Ops and aims to achieve:

- (1) **Surprise.** A successful deception plan will disguise or conceal friendly intentions, strengths, vulnerabilities and dispositions.
  - (2) **Security.** Deception aims to portray a false friendly course of action. The adversary should believe that he has located and identified major elements of the friendly forces, their intentions and capabilities, thus providing security for the real forces, dispositions and movements. Security should be further enhanced by an OPSEC plan, integral to the deception plan.<sup>6</sup>
- e. **Operations Security.** OPSEC denies the adversary access to essential elements of friendly information, preventing him from deducing details of friendly force activities such as dispositions, intentions, capabilities and vulnerabilities, as well as limits him from countering the Info Ops effort. Consideration of OPSEC within the JTFHQ combines the efforts of Info Ops, Force Protection and the J6 staffs. Detailed guidance on OPSEC, and its key principles are contained in Joint Doctrine Pamphlet (JDP) 3/98 '*Operations Security*' and is an issue requiring awareness, care and imagination by all members of the JTF all of the time.
- f. **Computer Network Operations.** Computer Network Operations (CNO)<sup>7</sup> seek to gain access to computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy their capability, or alternatively to intercept and utilise their capability, whilst protecting the capability of the JTF. Success in this aspect is directly proportional to the adversary's dependence on such systems, and whilst not under the explicit control of the JTFC, its efforts will be guided by the requirements of the JTFC.

## Targeting Including Joint Fires

2E5. Targeting and the Joint Fires process is one of the principal means by which the JTFC's objectives are achieved. In this context achievement is considered in its most generic sense and includes all Info Ops techniques, the use of Special Forces (SF) and, ultimately, physical destruction achieved through Joint Fires and by the actions of the components.

2E6. At the strategic level the principal purpose of influence will be to affect the adversaries will (normally aimed at the ruling elite), whilst at the operational level it

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<sup>6</sup> The importance of a counter ISTAR plan to include defeating Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) cannot be underestimated. GBAD systems specifically designed to combat such threats must be included to protect the JTF.

<sup>7</sup> Consisting of Computer Network Attack (CNA), Exploitation (CNE) and Protection (CNP).

will be to ‘shape’ the battlespace prior to and during operations. At the tactical level the aim will be to support component manoeuvre, and at the same time to reduce the adversary’s capability to achieve his operational objectives. At the strategic and operational levels the broad order effects to be achieved need to be determined (usually expressed in terms of commander’s intent) in order for the JEM to co-ordinate and advise on the most appropriate action(s) needed to achieve the desired objectives. The relationship between the selection of targets and the objectives in the Campaign Plan is key. It is the focus that ensures that the application of force or non-destructive methods to achieve influence is both necessary and the most effective. Targets selected and approved must conform to the overall scheme of manoeuvre for the Campaign and the JTFC must ensure that the results of interdiction operations do not later hinder his own operations (e.g. by the destruction of bridges on routes that will be needed for the subsequent delivery of Humanitarian Assistance (HA)). All components are fully engaged in targeting to achieve the desired levels of co-ordination but ultimate responsibility and control of Joint Fires will rest with the JTFC. Detailed co-ordination is achieved through the JEM process, with the execution of targeting being devolved to the CCs. Because currently the UK does not have a Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) specifically dealing with the Joint Fires aspects of targeting, Appendix 2E1 provides an expanded explanation.<sup>8</sup>

## Media Operations

2E7. Guidance on the close relationship between the military and the media can be found in JWP 3-45 ‘*Media Operations*’. How Media Ops is handled within the JOA has a fundamental impact on how the operation is perceived globally, regionally and at home. While a distinction is made at the strategic level between Media Ops and Info Ops, at the operational level they become more intertwined because short-term Info Ops messages rely on dissemination by all available means.<sup>9</sup> While Media Ops is of interest to the COS in so much as it affects Info Ops and the general backdrop to operations, it heavily involves the personal engagement of the JTFC because the maintenance of public support is vital if JTFCs are to maintain freedom of movement and morale within the JTF. To support him, the JTFC will have a media advisor as well as a specialist media staff, large enough to cope with all contingencies including incidents, the provision of media facilities, and escorts. All are controlled by the chief Media Ops who may also be the JTFC’s media spokesman.<sup>10</sup> Collectively, these elements are referred to as the Theatre Media Operations Group (TMOG).

2E8. Influencing the media at this level is very difficult to achieve because the media can neither be shaped nor attacked or exploited and a wholly protective approach would be regarded as defensive. It succeeds largely on personal relationships, and the

<sup>8</sup> AJP-3-9 ‘*Joint Targeting and Joint Fires*’ is in current draft and will supersede Appendix 2E1 on promulgation.

<sup>9</sup> This point is clearly made in both JWP 3-45 and JWP 3-80 ‘*Information Operations*’.

<sup>10</sup> A briefing from the JTFC/NCC can send a strong message but very senior briefers should be used sparingly

ability to grant access, rather than rigid adherence to procedural guidelines laid down in guides such as the Green Book.<sup>11</sup> In order to work successfully with the media it is important to understand their characteristics, both in terms of philosophy and their capabilities. The media comprises many elements, each with different agenda and requirements. Some will be generally supportive of the military and others will not, so it is important to appreciate the range and diversity of the media with which the military must engage. Where the media expectation is not met, they will fill the information vacuum by use of a range of themes and techniques, all having the potential to undermine the progress of the Campaign.

2E9. International news media interest can be intense during all phases of an operation but wanes the moment operations tend toward the routine. The amount of media in the JOA will vary dependent upon access, the operational tempo and duration, intensity of the violence and media activity at home and elsewhere. Digital technology and lightweight satellite communications give the media the ability to report incidents in the JOA often before the military are even aware of them, but often with incomplete facts and out of context. This illustrates the importance of having a Media Cell in place to manage news and deal with incidents, exploit opportunities for proactive media engagement and conduct rebuttal, if necessary. Any decision to deny the media access should be balanced with the following considerations:

- a. First, it will be extremely difficult to achieve and if attempted could be counter-productive.
- b. It may draw unwanted attention to areas of greatest sensitivity.
- c. Notwithstanding the requirement to closely preserve OPSEC it might on occasion be advantageous, for the benefit of accurate reporting, to allow selected media to be taken into confidence, and for future intentions and operations to be revealed in advance.
- d. For the safety of media representatives in the JOA, the military have a duty to ensure awareness of the risks and dangers associated with ongoing operations, which again might, on occasion, compromise OPSEC.

### **Civil-Military Co-operation**

2E10. Operations today take place in a more coherent political and civil context than ever before, and commanders at all levels are increasingly required to take account of social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors when planning and executing operations. An increased range and number of participants may be active in the JOA making the civil-military interface more

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<sup>11</sup> See also Joint Service Publication 512, the 'Green Book', which provides the basis for agreement between the media and the MOD as how co-operation will take place during operations.

complex. Many of these participants may not naturally defer to the military view of events and commanders must accept the presence of a diverse range of civilian organisations, each with their own viewpoints, mandates and objectives.

2E11. CIMIC provides the mechanism for commanders to be aware of, and actively engage with, the civil sector to enable a coherent and co-ordinated response to crisis. It will neither be practicable nor necessary to have the same degree of co-operation or co-ordination with all civil organisations. There are those organisations with whom it is appropriate to conduct co-ordinated planning, and those with whom it is more appropriate to engage through liaison and information sharing. CIMIC activity should be carried out to support or achieve specific operational level effects and the JEM process is the means by which CIMIC activity is harmonised with other areas of Operations Support. The output of the JEM also allows the JTFC to direct and influence CIMIC lines of activity during the Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB). The effect of a successful CIMIC process is to enable the overall mission to be accomplished in a more timely manner through the harmonisation of civilian and military plans and activity, thereby facilitating the earliest possible disengagement of military forces.

2E12. IJWP 3-90 '*Civil-military Co-operation*' gives a fuller description of the principles of CIMIC which are applicable across all operations and to all components, albeit to varying degrees. Awareness of CIMIC should not be restricted to a single staff branch in the JTFHQ, and to be effective the CIMIC process must be appreciated by all in the JTFHQ. It must also be conducted within the normal command chain, and be fully synergistic with the Info Ops plan. This is an area where the Political/Policy Advisor (POLAD) has a pivotal role, particularly in strengthening the links between the JTF and the various civilian organisations. Increasingly, use is being made of a Humanitarian Advisor (HUMAD), provided by DFID, who advises the JTFC on operational level HA issues to better inform his decision-making. There will also be close interaction and linkages with other JTFHQ staffs, particularly in the J4 and J9 areas.

## **Force Protection**

2E13. **Definition and Aim.** Force Protection (FP) is defined as '*all measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force*'.<sup>12</sup> FP must not be viewed as a totally negative and defensive set of measures but as an activity that directly contributes to the maintenance of both the physical and moral components of fighting power. The physical is maintained by prevention of attrition of force assets, the moral, by prevention of any undermining of the will to fight. FP therefore, does not only contribute to the protection of our own

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<sup>12</sup> Definition as accepted by NATO ESN Terminology Committee and pending incorporation in AAP-6.

Centre of Gravity (CoG) but it also contributes directly to increasing the sense of hopelessness on the adversary.<sup>13</sup> FP in this context addresses protection of the JTF in general terms outside the conduct of offensive actions; it does not deal with the protection of particular elements of the Force while conducting such actions. This is largely a function of individual and team training as well as being a routine aspect of command.

**2E14. Risk Management.** The key to efficient FP is effective risk management, balancing the assessed likelihood of occurrence and impact of a threat materialising against the costs of implementing measures that mitigate against that threat. Over-protection to counter an improbable threat can divert scarce resources from achieving the mission or may place restrictions on forces that could severely hinder their ability to operate effectively.

**2E15. The Process.** FP is not an issue that can be addressed in isolation. It must be an integral part of operations incorporated in the commander's plan from the outset. CDS's Guidance should consider FP as a significant issue that is subsequently reflected in force levels. The JTFC will examine FP in more detail as he conducts his Operational Estimate, which will confirm FP policy and only initial requirements. However, planning for FP does not stop at this point; it is a cyclical process continued and refreshed throughout the campaign, where the threat is continually assessed and measures taken to reduce the vulnerabilities at risk from threat.

**2E16. Responsibility for Force Protection.** Most, but not all, elements of FP already exist in military organisations, as do the C2 functions to implement the overall measures. At the operational level it is the co-ordination of all of the FP elements that is vital and these are brought together in a J3 co-ordinating function in order to provide greater Joint coherence. Although the JTFC is responsible for the FP of the deployed force, routine co-ordination of FP across the JTF is centrally conducted by the JTFHQ J3 Ops Support Cell.

**2E17. Constituents of Force Protection.** The key constituents of FP are explained at Appendix 2E2.

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<sup>13</sup> Detailed guidance is contained in JDP 1/99 '*Force Protection in Joint Operations*'. Updating this guidance is programmed for 2004.

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## APPENDIX 2E1 – JOINT FIRES ASPECTS OF TARGETING

### The Principles of Lawful Targeting

2E1.1. Targeting, which incorporates as its component elements, Joint Fires,<sup>1</sup> Special Forces (SF) action and the Information Operations (Info Ops) non-destructive techniques, is the process by which:

- a. A target is identified as a result of the development of the Campaign Plan, and then pinpointed through the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) process.
- b. A desired action against the target is selected through the auspices of the Joint Effects Meeting (JEM).
- c. The means of achieving the action is planned.
- d. The target is fixed and engaged. (Note that this aspect is not per se an integral aspect of the pre-planned targeting process as the fixing and engagement of targets is also common to all types of reactive fire such as small arms exchanges or immediate calls for fire from naval ships, artillery and from Close Air Support (CAS)).
- e. The effect on the target is assessed, and further action taken against it if necessary.

2E1.2. Targeting operations are subjected to careful scrutiny to ensure that they are necessary to achieve the objectives of the campaign, involve (as far as is possible) the use of necessary and proportional force, and, most importantly, meet the strict requirements of international law governing the conduct of military operations. Experience has shown that the targeting process will have a substantial impact on the Joint Task Force Commander's (JTFC's) personal routine, as well as on the Joint Task Force (JTF) Campaign Rhythm.

2E1.3. **Laws of Armed Conflict.** All military commanders are trained in the Laws of Armed Conflict (LOAC) and there is a legal adviser at every command level in the Joint Fires process to ensure that the obligations under LOAC are properly met. There are other special provisions under LOAC that place further legal restrictions on kinetic attack. Examples include avoiding cultural, historical and religious sites, and medical facilities. Also, there are rules which protect objects indispensable to the population's survival, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas and drinking water, and a prohibition, in most cases, on attacks that would cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to

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<sup>1</sup> Joint Fires is defined as kinetic attack co-ordinated or directed at the operational level by the JTFC/NCC. (See para 2E1.8)

the natural environment. With regard to targeting, the following specific legal principles apply:

- a. **Distinction.** Offensive action must only be directed against military objectives. Precautions are to be taken to avoid, and to minimise, loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects, particularly sites of religious or cultural significance and specially protected objects. Attacks must be suspended or cancelled if it becomes apparent that the target is not a military objective. Commanders should instigate robust mechanisms to call off attacks against units that have capitulated and are showing the correct signals.
- b. **Proportionality.** Military objectives must not be attacked if the attack is likely to cause civilian casualties or damage, which would be excessive in relation to the direct military advantage which the attack is expected to produce. Precautions are to be taken in the choice of means and methods of attack to avoid, or at least minimise, incidental civilian casualties or damage. Attacks should be cancelled or suspended if they cannot be carried out without breaching this proportionality principle.
- c. **Military Necessity.** Just because something is military, or has a military use, does not mean it should be attacked. To be a legitimate target, it must be judged according to the operational and tactical objectives sought; its neutralisation or destruction should offer definite military advantage in the context of the campaign at the time of authorisation.
- d. **Feasible Precautions.** In the LOAC context, the term ‘feasible’ means that which is practical or practically possible, taking into account all the circumstances, including humanitarian and military considerations.

2E1.4. **Prevention of Collateral Damage.** Intensive intelligence effort is undertaken to help commanders identify any civilian structure or residence within possible effective weapon radius. If such areas are identified, then weapons effects specialists will take additional care to reduce, or eliminate entirely, the potential for civilian casualties. These include:

- a. Using Precision Guided Munitions.
- b. Using smaller or inert weapons.
- c. Choosing different fuzing options for ordnance.
- d. Selecting different aiming points.
- e. Limiting the direction from which attacks are mounted.

- f. Timing the attack to coincide with periods of low or no civilian occupancy.
- g. When appropriate, by the issuing of warnings.

2E1.5. **Hierarchy of Effects.** Targets are categorised according to the level at which an effect is sought, although it is clear that when an action is conducted against one level, there might be ramifications felt elsewhere.

<b>Strategic Effect</b>	Targets that affect an opponent's long-term capacity and will to sustain hostilities, such as strategic Command and Control (C2). In addition, all targets capable of enabling the first use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) are classed as strategic in nature.
<b>Operational Effect</b>	Targets which affect an opponent's military capability, such as air defence systems, ammunition and fuel storage, or those that directly support an adversary's ability to sustain hostilities, such as lines of communication.
<b>Tactical Effect</b>	These include the adversary's military forces, which have the potential to influence the tactical commander's battles, such as air forces, echelon and reserve forces, and supply areas. Close Air Support (CAS), as an activity in support of the components, is not considered as part of the deliberate Joint Fires process; it is but one aspect of the contact battle.

**Table 2E1.1 – Hierarchy of Effects**

2E1.6. **Directives.** The kinetic targeting aspects of Joint Fires begins with the formulation of Directives:

- a. **Chief of the Defence Staff's Targeting Directive.** This is drafted by the MOD Targeting Board (MOD TB)<sup>2</sup> and issued to the Joint Comd as an annex to Chief of the Defence Staff's (CDS's) Directive. This directive sets out in broad terms UK strategic and military objectives and priorities, constraints to be applied, and acceptable target types.
- b. **The Joint Commander's Effects Directive.** Taking CDS's Targeting Directive, the Jt Comd produces his Effects Directive, which he issues as part of his overall Directive to the JTFC. This gives the JTFC/NCC guidance on what authority is delegated to him for target approval within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). Taking advice from his CCs, the JTFC/NCC will then, through the JEM process, set priorities provide targeting guidance and determine the weight of effort to be applied, apposite to achieving his

<sup>2</sup> The future of this organisation is currently (Apr 2004) under review, the drafting process is conducted within DTIO to ensure coherency with Info Ops directives.

campaign objectives. It is essential these actions are achievable and, ideally, measurable, to allow an objective assessment of success based against the objectives of the Campaign.

2E1.7. **Targeting Process.** Targets liable for kinetic attack are compiled and refined using a number of lists that are processed through some clearly defined key meetings:

a. **No-strike List.** A no-strike list is a list of those objects or locations granted protection from attack under international law. These include religious and cultural sites, civilians, important food resources and nuclear power stations. Thus, an object listed therein cannot be targeted for attack or be removed from the list unless it has lost that protection under the relevant provisions of international law.

b. **Restricted Target List.** A restricted target list is a list of military objectives, which, due to special considerations, require temporary protection from attack. This may arise, for example, because of the need to deconflict any proposed action with Info Ops or other activities, or because the site is assessed to have significant intelligence value. A proposal to attack a restricted target must be co-ordinated through the JTFHQ.

c. **Joint Target List.** Once Directives have been produced, the Target System Analysis Planning Group (TSA PG) within DIS will produce the Joint Target List (JTL). This Group is convened by the Director of Targeting and Information Operations (DTIO), through the MOD TB. This board nominates appropriate targets and leads in the production of the JTL in its early stages. The Joint Integrated Target List (JITL) seeks to identify all targets that *could* be attacked to achieve an appropriate effect. Some of the information used to populate the JTL will already be available from basic intelligence and open sources, which will be supplemented and updated by Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL).

d. **The Joint Integrated Target List.**<sup>3</sup> The JITL is owned by the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) and is derived from the JTL. JTFHQ and component Joint Fires staff will be involved early in the planning process and will work in close liaison with the PJHQ staff in the development of the JITL. It is a more refined and comprehensive list of potential targets produced from more detailed assessment at operational and tactical levels of the effects required to achieve the campaign objectives.

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<sup>3</sup> The distinction between the JTL and the JITL is reducing, with the result that the term JITL is now rarely used. The JTL therefore remains in a constant state of development (and is owned by the JTFC once it is activated) and contains, at any one moment, targets that might be considered for attack. It does not represent a list of targets that will be attacked, or targets that have been authorised for attack.

e. **The Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List.** The Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List (JIPTL) prioritises the targets on the JTL/JITL in accordance with JTFC direction and priorities, taking into account the Component Commanders (CC's) progress, and the availability of assets. CCs can nominate new targets for inclusion on the JIPTL at any stage but these need to be subjected to the development and clearance process as necessary. Political constraints or interest may demand that aspects of the JIPTL will have to be referred to MOD for ministerial approval, through the PJHQ. As campaign and component objectives and priorities change, the daily JEM process revises JIPTL priorities.

f. **The Target Nomination List.** The Target Nomination List (TNL) is the daily list of targets to be attacked kinetically. The TNL recommendation will be derived from the JIPTL by the JEM and represents that which is feasible or practical to attack within the period covered by the list.

g. **The Joint Effects Meeting.** The Effects process<sup>4</sup> is co-ordinated by the 2 JEMs. These JEMs, co-ordinated and run by the Ops Sp Branch, ensure that Joint Fires takes full account of the JTFC's prioritised objectives derived from the Campaign Plan. JEM 2 convenes at an appropriate time prior to the Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB) to properly inform that meeting. Having determined the effect to be achieved, the JEM will determine the actions that need to be prosecuted to achieve the effect and to recommend a component, a blend of components, or a method, to satisfy the requirement (such as kinetic attack from the air, Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), Special Forces (SF) action, or even an information leaflet drop), which will then be refined by the Joint Fires<sup>5</sup> sub-element of the JEM. The JEM is also responsible for the co-ordination/de-confliction of JTFC controlled assets, legal issues, and clearance procedures for new target proposals. CCs should have representation on both the JTFHQ JEM, and within each other's component HQ targeting cells (particularly the Battlefield Co-ordination Detachment (BCD) and Maritime Co-ordination Element (MCE) within the Joint Force Air Component HQ (JFACHQ)).


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<sup>4</sup> The UK's targeting process differs slightly from that of NATO and the United States and all are currently undergoing development. Nevertheless, the doctrine is essentially the same.

<sup>5</sup> The co-ordinated effects of Joint Fires has a potential synergy that far exceeds that achievable by individual components. With the high number of long-range fire support systems in existence that have the ability to fire into or through other CCs' Areas of Operation (AOO), their co-ordination is of growing importance. Technology is steadily increasing the effectiveness and precision by which lethal and non-lethal actions can be applied against strategic, operational, even tactical targets. Ensuring that the synchronisation of Joint Fires is fully in line with national objectives, strategic aims and the overall Campaign Plan, has become increasingly important. Direction and considerable co-ordination effort is therefore required to ensure that Joint Fires synchronisation is achieved and does not conflict or is dissipated by a fragmented approach.

**h. Joint Co-ordination Board.** The JCB gives the JTFC the opportunity to consider and determine targeting issues at his level. The primary targeting functions of the JCB are to review and confirm the JTFC's guidance and objectives, approve CC apportionment recommendations, and approve the TNL for the next 24 hours. The JCB should be held as late in the Campaign Rhythm as possible and some time after the JEM. This allows for detailed preparation to be done well in advance, and so reduce the necessity for subsequent points of clarification, or to reduce the chance of mistakes happening.

**2E1.8. The Joint Fires Cycle.** The process used to apply military force against discrete targets is referred to as the Joint Fires Cycle (at Figure 2E1.2). The ability to run this Cycle at high tempo, while having the capacity to respond to changes is fundamental to successful operations. This is because if an adversary is able to respond at a faster rate, he is likely to wrest the initiative. The generation of tempo can be an acute difficulty on multinational operations where each National Contingent Commander (NCC) must be given the opportunity to participate in the process to enhance overall co-ordination and synchronisation, and to maintain the cohesion of the JTF. The key strengths of the Cycle are an ability to define clear objectives with measurable outcomes, using specialists having access to excellent ISR, and Command and Control (C2) architecture, underpinned by the ability to provide tangible measurements of effectiveness for the effect caused.



**Figure 2E1.2 – The Joint Fires Cycle**

**2E1.9. Target Approval in the Joint Operations Area.** The degree of delegated authority given to the JTFC/NCC to engage targets will depend on the operation and can be politically sensitive. However, it is inevitable that there will be targets, which require clearance at the strategic level. In order to meet this imperative, the JTFHQ Targeting Cell must support a timely target clearance procedure in close co-operation with all other agencies involved. The approval process for particularly difficult or sensitive targets can take in excess of 24 hrs and this has to be factored into planning. However, as the Campaign progresses, shortcuts evolve as confidence levels grow. Where the UK is in support of a multinational JTF, an important advisory duty for the NCC is to apprise the JTFC of the reality of the UK's approval process.

**2E1.10. Rapid Attack of Targets.** It will not always be possible to prosecute Joint Fires targets using the deliberate cycle and clearance procedures described above. In such cases, where a reaction may be required or demanded in a matter of hours, or even minutes, the JTFC will need to develop appropriate procedures. These must optimise the sensor, decision-making, and shooter links. To assist this, possible targets are divided into 3 categories:

- a. **Time Sensitive Targets.** Time sensitive targets (TST) are those targets requiring immediate response because they represent a serious and imminent threat to friendly forces or are high payoff, fleeting targets of opportunity. In practice, TSTs are specific target sets designated by the JTFC.
- b. **Dynamic Targets.** A dynamic target (DT) is a target identified within the current ATO cycle that was previously unanticipated or newly detected, which is of significant importance to all components and should be struck within the ATO period. These are generally dealt with by the components in the same manner as a TST, but might require clearance by the JTFC.
- c. **Emerging Targets.** An emerging target (ET) is a target that meets sufficient criteria to be considered and developed as a target. The criticality and time sensitivity of this potential target is initially undetermined and may be subsequently dealt with as either a TST, DT or as a target planned in the deliberate cycle.

**2E1.11. Interdiction.** Interdiction is a principal means by which the JTFC, and the CCs, shape their battlespace. It diverts, disrupts, delays or destroys an adversary's military potential before it can be used and targets of this nature will be a main point of early planning effort. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) is usually the Supported Commander responsible for the conduct of Air Interdiction operations which, when synchronised with Maritime and Land interdiction operations, can significantly amplify the disruption caused to the adversary.

## Fire Support Co-ordination Measures

2E1.12. Clear articulation of the JTFC's and CCs responsibilities is key to the co-ordination and control of Joint Fires. This is normally achieved through the provision of clearly understood Fire Support Co-ordination Measures (FSCM), a form of procedural control. Selected FSCMs also have application as Airspace Control Measures (ACM) but the authority remains with the sponsor of the FSCM. Principal considerations are:

- a. Establishing the boundaries of the CCs AOOs, and providing the Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) necessary to determine where all their forces are.<sup>6</sup>
- b. The recognition that dynamic adjustment of the FSCL is likely.
- c. The imposition of Restrictive Fire Lines or Areas (RFL, RFA) Fire Support Areas (FSAs), other FSCMs, and any other co-ordinating measures necessary to enhance responsiveness or safety.

2E1.13. **Fire Support Co-ordination Line.**<sup>7</sup> The principal C2 tool for the co-ordination of Joint Fires onto the Land environment is the FSCL. The FSCL is a permissive fire support co-ordination measure for the attack of surface targets within the land or amphibious AOO and must be agreed between the JFMCC or JFLCC and the JFACC. If agreement cannot be reached the JTFC will arbitrate, usually at the JCB once the matter has been staffed through the JEM. The FSCL, of which there may be more than one, applies to all fires of sea, land and air weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. Targets are defined as being:

- a. **Short of the Fire Support Co-ordination Line.** Attacks against ground-targets short of the FSCL must be conducted under the positive clearance or procedural clearance of an appropriate local commander. These targets are of direct interest to the appropriate CC who consequently controls their selection, prioritisation and attack.
- b. **Beyond the Fire Support Co-ordination Line (and inside the Land/Amphibious Area of Operations).** These targets are found where they can influence the Land or Amphibious component. Attacks may be conducted by any component into this area, such as by Air Interdiction (AI)), but clearly must be closely co-ordinated and synchronised with the Land or Amphibious CC in order to avoid fratricide and to harmonise the joint effort.

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<sup>6</sup> In principle fire may not be applied into a commander's AOO without it being co-ordinated with him.

<sup>7</sup> AAP-6.

c. **Outside the Land/Amphibious Area of Operations.**<sup>8</sup> Exceptionally, and once authority has been given, attacks may be conducted by any component outside immediate AOOs. These must be tightly co-ordinated with the most likely Supported Commander, the JFACC.

2E1.14. **Positioning of the Fire Support Co-ordination Line.** An important issue for the JTFC is where the FSCLs should be, because this has a major impact on the relative freedoms of action of the Land, Amphibious<sup>9</sup> and Air components. While it is unusual to place the FSCL much beyond the range of the JFLCC's weapon reach, or the capability of his ISR systems, some of the factors that need to be weighed up by the JTFC are:

- a. With which CC does his Main Effort lie?
- b. What are the anticipated rates of movement of his forces, and those of the adversary?<sup>10</sup>
- c. What are the ranges and capabilities of the fire support systems available to his CCs?
- d. What are their ISR capabilities?

2E1.15. **Co-ordination and Communications and Information Systems.** The ability to co-ordinate Joint Fires effectively relies on having effective command and control, Communications and Information Systems (CIS), and co-ordination (particularly that achieved through liaison). The resources to provide special links to facilitate unanticipated Joint Fires activities are inevitably limited. The JTFC, advised by his commander Joint Force Communications and Information Systems, will need to give careful allocation of communications personnel, equipment and bandwidth in order to provide the necessary connectivity between sensors, controllers and weapon systems.

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<sup>8</sup> The US refer to the line that separates the land/amphibious AOO from the remainder of the area within the JOA as the Forward Boundary (FB).

<sup>9</sup> If present.

<sup>10</sup> The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) when in 'defence', rather than when on the offence. During a fast moving advance it may change as frequently as every several hours. Adjustments need to be transmitted early in order to allow detailed co-ordination.

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## APPENDIX 2E2 – FORCE PROTECTION

2E2.1. **The Threat.** The threat posed to the Joint Force that Force Protection (FP) must address has several components including: hostile ISR action, physical attack (air, surface and sub-surface), electronic attack and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attack. Careful and detailed assessment of the threat is vital if FP measures are to be implemented effectively. The assessment process will start at MOD/PJHQ level as part of the planning process and may take account of political guidance on the priority to be given to avoiding casualties. Refinement of this assessment will take place once the force has deployed, followed by additional localised assessments to take account of local factors such as subtle differences in ethnic or political affiliations of the civil population.

2E2.2. **Components of Force Protection.** The measures and means used to achieve FP are particularly wide-ranging but can be grouped as: Air Defence, NBC Defence, Security, Defensive Information Operations, Fratricide Prevention, Joint Personnel Recovery (JPR), Mine Awareness and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), Firefighting and Fire Safety, Road Safety, Environmental Health and Medical FP. These components, and their sub-components, are shown diagrammatically at Figure 2E2.1. This diagram does not represent a hierarchy of importance, nor does it show a command and control hierarchy, it simply shows the areas that will have to be considered in looking at FP. Some will require the detailed involvement of FP staffs, some will require occasional JTFC involvement and some will require staff to maintain no more than an overview with occasional interjections to set force wide policy.

2E2.3. **Air Defence.**<sup>1</sup> Air Defence (AD) is defined as ‘all measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action’.<sup>2</sup> As an integral part of Counter-Air operations, joint AD operations seek to achieve the appropriate level of control of the air, and thus protection of friendly forces from air threats. This is achieved through a joint AD plan which serves the joint campaign by integrating all assigned AD assets, while meeting the requirements of the individual components. AD throughout the Joint Operations Area (JOA) must be based upon agreed joint doctrine from which concepts of operations, detailed plans and compatible tactics, techniques and procedures can be derived. This will apply whether the force is required to operate within an area of influence of an existing fixed AD system, or where no such system exists. As well as the use of appropriate sensors and weapon systems, AD must also include an appropriate warning and reporting system that reaches all parts of the JOA. An element of AD that is likely to be of particular interest to the operational level commander is Theatre Missile Defence.

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<sup>1</sup> Detailed guidance is contained in JWP 3-63 ‘*Joint Air Defence*’.

<sup>2</sup> JWP 3-63.

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


Figure 2E2.1 - The Constituents of Force Protection

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a. **Theatre Missile Defence.**<sup>3</sup> Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) is only one element of AD and must be included within the AD plan to ensure coherence with those other AD forces being employed. However, the potentially catastrophic effects of the successful use by an adversary of weapons such as tactical ballistic missiles or cruise missiles, dictate that the JTFC will have a great interest in the plans and preparations to counter such use. Notwithstanding that the UK does not possess an active Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence capability, the JTFC, in conjunction with the CCs, must plan for TMD operations within the JOA ensuring for example he has sufficient Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) even if the fixed or rotary wing threat is low. The JTFC must seek coverage from other alliance/coalition members, or where active TMD capability is not available within the coalition force, UK forces would have to focus on passive defence, conventional counter-force operations and Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) measures. In this latter category, maximum use should be made of Coalition/Host Nation (HN) ballistic missile warning and reporting arrangements. To achieve this, liaison will be required at JTFHQ, component and local levels.

2E2.4. **Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence.**<sup>4</sup> The aim of UK NBC Defence<sup>5</sup> is to allow UK forces to maintain freedom of action despite the presence, threat of use, or use of nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons. NBC Defence as a function of FP is guided by the same principles as the overall FP process.

a. **Functional Components of NBC Defence.** NBC defence of UK forces is conducted under five functional components along with their supporting policies, doctrine, equipments and procedures. These components are inter-related and underpinned by the principles of FP. The components are:

- (1) Detection, identification and monitoring.
- (2) Warning and reporting.
- (3) Physical protection.
- (4) Hazard management.
- (5) Medical countermeasures and support.

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<sup>3</sup> Incorporating Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD).

<sup>4</sup> Guidance on the planning and conduct of NBC Defence is provided in JWP 3-61.1 'Joint NBC Defence' and detail on aspects of NBC defence operations and on NBC defence equipment is provided in JWP 3-61.1.1 'Joint Manual of NBC Defence'. Warning and Reporting procedures are detailed in ATP-45(B) 'The Reporting of Nuclear Detonations, Biological and Chemical Attacks, and the Predicting and Warning of Associated Hazard' (Operator's Manual).

<sup>5</sup> The term NBC Defence is still used when referring to UK NBC Defence capabilities. The term CBRN is used to when referring to threat types.

Further details on the conduct of operations where the threat of use of CBRN exists are covered in Chapter 3.<sup>6</sup>

2E2.5. **Security.** Security encompasses a myriad of activities that contribute to effective FP. These include:

a. **Arming.** A separate arming directive will generally be required for each nation in which UK forces operate. The production of the arming directive and, where necessary, agreement with host nations, will be the responsibility of JTFHQ staffs. The directive will detail the qualification and currency requirements for individuals. The setting of the Arming State, what weapons and ammunition are to be carried, will also require JTFHQ involvement. Finally, JTFHQ will be responsible for promulgation of agreed Rules of Engagement (ROE) and Guidance for Opening Fire.

b. **Positional/Installation Security.** There are a number of physical and procedural measures that will be put in place to protect positions, installations and units from attack, sabotage and theft. Measures taken can broadly be categorised as active or passive.

(1) **Active Defence.** Active defence includes control of entry, observation of approaches and patrolling to dominate an area outside a defended location or installation in order to prevent adversary reconnaissance, attack preparation and the employment of stand-off weapons.

(2) **Passive Defence.** Passive defence includes: physical protection; camouflage, concealment and deception; and dispersion. These measures will be implemented to reduce the likelihood of detection by an adversary and to reduce the impact of any attack.

c. **Personnel Security.** Personnel Security encompasses those physical and procedural measures taken to protect personnel. These include physical measures to protect personnel from all forms of terrorist attack or reduce the effects of attack e.g. policy on the wearing of combat body armour and helmets. Measures are also required to protect personnel from seditious or subversive influences likely to undermine morale. Protection must also be considered for contractors and locally employed civilians.

d. **Information Security.** Information is a valuable commodity that is essential to the functioning of the Force and particularly the JTFHQ. The JTFC must ensure it is protected and FP measures will include physical and procedural barriers to protect friendly information. The deliberate or

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<sup>6</sup> See Chapter 3, Section III 'Conducting the Campaign'.

inadvertent compromise of classified information by the Media is a risk, and this aspect of information security must be tightly controlled by the JTFHQ. The levels of access afforded to the Media, and the ability to control this, will have an impact on FP.

e. **Equipment Security.** This will include the security of weapons, equipment and ammunition. Any instructions will state the authority required to deviate from recognised procedures and actions to be taken if such deviation is necessary.

f. **Lines of Communication Security.** This will encompass patrols, mine clearance and overwatch to ensure the safety and security of lines of communication.

2E2.6. **Fratricide Prevention.** The implementation of measures for the reduction of fratricide or deaths due to ‘friendly fire’ are a high priority for the JTFC, particularly given the likely political interest in such incidents and potentially devastating effect on own forces morale and cohesion. The JTFC’s aim must be to strive for a complete absence of such casualties or, at the very least, reduce them to a minimum. Measures fall into 2 categories, combat identification (Combat ID) and battlespace management:

a. **Combat Identification.** The prevention of fratricide is greatly enhanced by an effective Combat ID process. The elements of this process are explained at Annex 2D.

b. **Battlespace Management.** A Battlespace Management policy must be formulated and co-ordinated with allies/coalition partners. Battlespace Management will normally be implemented through the use of well-established procedures within each of the physical environments. The Joint Effects Meetings (JEM) process will also contribute greatly to the macro aspects of deconfliction within the JTF.

2E2.7. **Joint Personnel Recovery.** The JTFC should make provision for the recovery of personnel and equipment ‘lost’ within reach of the enemy. Co-ordination of such activities is likely to be a force level issue and may include co-ordination with coalition partners. Judgement of risk/benefit for rare but highly charged ‘rescue’ missions will be made at senior level within the JTFHQ, possibly by the JTFC himself. The subject of Joint Personnel Recovery is dealt with fully in JWP 3-66 ‘*Joint Personnel Recovery*’.

2E2.8. **Mine Awareness and Explosive Ordnance Disposal.** Mine, Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) awareness training will, when necessary, be part of special-to-theatre training. The policy for the conduct and content of such training will be a force level issue. EOD assets are likely to be

deployed into theatre from all 3 Services. FP staffs within the JTFHQ in conjunction with JF Engineers will be responsible for the co-ordination of these scare assets.

**2E2.9. Firefighting and Fire Safety.** Unit commanders are responsible for fire protection measures for their units, including provision of firefighting resources, alarms, procedures, pickets and rehearsals. Fire staff will provide advice on specialist issues including those that arise during the planning and construction of temporary infrastructure, particularly accommodation and headquarters. Commanders may be involved where decisions have to be taken on acceptable levels of risk, where fire safety measures threaten to compromise operational effectiveness.

**2E2.10. Road Safety.** Road safety is an important FP consideration, one that can protect the force from avoidable and often significant attrition. The majority of road safety issues are likely to be staffed by J4 Logistics, but senior commanders may have to be involved where major balance of risk decisions have to be made. Compromise and/or prioritisation may be required when considering road safety measures for example, the wearing of combat body armour and helmets may enhance protection against attack, but it may also degrade driver alertness in a hot climate.

**2E2.11. Environmental Health.** Environmental Health (EH) is generally brigaded with medical in peacetime. However, on operations EH is a distinct, and key, element of FP. The aim of the EH effort is to minimize attrition of the force through disease and non-battle injuries (DNBI).<sup>7</sup> EH thus has linkages to both medical and FP. A key EH activity is Health Risk Management, the aim of which is to minimize preventable casualties and to ensure that where casualties do occur, the appropriate resources are available to treat them.

**2E2.12. Medical Force Protection.** Medical operations are a Logistics activity and are therefore addressed by the J4 branch. However, elements of medical activity contribute to FP, medical and FP staffs must therefore liaise and co-operate to address these issues. Close liaison is particularly important in the event of suspicion that a biological warfare agent might have been used. It may be difficult to determine that such an attack has occurred, and monitoring illness and symptom occurrence is likely to be a crucial factor in informing that decision.

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<sup>7</sup> Historically amongst the cause of greatest casualties.

## ANNEX 2F – INTER-COMPONENT LIAISON

Parent Component	Host Component				
	Maritime	Land	Air	SF	Log
Maritime		MCE(L)	MCE(A)(3)	(4)	(1)
Land	BCD(M)		BCD(A)	(4)	(2)
Air	AOCC(M) (3)	AOCC(L)		AOCC(SF)	(5)
SF	(4)	SF LO	(4)		NA
Log	Nil	Nil	Nil	Nil	

### Key:

AOCC - Air Operations Co-ordination Centre

MCE - Maritime Co-ordination Element

BCD - Battlefield Co-ordination Detachment

### Notes:

1. COMUKMARFOR is complemented with its own logistics team who provides support to all units under the command of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC).
2. Currently there is no standing Joint Force Logistic HQ. Land has two Logistics Brigades that frequently undertake this role and hence, if used, Land Component (Liaison Officers) LOs are normally not required.
3. Complement billets on each other's staff in peacetime.
4. Special Forces LOs are not routinely provided to the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) and Air Component Commander (ACC), or vice versa, but will be allocated on a case-by-case basis as necessary (SF has dedicated air support assets which provide their own LOs at the tactical level).
5. Organic support to deployed RAF units is provided by the Air Logistic Cell (ALC) which is part of the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) HQ.

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## CHAPTER 3 – CAMPAIGN EXECUTION

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to describe the key co-ordination and synchronisation activities which allow the Chief of Staff (COS) to execute - that is implement and control - the Joint Task Force Commander's (JTFC's) campaign plan.

Section I – Introduction

Section II – Preparatory Activities

Section III – Conducting the Campaign

Section IV – Co-ordination and Synchronisation

Section V – Termination and Transition

### SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

#### Managing the Implementation of the Plan

301. While Component Commanders (CCs) have the means by which military action can be prosecuted and delivered at the tactical level, their capabilities are most effective only when applied in concert. This is the principle of synergy, which is only achieved through excellent integration, co-ordination and synchronisation. In this capacity the role of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) as the co-ordinator of the various component operations, at different tempos, with a high degree of delegation of decision-making is key. Having made his campaign plan, the JTFC will:

- a. Apply the military resources allocated to him to achieve his goal within any constraints imposed.
- b. Identify and weigh up the effect of each action, in terms of the impact it will have on achieving his objectives, the risks that it entails, and the resources required for its success and means of minimising the risk.
- c. Exploit the situation by adjusting and developing his plans in order to contend with changing circumstances and to take advantage of opportunities.
- d. Re-visit the operational estimate at regular intervals or whenever there is a change in the operational situation or when Campaign Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) dictates a change in emphasis is required.<sup>1</sup>

302. It is counter productive to try and over-regulate what is an inherently complex and chaotic activity; placing absolute faith in closely sequenced plans made in advance does not work. However, what is vital is the close synchronisation of strategic, operational and tactical planning in the build-up, and to have a series of robust

<sup>1</sup> See JWP 5-00 'Joint Operations Planning', Chapter 2.

mechanisms in place to both keep the campaign on track and to cope with the unexpected. An important and parallel consideration is to endeavour to keep the Joint Task Force (JTF) agile enough to cope with change in a responsive manner.

## SECTION II – PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES

### Preparedness

303. **Pragmatism.** At the point when an operation looks as though it will be likely, multiple activities occur concurrently and at every level, all requiring integration and co-ordination. In particular, surveillance operations of the potential Joint Operations Area (JOA) should be commenced and intelligence forces based outside the JOA should be focussed on gathering intelligence to inform strategic decision-making. However, pragmatism recognises that military force might be committed without the strategic conditions for success having been set (particularly in a rapidly unfolding crisis). From the beginning there is a frenzy of activity. The need for resources has been identified but not the source, organisations and structures need to be established information pours in from all directions or there may be a paucity of information. Moreover, while there are established practices for national operations, multinational operations bring significant added complication. Even apparently straightforward activities, such as the early deployment of reconnaissance parties or enabling capabilities, may be unusually difficult. Most important of all is the reality that the situation is unlikely to wait for the measured build-up of forces.

304. **Graduated Readiness.** For many reasons, the holding of large numbers of forces at high readiness is counter-productive. Therefore, the UK operates the principle of graduated readiness, working back from the time required to be ready for operations. The period of time leading up to operations is referred to as the warning time,<sup>2</sup> and the remainder of Section II follows this model. Illustrated at Figure 3.1, its principal elements are:


- a. **Decision Time.** The period from first indication of the crisis until the political decision to commit forces.<sup>3</sup>
- b. **Readiness.** The time required for force elements to be ready to deploy for operations.
- c. **Deployment Time.** The period to deploy forces into theatre. It is largely a function of size and composition of the JTF, distance and available strategic lift.

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<sup>2</sup> The time between the first indication of a crisis and the time of the first planned engagement in the JOA.

<sup>3</sup> Political reality dictates that 'commit' has 2 distinct stages. Commitment in terms of actual deployment into the JOA, and commitment in terms of the actual conduct of operations.

d. **In Theatre Preparation.** The time to be ready to commence operations including acclimatisation training, force integration and tactical deployment.



**Figure 3.1 – The UK's Preparedness Model**

### **Decision Time**

305. **Permanent Joint Headquarters Operations Teams.** Once an operation gets underway, the focus for staff effort within the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) moves away from J5 Plans Division to the J3 Operations Division. Contingency Planning Team (CPT) members will form the nucleus of an Operational Team (OT) under the direction of the J3 OT Leader. The function of the OT is to conduct the day-to-day business of deploying, sustaining and recovering the force and acting eventually as the single interface between the JTFHQ in the JOA, the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO), other nations, and the supporting commands.

306. **Joint Force Headquarters Situational Awareness.** As a crisis develops the JFHQ will form a central Situation Awareness Group (SAG) to monitor impending crisis in parallel with the PJHQ CPT and OT. While not yet having the full planning remit required for a JTFHQ, it nevertheless acts as the focus for briefing, initial planning and decision-making in the early days of an impending crisis. If the JFHQ is then subsequently not chosen as the operational headquarters, it is still probable that its SAG, at least in the early stages, will migrate across to the selected JTFHQ.

307. **Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.** Experience has shown the rapid despatch of an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT)<sup>4</sup> from the JFHQ to a potential theatre of operations is vital for early situational awareness. Following briefing by the PJHQ Operational team (OT), the OLRT will be despatched with a directive from the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) to gather factual information on the JOA and liaise in order to allow properly informed strategic decisions to take place. Where possible OLRTs will integrate with the appropriate UK diplomatic structure. In outline, the tasks of an OLRT include:

<sup>4</sup> Consisting of a team leader, intelligence, operations, logistics, communications operators as well as other operators as required.

- a. **Liaison.** OLRTs will liaise with host nation authorities, allies, possible coalition partners and other important agencies and organisations already in the area of interest.
- b. **Reconnaissance.** The OLRT will conduct as detailed a review of the situation as is possible without compromising their safety. They are likely to recommend the most appropriate location for the initial Command and Control (C2) elements of any follow on elements, and will also scope the requirement for Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) and the need for Access, Basing and Overflight (ABO).
- c. **Review of Existing Plans.** It is likely that standing plans, if any exist, will need updating.<sup>5</sup>
- d. **Advice and Reports.** The OLRT reports to the Jt Comd through the OT, who are then responsible for keeping the JTFC<sup>6</sup> informed of developments. The OLRT might return to the UK to back-brief the JT Comd and JTFC and be re-integrated into the JTFHQ, but is more likely to remain in the JOA until the arrival of the Main Body to enable subsequent JTF/National Contingent (NC) access and bolster the nucleus of the JTFHQ advance elements.

308. **Production of the Joint Statement of Requirement.** On completion of the strategic estimate, PJHQ J5 produces and issues a Joint Statement of Requirement (JSOR). The key elements of the JSOR are a statement of the Jt Comd's intent, outline courses of action, capability required for each course, an outline sustainability statement (if known) and any constraints. The JSOR may initially have to be based on a series of assumptions that will be refined subsequently as more information becomes available.

309. **The Joint Force Element Table.** From the production of the JSOR comes an assessment of required capabilities which are passed to the Front Line Commands (FLCs) who then produce their single-Service Force Element Tables (FETs). These are then consolidated (through a process of negotiation with Ministers and the FLCs), by the OT into a Joint Force Element Table (JFET). This informs the planning process within the JTFHQ and leads to the construction of the Joint Desired Order of Arrival matrix (JDOA) by the JTFHQ and gives the Defence Transport and Movement Agency (DTMA) an early indication of the likely lift requirement. This is turned into a

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<sup>5</sup> Such as civil contingency plans, security plans for UK personnel, and UK Joint Campaign Plans. See also JWP 5-00, Chapter 3.

<sup>6</sup> Who may not have been formally nominated at this point.

detailed deployment plan by PJHQ and then enacted by the nominated Mounting HQ,<sup>7</sup> which will be one of the FLCs. In addition the JFET provides:

- a. An authoritative statement of the capability, by force element, assigned to the JTF.
- b. DTMA with the information necessary to enable them to deliver appropriate strategic lift.
- c. The ability to monitor manning levels and manage deployment.
- d. Acts as a basis for the JDOA.
- e. Provides a logical basis for identifying and changing notice to move (NTM).
- f. The basis to calculate sustainability requirements.
- g. It can also form the basis for planning roulement and redeployment.

310. **The Assignment of Force Elements.** The process of assignment adopted by the JTFC takes a joint approach in determining the best mix of capabilities meaning that force elements traditionally associated with one component might be aligned to another component. Examples include strategic communications or Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) units; another is the basing of air component aircraft on the carriers operated by the maritime component. Well recognised by the air component, the assignment process has useful applicability at the operational level and uses the following 4 terms:

- a. **Allotment.** Allotment is a temporary change in the assignment of forces between subordinate commanders. The authority to allot is vested in the commander having Operational Command (OPCOM).
- b. **Apportionment.** Apportionment, which is the responsibility of the JTFC, is the determination of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to a particular operation, effect and or geographic area for a given period of time.
- c. **Allocation.** Allocation is the translation of an apportionment decision into the required effort by force elements, by unit number and type.
- d. **Tasking.** Tasking is the process of translating allocation of force elements into orders and passing these orders to the units involved.

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<sup>7</sup> A lead Mounting HQ will be nominated by PJHQ to co-ordinate mounting of the JTF. This HQ will provide instructions and the wherewithal that allow the FLCs to deploy their force elements.

311. **Formal Commitment to Operations.** In the UK, formal recognition of the national commitment of military forces to an operation is usually achieved through a statement delivered by the Secretary of State for Defence in the House of Commons.

## Readiness

312. **Establishing a Multinational Joint Task Force.** While the JTFC has the onus placed upon him for building the multinational JTF, he should expect to be able to draw it together in a spirit of positive international co-operation. However, both he and his senior staff need to be alert to the various National Contingent Commanders' (NCCs') understandable efforts to advance their national interest, particularly regarding the role they wish their forces to perform. Building a multinational JTF is as much based on personal relationships and shared common purpose as it is upon publicly stated agreements or commitments (though it is also essential that all requests or decisions have an identifiable audit trail). A JTFC, and his Political/Policy Advisor (POLAD), must expect to spend a significant amount of their time ensuring that multinational partners are content about how the campaign is developing, and that they fully understand, and accept, the JTFC's command authority and intent. This places a significant additional burden on the JTFC. As a consequence, the COS, or deputy commander if one is appointed, will have to assume additional responsibilities.

313. **Force Projection.** Once the decision has been made for the UK to commit forces, the ability to project force early will depend on a number of factors. These include:

- a. The size of the joint force to be deployed.
- b. Proximity and availability of UK assets to the JOA.
- c. Availability of strategic lift assets.
- d. Availability of regional ABO.
- e. Ability to operate with, and/or share capability with, coalition partners or allies.

314. **Constructing a Multinational Joint Task Force.** As an operation unfolds it is usual to hold a Troop Contributing Nations (TCN) meeting, sponsored by the PJHQ, focusing on the development of the JSOR. In addition, these gatherings are useful in gaining a common understanding of the situation within the fledgling JOA and to allow early issues to be aired. These meetings also act as a baseline from which the force contributors inform their own planning. Throughout this process, the COS JTFHQ, supported by the Deputy COS (DCOS), has a central role in assessing the likely capabilities to be offered and, if they are subsequently accepted, how they might be best utilised. They must be careful to ensure freedom of manoeuvre is not

constrained by the (often-conflicting) interests of the TCNs, and at this point promises about possible roles should be avoided. Indeed, every opportunity should be sought to burden share and if possible to reduce overall numbers, particularly with the sustaining capabilities. The process of integrating the elements of the force begins at this time, then continues during build-up and is strengthened over time. As the force forms, the task of integration largely falls to the functional heads within the JTFHQ, assisted by its permanent staff members. Following the meeting, and if operational circumstances permit it, NCCs of the TCNs might depart for a reconnaissance of the JOA.

**315. Transition from an Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team to a Joint Task Force Headquarters.** In circumstances where the OLRT transitions into a JTFHQ without first returning to the UK, the OLRT must be configured to command from the outset, bringing with it the additional requirement for staff and communications infrastructure. This is an important transitional phase and a vulnerable period in the progress of the operation where the COS JTFHQ has to take personal charge. The structure and formation of the HQ is the most important thing to get right before the force itself is built, and in many respects this critical period sets the tone for the remainder of the operation.

**316. Pre-Deployment Training, Validation and Rehearsals.** If time permits, the JTFC will make use of the standing operational level training regime operated by PJHQ J7. A feature of readiness is that, except for organisations at the highest readiness, normal peacetime structures and other commitments inhibit the degree to which headquarters and forces are ready to deploy on joint operations. Nevertheless, training is the most important peacetime military activity and consequently, the UK has established a tiered training scheme to maintain joint currency. Where possible, exercises will involve Ministers from all relevant other government departments (OGDs), thus exposing these departments to military doctrine and processes. The UK's Joint Operations Planning Course (JOPC) provides additional training for commanders and their staff, and is used to supplement advanced and higher training received at the Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC). The basic guide to the hierarchy of UK joint and multinational collective training is at Annex 3A. The JTF will also conduct extensive training at all levels during the warning time in order to prepare for the specific circumstances of the operation at hand.

**317. Joint Desired Order of Arrival.** The COS will take a close personal interest in the preparation of the JDOA<sup>8</sup> and its associated Desired Order of Arrival Staff Table (DOAST), thus ensuring the JTF arrives in the Forward Mounting Base (FMB) or JOA in correct sequence in accordance with the JTFC's intent. However, nations will still go ahead and conduct their own deployment, using their own strategic means in accordance with their national priorities. While it is important to have minimum control mechanisms required to achieve inflow, it is essential that, when necessary, the

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<sup>8</sup> US forces use the term Time Phase Force Deployment Data (TPFDD); phonetically the 'tipfid'.

COS can impose order so that at all times the JTF remains properly balanced. For example, by matching sustainment levels to force levels,<sup>9</sup> by ensuring Force Protection (FP) keeps pace with force inload and, where it exists, additional capacity is made available for the good of all the force.

318. **Mounting the Force.** The Detailed Deployment Plan (DDP)<sup>10</sup> is the merging of the products from the JFET and the JDOA. The process is led by the PJHQ J3 Deployment Cell, in consultation with the nominated JTFHQ, FLCs, the Mounting HQ and the DTMA. A close relationship continues throughout the operation, as all parties respond as necessary to changes in operational priorities.

319. **Preparation of Component Mounting Instructions.** On receipt of the DDP, the FLCs will produce their detailed Mounting Instructions (drawing on the guidance provided by the Mounting HQ Instruction) and prepare their force elements ready to be called forward by the Mounting HQ to the Points of Embarkation. The PJHQ will, however, retain mounting authority and thus maintain control of the overall deployment, except in the case of small-scale operations when a single command may be appointed to be the mounting authority for the rest.

## Deployment

320. **Deployment Flow.** The JTF should be inloaded into the JOA in accordance with the JTFC's intent but, because it is a highly dynamic process, this principle is not as simple as it might first appear and can become an emotive issue, with the components competing for the allocation of limited strategic lift. While the deployment plan is J3 led, most of its key functions and expertise are logistic; indeed as joint enablers, logistic units are likely to front load the deployment.<sup>11</sup> The flow into and out of theatre requires a constant balancing act, and will involve intense planning effort by the PJHQ, the FLCs, the deploying HQ and the JTFHQ. It should be noted that the deployment and sustainment phases, although technically discrete, will invariably overlap.<sup>12</sup>

321. **Training and Rehearsals En-route.** Training, but particularly rehearsals, are able to deliver an important message to a potential adversary regarding intent and credibility, having a purpose broadly similar to the naval characteristic of a 'demonstration'. The training and rehearsal posture may have a central part to play in Information Operations (Info Ops) and thus it follows that everybody involved at this stage of operations has to rigorously respect the Operations Security (OPSEC) requirement in order that the operational effect is achieved.

<sup>9</sup> Including holding a reserve of essential supplies.

<sup>10</sup> The US use the term Time Phase Force Deployment List (TPFDL).

<sup>11</sup> Detail on this is in JWP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*', and supplemented in IJPW 1-00 '*Joint Operational Personnel Administration*'.

<sup>12</sup> For more on the mechanics of deployment, including the use of Forward Mounting Bases and Forward Operating Bases, refer to JWP 4-00, Chapter 7, Section II.

322. **Entry into the Joint Operations Area.** In terms of force build-up, it is a standard principle to build up a bridgehead before commencing operations. It clearly makes sense wherever possible to conduct a benign<sup>13</sup> and deliberate deployment rather than a quick opposed entry.<sup>14</sup>

### **In-Theatre Preparation**

323. **Reception, Staging, Onward Movement (and Integration).** The receipt, briefing and movement of personnel into the JOA is a key responsibility directed by the J3 JTFHQ but usually executed by the JFLogCC. Although Reception, Staging, Onward Movement (RSOM)) is nominally a logistic function, this complex, but largely administrative joint activity, is best co-ordinated through a single headquarters to draw together the movements and administrative functions necessary to receive, move, process, accommodate and provide life support functions to a transiting force. The integration aspects will normally be conducted by the environmental components assisted by guidance on local conditions, conducted by a Joint Force Orientation and Briefing Unit (JFOBU). For the JFLogCC, the RSOM function tends to merge directly into one of sustaining the force. The reverse of RSOM, Reception, Staging Onward movement and 'Recovery' is activated once the decision has been taken to re-deploy the force.

324. **Joint Task Force Commander's Priority List.** Although the DDP should embody the execution of PJHQ's deployment planning, circumstances such as changed priorities and unforeseen slippage in the deployment require the JTFC through his COS to personally influence the actual deployment. A common technique used is to draw up a priority list as a means to amend the detail of the DDP to meet the changing situation. This may involve a change in the priority of arrival of force elements, additional force elements identified, equipment issues, Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) and sustainment into the JOA. These can be raised as specific issues or brought up at appropriate junctures such as on Assessment Reports (ASSESSREPs) or during the daily Video Teleconference (VTCs).

325. **Initial Operating Capability.** The point at which Initial Operating Capability (IOC) occurs is largely a subjective assessment based on political requirements and or pragmatism. Its achievement is useful in expressing a 'halfway-house' between the initial deployment into the JOA, and the achievement of a full capability. The declaration of IOC is the JTFC's call and relates directly to the operational situation. For example, in a campaign which has an initial deterrence/defensive posture, IOC

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<sup>13</sup> **Benign Entry.** The opportunity to build-up combat power gradually enhances all the preparatory activities such as acclimatisation, integration and training. The flow into the JOA will be controlled to match the DDP. It therefore follows that in-load will tend towards the logistic effort, rather than combat capability in the initial stages.

<sup>14</sup> **Opposed Entry.** It should be the option of last choice, characterised by its risk and having combat elements front-loaded and immediately ready for combat.

may be related to achieving that effect, or it might be the added ability to conduct limited offensive operations.

326. **Full Operating Capability.** In theory, Full Operating Capability (FOC) is achieved once all politically endorsed<sup>15</sup> force elements have arrived in the JOA, completed in-theatre preparation and are ready to commence operations. This may be achieved after some elements (the IOC) have already commenced operations.

### SECTION III – CONDUCTING THE CAMPAIGN

327. The operational level framework of SHAPE, ATTACK, PROTECT and EXPLOIT should not be regarded as phases and neither are they necessarily neatly sequenced in that order. Due to the highly dynamic nature of military operations, they will be concurrent and continuous. Indeed, it is the complex relationship between activities, in terms of time, space and purpose that requires orchestration by the JTFC, for it is only at the operational level that there is sufficient visibility of the full range of inter-related activities. While the CCs are vested with the means by which military action can be prosecuted and delivered at the tactical level, the JTFC has to exert his influence, where necessary, to ensure that the sum of these actions is consistent with his campaign objectives.

328. **Effects Based Operations.** Success is only fully realised when capability is focused, through set actions, to achieve a specific ‘effect’ (not just the destruction of physical target sets) on an adversary in accordance with set objectives. Actions fall into two broad categories: physical (and more than just kinetic weapons) that can be targeted against capability, and cognitive actions that are targeted against will. Effects are best co-ordinated at the highest levels by integrating all 3 levers of national power. Whilst the concepts and methodology for contemporary effects based operations is still maturing, its genesis within the JTFHQ, the Joint Effects Meeting (JEM) process, is established and has the capacity to adapt to new thinking in this area. However, a truly Effects Based Approach (EBA) is one that identifies the pan-JOA actions that will lead to campaign success (the *end-state*). Thereafter, the optimum mix of capabilities and techniques to achieve these effects must be identified. At the operational level, the approach will be joint so that tactical operations can be synchronised by the JTFHQ through the JEM and Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB) as well as by the other ‘actors’ present in the form of focused, and ideally, co-ordinated actions, on the adversary. An essential element of an ‘effects’ approach is having a process to track whether the effect is happening. This is achieved through Campaign Effectiveness Analysis (CEA).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>15</sup> In the UK normally tabled as a formal statement to the House of Commons by S of S.

<sup>16</sup> See JWP 5-00 ‘Joint Operations Planning’, Annex 2E.

## Shaping the Operational Environment

329. **Isolating the Adversary.** Activity within all three levers of state power, from the diplomatic, through economic measures (including sanctions), to the exploitation of events in the JOA and the build up of forces will be applied to isolate the adversary by denying him allies, sanctuary or other options.<sup>17</sup> The overall purpose is to limit the potential for horizontal or vertical escalation, and the JTFC has a particular role to play in shaping the local situation.<sup>18</sup> Info Ops is pivotal in creating in the mind of the adversary the perception that achieving his end-state is not possible and will lead to significant loss of political credibility and resources. Indeed, he will be severely curtailed by continuing with the course of action he has chosen. Identifying the vulnerabilities (for later attack) of the critical capabilities which underpin his centre of gravity (CoG) is the essence of the manoeuvrist approach, where the effect achieved will be far greater than a direct assault on the adversary's strengths.

330. **Preliminary Operations.** Preliminary operations will usually be required prior to engagement of the main body of the JTF. The principal purpose of preliminary operations is to shape and prepare the JOA for its favourable exploitation. Examples include, setting up logistics nodes and lines of communication, establishing Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Communications and Information Systems (CIS) architecture, conditioning the force to the specifics of that operation, or by conducting Special Forces (SF) operations.

331. **Employment of Strategic Assets.** The early deployment by strategic assets such as SF and submarines can have a powerful operational benefit to the JTFC.<sup>19</sup>

332. **Gaining Control of the Environment.** Gaining the necessary measure of control of the maritime, land and air environments, as well as control of the Electro Magnetic Spectrum (EMS), although probably limited in time and space, are necessary preconditions for enabling freedom to manoeuvre for the JTF within the JOA. Once this control has been achieved, it requires a deliberate and concerted effort to maintain any level of superiority over the dimensions of the battlespace.

### Attacking the Adversary's Will and Cohesion<sup>20</sup>

333. To dominate the situation requires the ability as well as the resolve and determination to outwit the adversary. Opportunities have to be seized when they

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<sup>17</sup> Examples include coercing foreign powers to comply through use of a co-ordinated international and national strategy, to the lowest levels, for example striking at second echelon forces, or removing an adversary's command and control infrastructure, or targeting the views and opinions of the indigenous population.

<sup>18</sup> The production of an 'intent' schematic neatly summarises the effects to be achieved. See JWP 5-00, Annex 2B, Figure 2B.1.

<sup>19</sup> For more information on the role of SF refer either to Annex 1C or to JWP 3-40 '*Special Forces Operations*'.

<sup>20</sup> In a situation where there is no clear adversary, such as a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO), this might be the object of the mission, i.e. the thing which provides the greatest resistance to the mission, and in that sense is 'Affect' rather than 'Attack' and so will not be focussed on cohesion but on ensuring 3<sup>rd</sup> parties do not hinder the progress of the mission.

present themselves and every effort made to avoid fighting the adversary on his terms; his strengths must be rendered ineffective. Critical capabilities such as C2 systems, high value bases, logistic and industrial facilities must be identified and, if not appropriate for exploitation by other means, dealt with as part of the JEM process. Successfully attacking the cohesion of the adversary force will cause it to break apart, leading to its inevitable defeat.

334. However, the JTFC must consider the manner in which that defeat is achieved. A resolute adversary may consider it worth fighting on in a piecemeal manner, perhaps changing tactics in order to prolong the struggle in the hope it will undermine the will and cohesion of the JTF. Particular problems arise when confronting an adversary that has the ability to fight cohesively as an organised body, then to change into a more diffuse, loosely structured organisation. When faced with the latter circumstance effort tends to be expended at defeating the adversary's will rather than attacking identifiable material objects.

335. **Means of Attacking Will and Cohesion.** The following may be used to attack the cohesion of the enemy:

a. **Manoeuvre.** Manoeuvre is the means by which force is concentrated to achieve surprise, psychological shock, physical momentum and moral dominance. Through manoeuvre, a position of advantage relative to the adversary is sought by which force can be threatened or applied. Tactical manoeuvre aims to gain advantage in combat where the JTFC seeks to secure a decisive advantage before battle is joined. Operational manoeuvre, on the other hand, extends beyond the realm of combat. Indeed it aims to reduce the amount of fighting necessary. Operational manoeuvre is applied directly to achieving the end-state and should be directed against the adversary's CoG.

(1) **Firepower.** Firepower, prosecuted at the operational level by the Joint Fires Element (JFE) of the JEM, destroys, neutralises, suppresses and demoralises. It is delivered by platforms from the sea, land or air having both lethal and non-lethal objectives. It is firepower that provides the violent, destructive force that amplifies the effects of the other means of attacking cohesion. The resultant effects of firepower are the sum of volume, accuracy, lethality, suddenness and unpredictability. These are magnified by synchronising firepower in time and space. Factors that determine how effectively firepower can be applied are the quality of target acquisition and command systems, munitions supply and tactical and operational mobility of the delivery system. The most important qualities of firepower are the speed and precision with which weapons can be applied, the ability to synchronise the effects of different fire systems against one target, the flexibility to

switch rapidly between targets, to be responsive and be day/night and all weather capable.

(2) **Operational Mobility.** Tactical mobility is the flexibility to move swiftly up to, around and between objectives in the physical sense. Operational mobility can be regarded as the ability for the JTF to closely match the requirements of the Campaign Plan as well as maintaining flexibility to rapidly exploit fleeting opportunities.

b. **Tempo and Simultaneity.** Tempo is a significant factor because it is through higher tempo relative to the adversary that the initiative is gained which then allows the JTFC to dictate the terms of the campaign. However, in multinational operations, achieving higher tempo than the adversary is particularly challenging. Tempo seeks to overwhelm the adversary decision-making process and make him increasingly unable to react, his responses being inappropriate in terms of time and space. Tempo is:

(1) Gained by multiple, synchronised tactical actions undertaken simultaneously. This is the principle of simultaneity. The adversary is attacked or threatened in so many ways at once that he is denied the ability to concentrate on one problem at a time, or even to establish priorities. He faces multiple dilemmas about how and where to react. If the effect is achieved against a number of different target sets, cumulative effect of paralysis spreads throughout the adversary's force. By using the full range of friendly capability, the adversary's problems are compounded; his response to one form of attack either makes him more vulnerable or exacerbates a different problem. Simultaneity must be seen through the eyes of the adversary and its effect judged by the results of his subsequent decision-making.

(2) Enhanced by anticipating tactical results and by developing in advance operational sequels for exploiting those results without delay.

(3) Generated by creating a command system based on decentralised decision-making within the framework of a unified intent.

c. **Surprise.** Surprise (to which OPSEC makes a major contribution) causes disorientation and decision-making paralysis resulting from unexpected events, or the scale of events, and degrades the adversary's ability to react effectively. Tactical surprise catches the adversary unprepared in such a way as to affect the outcome of combat; it is of a relatively immediate and local nature. Operational surprise catches the adversary unprepared in such a way as to affect the whole campaign and thus, if it can be achieved, is often decisive.

Surprise can be achieved using the following techniques, which are at their most effective when combined:

- (1) Operational deception, by which the adversary is misled into acting in a way prejudicial to his interests, which is subsequently exploited.
- (2) Ambiguity, leaving the adversary confused as to one's intentions through variable or multiple actions.
- (3) By being novel and unpredictable within the constraint of taking appropriate levels of risk.

d. **Asymmetric Warfare.** Few aggressors knowingly choose to confront military strength according to established rules. Rather they will seek an 'asymmetric advantage' relative to the forces they are matched against. Exploiting an opponent's weakness is fundamental to success, just as the identification of the weakness that an opponent would wish to target is crucial to countering the asymmetric threat (i.e. PROTECT). There are 3 principal aspects of asymmetry in conflict:

- (1) The asymmetric nature of an opponent himself. For example is he difficult to identify, to target, or to negotiate with?
- (2) The asymmetric nature of an opponent's ideals or culture which *de facto* are at variance to one's own beliefs, priorities and moral constraints. Examples include the willingness to accept casualties, or being prepared to target the civilian population.
- (3) The asymmetric methods that an opponent may employ to counter a qualitative and quantitative advantage, such as by the use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear, (CBRN) weapons, by adopting insurgency tactics, or by attacking the JTF at its home bases or along the Lines of Communication (LOC). Indeed, the adversary may export his capabilities outside the JOA and attack selected targets for their political and economic effect anywhere it suits his purpose.

### Protecting the Cohesion of the Force

336. The military effectiveness of a force is conditioned by the extent to which the 3 components of fighting power - the conceptual, moral and physical - can be bound together.<sup>21</sup> However, on multinational operations, contributing nations provide forces of different capability, including different doctrine and often, incompatible equipment.

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<sup>21</sup> JWP 0-01 'British Defence Doctrine'.

There are many practical methods of enhancing FP and it is recognised as a key operations support activity, likely to have its own line of operation (see Annex 2E). Of most importance with regard to FP is the necessity by the JTFC to pay heed to the following 2 principles of war:

a. **Maintenance of Morale.** Having identified a friendly force's critical vulnerabilities, an adversary will make every effort to attack weakness, to reduce morale and thus erode cohesion. The JTFC will be sensitive to the living and operating conditions of all the force to ensure that all elements are treated fairly and that burden is shared. Morale is generally at its best in small, cohesive and self-contained units that are well motivated and have a strong sense of identity and purpose. Trying to engender this spirit in a large, multinational JTF is a significant challenge for all commanders. The JTFC must attempt to mask these vulnerabilities by enunciation of a unifying purpose and keep the force focused on the maintenance of the aim, based upon a measured assessment of the threat whilst ensuring an appropriate and proportional approach to FP.

b. **Unity of Purpose.** The effective employment of military forces requires them to be directed relentlessly toward the achievement of a common aim or mission. The JTFC plays a key role in focussing his command on achieving the mission and generating a common sense of purpose. Within multinational operations, individual goals and interests will need to be harmonised to ensure a common purpose, and consensus will need to be maintained to ensure political and military cohesion. The JTFC may find that he will need to dampen national preference for the good of the force as a whole.

337. **Weapons of Mass Destruction.** Obviously, the threat, or use, of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will have a very significant impact on the progress of the campaign, specifically on the moral and physical cohesion of the JTF. Dealing with this eventuality might be so important as to place it at the heart of the Campaign's objectives. Expectation of the use of WMD can affect the following:

a. Tempo, by slowing it down primarily because of additional friction introduced by having to take steps to protect the JTF and/or civilian population.

b. An adverse impact on local and international public opinion leading to loss of media and public support for the objectives of the campaign because the objectives were not seen to be worth the risk of the possible release of CBRN agents.

c. Weakening of co-operation for the JTF by those countries who might see themselves at risk.

d. The undermining of wider Campaign objectives and particularly cohesion within the JTF due to differences in NBC Defence capabilities amongst contributing nations' forces, which could be exploited by the adversary by deliberately attacking weaker elements. To counter the WMD threat, the JTFC might consider taking the following precautions:

- (1) Devise specific punitive Information Operations (Info Ops) lines, including taking deliberate action to deter the adversary. The decision to attack an adversary's WMD capability (weapons, delivery systems or storage or production facilities) might well then become a high priority. However, this could lead to the release of contamination, presenting a significant hazard to human life and to the environment.
- (2) Establish a JTF NBC Defence infrastructure (including centrally organised training) and share NBC Defence capability to minimise differences in capability.
- (3) Ensure that there is adequate Theatre Missile Defence (TMD).<sup>22</sup>
- (4) Ensure planning is conducted to evaluate and prepare for the impact of having large numbers of displaced civilians.
- (5) Ensure medical provision is made to deal with large numbers of casualties.

### **Exploiting the Situation by Direct and Indirect Means**

338. **Exploitation of the Battlespace.** No plan, however well prepared, survives long before it needs modification. The intuition of the JTFC combined with good situational awareness are key attributes in the successful execution of a campaign. Exploiting the situation is all about recognising the opportunities to do so when they arise, and by having the agility to react (for example by undertaking a rapid and decisive early deployment to pre-empt escalation). The following contributing factors should be considered:

- a. The requirement not only to identify and plan for opportunities but also to create them.
- b. Possession of the means and will to exploit an opportunity.
- c. Use of offensive action will invariably be fundamental to seizing and holding the initiative.

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<sup>22</sup> The UK does not currently possess an active TBMD defence capability, instead relying on alliance or coalition partners to fill this capability gap.

- d. A higher tempo and agile force greatly assists the effort to create opportunities to exploit.
- e. Manoeuvre is key to seizing and maintaining the initiative.

339. **Continuous Planning.** As a function of planning, opportunities may be identified and developed that can drastically reduce the effort originally envisaged in initial planning. Planning staff will constantly review and revise plans based on developments.<sup>23</sup> The importance of this cannot be over emphasised. Situations change, intelligence reports reveal factors that may not have been considered, assets assumed to be available may become unavailable or the adversary does something unexpected. All these changes need to be applied against the deductions made in the original estimate to ascertain their impact.

## SECTION IV – CO-ORDINATION AND SYNCHRONISATION

### Interaction with the Strategic Level

340. Having given direction and guidance to the JTFC, passed operational control over to him, allocated the forces required to achieve the mission, and assisted with the deployment and sustainment of the force, the PJHQ and the MOD continue to be closely involved for the duration of the campaign.<sup>24</sup> It therefore follows that underpinning the JTFHQ's daily rhythm is the requirement for regular briefings, formal reports and returns up and down the Chain of Command. In addition, certain decisions, such as those involving targeting, Rules of Engagement (ROE) and the media can only be taken at higher levels, so the process must reflect these imperatives. An important aspect of ensuring understanding and building confidence is the requirement for face-to-face contact, as well as protocol in its widest sense. Visits to the JOA are an important activity, providing senior personnel with a personal perspective and to enable them to meet members of the JTF. Nevertheless, and for obvious reasons, all visits into the JOA will need to be tightly controlled.

### Command Factors

341. **Intent.** The JTFC will be personally exercised with making the major decisions regarding the employment of his force<sup>25</sup> and in steering the situation to his advantage, which, when appropriate, even includes deciding not to act.<sup>26</sup> This is

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<sup>23</sup> The central role that continuous planning plays in the development of the campaign can be found in JWP 5-00, Chapter 3, Section III.

<sup>24</sup> A NATO/EU JTFC on Article 5 type operations will receive OPCOM of assigned forces. A US Combatant Commander has OPCOM of all US forces. Where a UK JTFC/NCC is appointed, he should be given as a minimum OPCON of assigned national forces and preferably OPCOM.

<sup>25</sup> See JDP 01, Chapter 4, Section IV.

<sup>26</sup> The OODA Loop (Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action) provides a basic framework for decision-making. The stages of the decision process being: Direction, Consultation, Consideration, Decision and Execution.

because the JTFC who is proactive and more versatile than his opponent will gain the winning advantage. Regardless of what he decides, it is essential he communicates his intent to his staff and CCs so they can prosecute their actions in the right context. A commonly used tool by JTFCs is the intent schematic,<sup>27</sup> which can portray, in a number of ways, the effects he wishes to achieve within the JOA. Commonly, either a matrix or a geographical representation is drawn up showing where and when he wishes various effects to happen.

342. **Mission Command.** Within the principle of mission command the JTFC will seek to ensure that his CCs, his COS and DCOS, the functional heads in the headquarters and the commanders of the subordinate formations and elements are all given appropriate freedom to act. How this is then enacted downwards will vary according to best practice in each of the sub-elements. The JTFC's direction will include, as a minimum, a clear statement on how he sees the operation unfolding.<sup>28</sup> The JTFC will also identify those operational level decisions, which rightly rest on his shoulders, while offering maximum latitude to his subordinates in how they conduct their tactical battles and engagements. Thereafter, while encouraging feedback to ensure balance is maintained, he will expect CCs to determine their implied tasks and keep him, and each other, informed of progress. In turn, they will disseminate their own operation orders to support the part they have to play along the various lines of operation as detailed in the Campaign Plan. The JTFC will insist on regular situation reports and will seek advice from the CCs in order to inform the operational level decisions that he has to make. This does mean that under exceptional circumstances, usually where fleeting opportunities for decisive exploitation present themselves, the JTFC may have to reach down to whatever level is necessary and take charge of the situation.

## Campaign Management

343. Managing the campaign is a 24-hour responsibility led by the COS and overseen by the JTFC. As no individual, even the JTFC, is indispensable, the HQ will, by necessity, be run on a shift basis. Some staff will be operating on fixed shifts; others will be on extended days, or on call when needed. In cases when there is no dedicated Deputy Commander, the JTFC will appoint another commander to oversee the operation at times when he is away from the HQ. At the heart of the JTFHQ's internal regulatory mechanism are a series of meetings, briefings and planning groups, as well as a variable number of informal and specialist gatherings all used to co-ordinate activity and aid synchronisation, which together make up the Campaign Rhythm. The principal meetings, which are discussed in detail in Para 352 are:

- a. The Commander's morning brief.

<sup>27</sup> See JWP 5-00, Annex 2B, Figure 2B1.

<sup>28</sup> It is likely that the JTFC will utilise one of the one of the recognised forms of joint manoeuvre (Envelopment, Encirclement, Turning Movement and Penetration). See JDP 01 'Joint Operations' Annex 3B.

- b. The Joint Command Group (JCG) VTC and the Joint Task Force Command Group VTC. These generally occur daily.
- c. The Joint Force Planning Group (JFPG).
- d. The JEMs (JEM 1&2).
- e. The JCB.

344. The relative importance of each meeting will depend on the type, scale and intensity of the operation. For example, on Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations (HDRO) it is highly unlikely there will be a requirement to cover the physical destruction aspects of the JEM, but conversely the weight given to Civil-military Co-operation (CIMIC) is understandably much greater. Consequently, the internal Campaign Rhythm is inherently flexible allowing the COS to decide that the business of some meetings can be incorporated into others. His aim is to reduce the time spent by busy staff in meetings and to allow the JTFC time to fulfil his other responsibilities such as coalition building, visiting components, briefing the media, or having time to think.

345. The outputs of these fora are, broadly:

- a. A common understanding of the situation achieved through the exchange of information (briefing).
- b. Dealing with key issues and taking operational decisions.
- c. Deciding priorities and allocating resources to match them.
- d. Issuing direction and guidance.
- e. Focusing staff effort over the next period.
- f. General co-ordination.

346. **The Role of the Staff.** Every member of the JTFHQ must be keenly attuned to the progress of the operation and immediately bring to the COS's attention anything with the potential of having a significant impact, good or bad, but particularly that likely to attract political interest. Inevitably not everything will go as envisaged, so in place within the JTFHQ has to be a responsive monitoring and reporting system as well as a robust shortcut mechanism which gives the right amount of granularity, yet does not focus on tactical level business. In this respect, a powerful tool available to the JTFC is CEA which is explained in detail in JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*', Chapter 3. Deciding what needs to be brought to the attention of the JTFC is the responsibility of the COS, who will also ensure the JTFC has enough latitude to think and look ahead.

347. **Campaign Rhythm.** The method used to fuse staff effort is the Campaign Rhythm (sometimes called the Staff or Battle Rhythm.)<sup>29</sup> This is a disciplined routine of meetings, briefings and miscellaneous gatherings contained within 24-hour cycles and used to maintain an optimum tempo for all levels of command, location and timezone. It is the essential mechanism for maximising concurrent activity and aiding synchronisation but it should never become a self-fulfilling prophesy, it is a means to an end not an end in its own right aimed at achieving a command advantage. Two broad principles underlie this JTFHQ internal regulatory process. First, it should not be a slave to the rate of flow of information and secondly it should maintain a rate of activity greater than that of the opponent. As operations commence, the Campaign Rhythm should be established as quickly as possible and quickly bedded down into the most effective way to keep busy commanders and their staff up to-date. The rhythm is constructed on a hierarchical basis, in the sense that once the MOD and PJHQ have decided which slices of the day they wish to take, the remaining time is divided up down the chain. Once established, the JTFHQ internal rhythm will not necessarily be fixed, but the COS will be extremely cautious about making any major alterations to it. A basic model for a Campaign Rhythm is outlined in detail at Annex 3B.

348. **Routine Influences on the Campaign Rhythm.** Like any process there must be a well-understood short cut system to the rhythm in order to enhance responsiveness. To prevent confusion arising, the COS, usually through his operations J3 Co-ordination Cell, closely manages this aspect. Additional meetings, briefings, requests for information and the production of serious incident reports (SINCREFPs) are all used as appropriate. The following factors have an influence on the campaign rhythm:

- a. **Time Zones.** The Campaign Rhythm must endeavour to balance the requirement to inform the strategic Campaign Rhythm with the diurnal battle rhythm of the components. This will be particularly complicated on multinational operations where the sometimes widely varying time zones cause significant dislocation, particularly as the lead nation's requirements will always come first.
- b. **National Imperatives.** For the MOD DCMO to meet its remit to both inform and advise politicians, as well as take the decisions appropriate at that level, COS JTFHQ has to ensure the staff provides information in a timely manner through the PJHQ to the MOD. In addition to the formal reporting of SITREPS and ASSESSREPs, there will be a constant stream of requests and points of clarification; a fact of life in a busy headquarters.
- c. **Political Considerations.** Because military activity is conducted under political authority, the 2-way flow up the chain of command to politicians must

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<sup>29</sup> Battle Rhythm is the term most commonly used by the components.

be accurate and timely. However, military networks need to be highly responsive to track the near real-time media reporting, which enables Ministers to be aware of incidents before the formal chain of command can draw in all the relevant facts.

d. **Parallel Briefing.** In those cases where the UK has provided an NCC, rather than the JTFC, the senior UK representatives within each Component (the contingent commanders) are responsible for supporting a parallel briefing chain to enable the UK architecture to function correctly. In this instance the standard UK systems and procedures will apply and are adapted as necessary.

e. **Multinational Influences.** Multinational operations add to the briefing burden. The timing of briefings to international authorities or organisations such as the UN, Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as to coalition partners, will have significant influence on the JTFC's personal diary, to the extent it can become his principal activity.

f. **Shift Changes.** Shift changes should take place within individual cells in the period prior to the JTFC's brief. This ensures a smooth transition between outgoing and incoming staff and the maintenance of Shared Situational Awareness.

g. **Human Factors.** The demands placed on individuals during intense and prolonged 24-hour military operations cannot be underestimated. It is vital that rest time, and where possible recuperation time, is factored into the lives of the staff. Individuals who are continually required to put in long days over prolonged periods will quickly lose their sharpness and objectivity. The result is a tired and sluggish headquarters less capable of responding to the unexpected and in identifying opportunities for exploitation. However, this needs to be carefully balanced with the requirement for individuals to maintain currency. Therefore commanders at all levels have a vital role in watching their subordinates closely and ensuring their well-being. For good reason, operational welfare has a major part to play in the maintenance of morale.<sup>30</sup>

h. **The Media.** Media deadlines, particularly those that hit specific key morning and evening time slots, will need to be factored into the Campaign Rhythm. Often the staffing times required either to rebut or confirm incidents will be tied to these deadlines.

349. **Reports and Returns.** Apart from the various meetings and gatherings, a second important strand of activity within the Campaign Rhythm is the production of

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<sup>30</sup> Which is reflected in IJWP 1-00.

formal daily reports and returns.<sup>31</sup> An example matrix is illustrated at Annex 3C. The following form its main constituent parts:

- a. **Assessment Report.** An Assessment Report (ASSESSREP) is the daily assessment, informed by the component ASSESSREPS, which is personally made by the JTFC/NCC to the PJHQ, dealing with his major issues of concern. In turn, the JTFC will have sight of the PJHQ ASSESSREP, showing the activity taking place at the strategic level, including the progress of issues he originally generated. All ASSESSREPs are used to inform the DCMO process.
- b. **Down Report.** A Down Report (DOWNREP) is the daily report from the JTFC to CCs/Force Elements. The purpose of the DOWNREP is to keep the components and force elements informed of the current situation including strategic decision-making, operational issues and intent and the activities of each component. It will also seek to answer staff issues raised in previous component ASSESSREPs and to clarify or reinforce issues previously raised with the components or force elements. It is informed by the PJHQ DOWNREP to the JTFHQ, which seeks both clarification on issues within the JOA as well as providing an update on issues raised by the JTFHQ in previous ASSESSREPS.
- c. **Logistics Reports.** The requirement for Logistic and personnel reports is largely self-explanatory. However, Logistics Reports (LOGREPs) gives the opportunity to further emphasise high profile deficiencies or shortfalls that are subject to separate staffing effort.
- d. **Personnel Reports.** Personnel Reports (PERSREPs) provide a range of important personnel facts and figures.
- e. **Operational Record Reports.** The Operational Record Reports (OPRECREP) ensures the regular and complete reporting of an ongoing operation. Information collected includes reports and returns as well as any other relevant material of use to Operational Analysis (OA), Lessons Identified and Historical Analysis.
- f. **Serious Incident Reports.** The purpose of Serious Incident Reports (SINCREP) are to inform the Chain of Command in a timely manner of any occurrence, which may have operational, political, and/or media consequences.
- g. **Other Requests for Information.** Although the staffing of these formal reports and returns is a time consuming activity, the staff will also find

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<sup>31</sup> Templates for the various reports can be found in the '*Joint Staff Officers' Handbook*' (JSOHB) – Due publication in 2004.

themselves involved in researching and answering a plethora of other questions and miscellaneous points of clarification to the point that on occasion it can become the dominant activity for staff officers. The COS equivalents in all HQs are beholden to always ‘test’ a question before it is asked to ascertain if it will add real value, not just satisfy curiosity, and it has a realistic chance of being answered. Otherwise the staff will be distracted from the core activity of running the Campaign.

**350. Incident Management and Shortcuts to the Campaign Rhythm.**

Inevitably not everything will go as planned. It is the role of the COS to ensure that a process is in place to deal with unexpected activities. These include:

a. **Significant Incidents.** Significant incidents will normally be reported up the chain of command, but increasingly, the media dictate the speed with which such information reaches the public domain. The definition of ‘significant’ will be detailed in the Force Instruction Document and varies according to the type of operation. This definition will be ameliorated as the campaign progresses, insofar as that which is significant in the initial phases of a campaign may be less significant in the latter stages of the same campaign. On notification of a significant incident, the J3 Ops Coord desk within the JTFHQ will task organise an Incident Team who will be responsible for monitoring and reporting on the incident. Component LOs are an essential element of the Incident Team and will be the primary conduit between the Component HQ and the JTFHQ. Certain incidents (for example loss of an aircraft, mass casualties, fratricide etc) will have prescribed incident plans, whilst others will be managed as the incident develops. The Incident Team will keep the Ops Coord Desk informed and they in turn will keep the PJHQ, the JTFHQ, and the Components and Contingents informed.

b. **Rebuttal.** All incidents will generate a demand for information, possibly up to Ministerial level and often at short notice, and may require a subsequent media briefing. In exceptional circumstances and/or when timing is critical, the JTFHQ will report UK incidents directly to the Defence Press Office (DPO) and update the PJHQ as soon as possible thereafter. Depending on the nature of the incident, it may be necessary to consider the need for rebuttal. Rebuttal encompasses defensive actions undertaken to correct factual inaccuracies in media reporting or to refute allegations. Primarily this will be carried out at MOD level. However, there may be occasions when rebuttal is required in the JOA where there is direct access to the correspondents whose reporting needs to be rebutted. In such circumstances it may be necessary to form a JTFHQ Rebuttal Cell. The immediate tasks of this cell will be to determine whether a requirement for rebuttal exists and if so, what supporting information (e.g. such as weapon system video) is required to support the

incident. The Rebuttal Cell, chaired by the JTFHQ Media spokesman, will then determine the end product that is required, proposed a time constraint and dictate the point of release (e.g. a press briefing). The development of media holding lines will be done by the JTFHQ media staff and will be cleared with the DPO before release. This will ensure a common line at all levels of media engagement.

351. **Harmonisation with Component Commanders' Battle Rhythms.** Clearly the operational tempo of each component will vary. For example, the JFACC achieves high tempo by achieving a maximum sortie rate. Since the target sets include those with strategic as well as operational and tactical significance, the targeting process must include time for political decision-making. Thus, air operations and their associated Airspace Control Orders (ACO) are therefore typically planned 12 -72 hours in advance. Other components have different cyclical requirements and action times and the extent to which the COS JTFHQ can co-ordinate and synchronise the disparate component cycle rates will contribute greatly to force synergy. There is clearly more to this aspect than simply allocating slices of the daily Campaign Rhythm not already used up and the various liaison networks have a significant role to play in anticipating requirements and in thinking laterally.

352. **Conferencing Facilities.** VTC (audio-visual), on-line computer (e-mail), radio/telephone/intercom (voice) conference call facilities, and E chat rooms enable maximum real-time participation in meetings and in general debate by individuals widely dispersed around the globe. Each conferencing technique has its particular advantages, and some or all facilities may not be available some or all of the time. For example a Public Address (PA) broadcast facility can rapidly disseminate information in a local area, and Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) facilities enable meetings to be monitored by the remainder of the staff who can monitor what is going on without participating. With the tendency to move away from written orders and orders groups it is vitally important that important decisions made in the various key conferences are recorded and staffed for coherence by the COS and the staff. This process will be detailed in the Theatre Information Management Plan.

353. **Key Joint Task Force Headquarters Meetings and Briefings.** The overall aim of JTFHQ meetings is to guide the important decisions that ultimately provide the components with their tasking. Collectively these groups manage and process time sensitive information, passing it across to other groups within the JTFHQ, hence the requirement for a sequenced, defined and punctual programme. The key meetings of the day are:

- a. **The Commander's Brief.** The Commander's Brief symbolically represents the start of the daily cycle, setting the foundation for staff effort and the basis of briefing over the next period. The JTFC is briefed on the last, and next, 24 hours in detail and the next 48 hours in outline. It is given by the

outgoing watch and should be attended by all available staff. It usually concludes with the JTFC/NCC who may wish to emphasise certain aspects. Once the JTFC/NCC has departed, the COS will give further points of guidance and direction. During those instances where the UK provides a NCC, his morning brief will normally precede his attendance at the multinational JTFC's morning brief. Briefing material prepared for the Commander's Brief is usually archived for the official Commander's War Diary. An outline format for this brief is at Annex 3D.

b. **The Joint Force Planning Group.** The aim of the JFPG is to refine the development of the campaign plan, monitor ongoing force planning activity, to approve completed force level plans and initiate additional direction for contingency planning. It is attended by all staff division heads with specialist advisors as necessary. The meeting is divided into 2 separate parts straddling both the J3 and J5 areas of planning responsibility and is led by the COS and might on occasion be attended by the JTFC:

(1) **J3/5 Plans (present phase).** Led by the COS, discussions start with an assessment of likely adversary actions. J3 then outlines the intentions of the CCs, followed by Operations Support (Ops Sp) and DCOS. The COS will give direction on the way he sees the phase developing and making adjustments to planning as necessary. The output of this sub-session will be formulated by J3/5 Plans and promulgated, usually by some form of written document. The meeting then moves on to the second sub-session.

(2) **J5 Plans (next phase).** The likely enemy reaction to events is once more considered before J5 then describes the possible branches and sequels to combat these intentions. The JTFC, through the COS, will lay down any direction required to allow contingency planning to take place. These aspects are considered in more detail in JWP 5-00.

c. **Operational Plans Teams.** Following the break-up of the JFPG, Operational Plans Teams (OPTs) might form-up to staff discrete aspects of the campaign and, having been given a deadline to work to, will report back to the COS with their recommendations. There may be a number of OPTs running simultaneously.

d. **The Joint Commander's Video Teleconference.** At some point (synchronised with the DCMO process) the JTFC/NCC will attend a VTC where he will receive guidance and direction from the Jt Comd and output from the DCMO process, as well as being given the chance to discuss any areas of concern to him. This VTC will normally only be attended by the JTFC, his closest advisors, and other subject matter experts as and when they

are required. Essentially it takes a slightly longer-range view and acts as a catalyst for more dedicated staff effort. VTC conference calls can also be set up at any time in response to significant incidents.

e. **The Joint Task Force Command Group Video Teleconference.**

Usually following on from the Jt Comd's VTC the JTFC will use the same method to get his message over to his CCs, and to hear their concerns. It too, is a relatively exclusive meeting involving senior commanders only. Increasingly this VTC addresses some of the higher level issues normally the province of the JCB and, as a consequence on some operations and in some HQs, it is increasingly subsuming the role of the JCB.

f. **Joint Effects Meeting.** Two JEMs take place between each JCB. Both meetings consider the same agenda, with the first meeting (JEM1) at working level soon after the JCB to initiate the necessary interaction between components and the JTFHQ for Joint Effects development. The second meeting (JEM2), chaired at COS or ACOS level and just prior to the next JCB, is intended to iron out any remaining inconsistencies in the desired Joint Effects and resolve differences where necessary. The 2 meetings and the work generated in between represents the Joint Effects process and aims to synchronise the Ops Sp activities<sup>32</sup> within the campaign plan. The following specific functions are performed by the Joint Effects process and finalised by JEM2 for endorsement at the JCB:

- (1) Issue Joint Effects guidance to inform component planning up to 96 hours ahead.
- (2). Draft and review target priorities, both for physical attack and for soft targeting through Info Ops up to 48 hours ahead.
- (3). Endorse component plans for Joint Effects execution up to 24 hours ahead.
- (4). Provide a forum for the co-ordination of Battlespace Management (BSM) by J3/5 staff.
- (5). Update the various physical attack and Info Ops target lists.

g. **The Joint Co-ordination Board.** The JCB is the JTFC's principal meeting. Its aim is to assist the macro aspects of the overall synchronisation of JTF activity and effects, specifically to issue commander's guidance about priorities across the components, and to resolve potential areas of conflict. The JCB usually meets once a day and will be chaired by the COS. It comprises

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<sup>32</sup> See Chapter 2, Section IV and Annex 2E.

the JTFC, COS, DCOS, CCs (in person, by VTC, or represented by their senior LOs), POLAD, Legal Advisor (LEGAD), targeting and J3 Ops Support staff, and other individuals as required. The JTFC will give direction on the output from the JEMs, decide on the assignment of forces and set a context for the execution of operations out to about 96 hours.<sup>33</sup> In effect the main function of the meeting is to ensure that activity accords to the tempo required by the JTFC. It runs to a comprehensive agenda, which includes the following:

- (1) Quick update by the COS on recent developments.
- (2) Back-briefs from components and branch heads.
- (3) A summary of key events over the next 24 hours.
- (4) JTFC/NCC's intent and guidance out to 96 hours.
- (5) An assessment of CEA from previous action. The monitoring of CEA extends far beyond Battle Damage Assessment (BDA). It is natural for the JTFC to want to be on top of the progress of his campaign and so CEA will be an important topic for discussion at the JCB. It includes analysis from a wide range of sources to assess how the campaign is progressing where some of the effects may be subtle and difficult to measure. CEA is an integral part of campaign planning and is considered in detail in JWP 5-00, Annex 2E.
- (6) Environmental assessments and intelligence.
- (7) Direction given for the development of discrete contingency plans.
- (8) ROE considerations.
- (9) Major logistical issues.

h. **Coalition Briefs.** Where the UK commands a multinational operation, additional briefings will be held to keep the NCCs/Contingent Commanders of the other nations informed of progress.

i. **Other Meetings.** In addition to the principal boards and meetings there are other gatherings, some temporary, some permanent, used by the COS and DCOS to detail future staff action, allocate work priorities and to set deadlines.<sup>34</sup> As with any other process, these meetings have to be tightly

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<sup>33</sup> National contingents should also run parallel meeting where they will ensure their contingent is synchronised with the host component.

<sup>34</sup> Such as the Joint Command Group (JCG), which convenes to consider important aspects of the campaign. For example it meets to assist the JTFC in the conduct of mission analysis. See JWP 5-00, Chapter 3.

managed to prevent staff paralysis caused by having key members bouncing from one meeting to the next. It is up to the COS to decide on the need for meetings and, once they have ceased to have relevance, to disband them. The principal aim of any ad-hoc gatherings should be:

- (1) To establish a minimum control mechanism necessary for all operational level activities.
- (2) To eliminate stovepipes and enhance information exchange.

### **Shared Situational Awareness<sup>35</sup>**

354. Shared Situational Awareness (SSA) is essential because it significantly enhances decision-making, it enables effective management of the battlespace and thus it enhances the all-round effectiveness of the JTF. It supports the co-ordination and synchronisation of military actions against an adversary, and is a key component of Force Protection.<sup>36</sup> The SSA needs of commanders and staffs will vary at each level and within and between HQs, although many of the systems and displays will be common. Correct interpretation and use of the available data is a key consideration and its value is universally recognised. Taken to its natural conclusion SSA would allow all friendly forces to know where all friendly forces are, where the forces of the adversary are, and the location of neutral agencies and bystanders, as well as what their intentions are and what freedoms and constraints they are operating under. This would then allow the removal of most of the procedural architecture currently used by friendly forces to deconflict their activities. Unfortunately however, reality currently falls some way short of this aspiration. In broad terms, SSA shows:

- a. The Joint Operating Picture (JOP).<sup>37</sup>
- b. The status and possible intentions of the adversary.
- c. The status, posture and sustainability of own forces.
- d. The locations and actions of other groupings of interest within the JOA.
- e. Information on the physical environment (geography, meteorology, oceanography and hydrography).

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<sup>35</sup> Situational Awareness is defined as ‘*The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander’s (or staff officer’s) mission (or task)*’ (JWP 0-01.1). SSA has been interpreted further as ‘*the assimilation of current and historical information to form a mental image of what is going on and what may happen in order to inform decision-making*’.

<sup>36</sup> See Annex 2E.

<sup>37</sup> The JOP includes background information on the JOA from open sources, or intelligence, overlaid with information on tactical activity within the battlespace.

355. Maritime and Air component warfare is heavily platform based and the environments themselves are relatively uncluttered compared to the land environment. Consequently dynamic information, at good resolution, of own and enemy forces is already available at the operational and tactical levels of command. Information is exchanged automatically through tactical data links and presented as either near real time (NRT) pictures on command systems or non-real time (non-RT) pictures on networked command and mission support systems.<sup>38</sup> The Land environment is considerably more complex, being only partially platform based, and will not be fully digitised for some time. Land SSA is generally achieved through the repeated aggregation of information provided by subordinate HQs, which is then presented to commanders, still reliant on procedural aids such as bird tables.

356. **Battlespace Management.** Within the battlespace, it is essential to co-ordinate and synchronise the locally conflicting needs of a wide variety of force elements all operating within a confused and sometimes densely occupied volume of space. It is clearly impractical for the COS and his JTFHQ staff to be expected to oversee the detailed management of this issue, so it is generally devolved to the lowest appropriate co-ordinating authority, usually to those commanders responsible for specific Areas of Operation (AOOs). Generally the battlespace priorities will be derived from the JEM and its associated processes. In that it is the JEM that decides on the broad order effects that need to be achieved by the JTF, with each component then undertaking its contribution in the form of endorsed actions to achieve the effect required. It is the synchronisation of the delivery of these actions across the battlespace, as well as deconfliction with regard to routine activity, that determines the peaks and troughs in Battlespace Management activity. At Annex 3E is a guide to the key battlespace management themes dominant in each of the primary environments. Because of the complexity and the risk of conducting operations under conditions of uncertainty, the military understandably seek a fully integrated Battlespace Management solution that can achieve *inter alia*:

- a. SSA on the location of friendly, enemy and other participants at all times.
- b. A fail-safe method of co-ordinating and synchronising Joint Fires.
- c. Logistic C2 and asset tracking.

357. **Battlespace Management Group.** The various factors influencing the use and allocation of battlespace have to be considered by the specialist users present within it. The Battlespace Management Group (BMG) is responsible for allocating responsibility for battlespace management on behalf of the COS. Close liaison with

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<sup>38</sup> Such as RNCSS and RAFCCIS. For further information on SA and the role of tactical Data Links refer to JDP 2/01 'Real-Time Exchange of Tactical Data'.

the JEM process and between the various cells of the JTFHQ is essential in order to identify those operational actions that could impinge on land, sea or air planning such as the use of strategic assets like Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) that are likely to use the same battlespace as the components. If this looks like occurring, the Joint Airspace Co-ordination Cell (JACC) is informed and will perform the deconfliction function. Proposed changes to the current and planned battlespace will be considered by the JFPG, with further deconfliction achieved as part of the JEM. Significant changes might be detailed by the JTFC's guidance at the JCB or, if more urgent, by the most appropriate means of communication.

358. **Information Management.**<sup>39</sup> Information Management (IM) is the effective handling of all forms of information into, within, and out of the JTFHQ. IM aims to ensure that information gets to the right people, at the right time and in the right form. The COS will maintain an overwatch of this issue, though the detail is managed by the J3 Information Manager with assistance from the Comd Joint Force Communications and Information Systems (JFCIS).

359. **Battlespace Spectrum Management.**<sup>40</sup> The utilisation of, and reliance on, the EMS by both military and commercial users has increased considerably in recent years and continues to grow. Dominance of the EMS is a pre-requisite for successful operations and the ability to manoeuvre within it is enabled by Battlespace Spectrum Management (BSM). The sheer volume of information and data available can easily lead to information overload, which reinforces the need for effective IM.

360. **Techniques Used to Aid Shared Situational Awareness.** A variety of practical tools can be used to engender understanding, to aid deconfliction, and to enhance synchronisation.

a. **Synchronisation Matrix.** Synchronisation matrices, derived as output from the deliberate estimate process, have traditionally proved to be a useful tool in showing the broad order activities that require to be sequenced, as well as indicating, at a glance, possible areas of deconfliction or uncertainty. An example of a synchronisation matrix is at Annex 3F.

b. **Joint Operational Picture.** The real-time/near real-time exchange of tactical data via a network of tactical data links (TDL) has been a fundamental aspect of operations for many years, particularly in the maritime and air environments (see Para 355 above).<sup>41</sup> However, it is constrained both by the equipment level of participating forces and by the manner in which the TDL capability has been implemented into the platforms.

<sup>39</sup> See JWP 6-00 'CIS Support to Joint Operations', Annex 1A and Annex 2 D.

<sup>40</sup> See JWP 6-00, Annex 4D.

<sup>41</sup> UK assets such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), Airborne stand-off Radar (ASTOR) and Nimrod MR2/MRA4.

- c. **Mission Rehearsal.** At any level, a commonly used and well understood rehearsal technique is to conduct a walk-through, talk-through, mission rehearsal (in the US known as ‘rock drill’) involving the key personalities in a stage, or activity, but usually open to as wide an audience as is possible commensurate with OPSEC. Effectively, this is a verbal rehearsal<sup>42</sup> where participants get a feel for the part they have to play, as well as understand the impact of their actions on others. These rehearsals require the close participation of a multi-disciplined unbiased ‘Red Team’ who will consider events from the adversary’s perspective.
- d. **Mission Essential Checklists.** A Mission Essential Checklist is a detailed matrix of actions, and sequences (such as a tactical inload) that details the go/no go criteria for discrete activities within the operation, including anticipating actions that could cause the mission to be aborted. The lists are usually constructed in codeword format to preserve OPSEC, and to aid simplicity.
- e. **Wargaming.** Wargaming should not just be regarded as an aid to deliberate planning; it can be conducted at any stage of execution, and can consider a wide range of eventualities. Normally based on action and consequence format, a range of manual and computer generated techniques can be used to great effect. However, it is important to appreciate that the solutions generated by operational analysis must be subjected to rigorous military judgement to be of real value.<sup>43</sup>

## Output from the Joint Force Headquarters

361. **Hierarchy of Operational Paperwork.**<sup>44</sup> JWP 3-00 is concerned with those products that translate the campaign plan into executable detail. Figure 3.2 shows the principal paperwork produced and who takes the lead for its production and includes:

- a. **Campaign Directive and Force Instruction Document.** The framework for the campaign is articulated in the Campaign Directive, a cornerstone for the CCs and the JTF, providing an overview of the conduct of the campaign in its entirety. Central to this document is the Campaign schematic with the supporting/supported relationship between components being clearly stated for each sub-operation. The second capstone document is the Force Instruction Document (FID), which presents the enduring supplementary instructions and supporting information from across the JTFHQ. The issuing of other ‘directives’, raising issues the JTFC personally

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<sup>42</sup> Though does lend itself to the use of models and other visual aids.

<sup>43</sup> The place of wargaming in deliberate planning is considered in JWP 5-00, Annex 2C.

<sup>44</sup> See also JWP 5-00, Chapter 3.

wants to emphasise are essentially a personal affair and can follow a variety of formats.

b. **Operational Plans.** Operational Plans (OPLANs) are generated by the J5 staff.<sup>45</sup> They may address individual Decisive Points (DPs), groups of DPs related in purpose, complete lines of operation, or phases. Crucially, an OPLAN indicates the scope and intent of a subsequent Operation Order (OPORD) developed by J3/5, ensuring its coherence with other OPORDs within the overall campaign.<sup>46</sup> Beyond this, an OPLAN's content, and thus its format, will be dictated by the time available for production. However, it should always strive to follow the NATO 5-paragraph sequence.<sup>47</sup>

c. **Operations Orders.** The J3/5 cell will draft OPORDs including component mission statements and detailed co-ordinating instructions. It will build on a specific OPLAN and follows the standard 5-paragraph sequence.

d. **Fragmentary Orders.** Fragmentary Orders<sup>48</sup> (FRAGOs) are produced by J3 or J 3/5 staff as significant modifications to previous orders or direction. FRAGOs use abbreviated form, though still following the standard format. For example, if there has been no change to any aspect of previous orders given then these are not reiterated. Examples of when FRAGOs are used include:

- (1) Dealing with a switch in emphasis with regard to the critical path of the campaign.
- (2) As a way of co-ordinating effort on a particular branch, sequel, or associated group of activities on the campaign plan.
- (3) A rapid means of giving direction when the unexpected has happened.

362. **Contingency Plans.** Contingency Plans (CONPLANs) capture segments of the Campaign Plan where opportunities are foreseen, reversals have occurred, or where clarity is required on a specific issue. Written by J5 they will be issued to direct component tactical planning. CONPLANs may be delegated to a specially convened team tasked to develop them further and produce recommendations or options for further action.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> There can be uncertainty as to which document is produced by which cell. Relatively enduring and overarching information should be found in the capstone documents, direction to components that is specific to discrete parts of the campaign, should be given in the particular OPLAN, Operation Order (OPORD) or Fragmentary Order (FRAGO).

<sup>46</sup> J5, as custodian of the overall campaign design, is best placed to mesh together the separate pieces of operational paperwork. J3/5's OPORDs will always find their antecedents in J5 authorised OPLANs.

<sup>47</sup> Situation, Mission, Execution, Service Support and Command and Control. For the standard NATO template and other operational writing templates, refer to the Joint Staff Officers' Handbook (JSOHB) (Due publication in 2004).

<sup>48</sup> Again, following the same NATO format.

<sup>49</sup> See JWP 5-00, Chapter 2, and Chapter 3.




Figure 3.2 - The Hierarchy of Operational Paperwork

363. **Orders Groups.** It is not usual for a JTFC routinely to give orders in the way a tactical commander might; the tendency is to highly individualise the format, though still ensuring the 5 main themes of the standard NATO orders format are included. However, at some stage, usually during force build-up, it might be deemed appropriate for the JTFC to hold an initial orders group where he would set a baseline of missions and tasks for his CCs. The direction and guidance a JTFC provides to his CCs should include as a minimum:

- a. A review of the situation.
- b. A mission statement and his concept of operations encompassing his intent, scheme of manoeuvre and main effort, usually supported by a written campaign plan and/or operation order.
- c. An unequivocal statement on the relationship between a supported and supporting commander and the supporting commander's responsibilities.
- d. Detail of the operational, logistic and administrative resources allocated to accomplish the mission.
- e. The ROE at that time, noting that modification may follow in due course.
- f. C2 arrangements, including a clear chain of command, the delegation of authority and the allocation of personnel, agencies or elements that will enable subordinate commanders to accomplish the mission.

### **Movement of all or part of the Joint Task Force Headquarters**

364. **Moving the Headquarters.** Clearly, as the situation evolves after the JTF has deployed, the occasion may arise where it is necessary to re-locate the JTFHQ. While there are advantages to maintaining a static JTFHQ/NCHQ because of its size, the dislocation that would be caused by not moving has to be balanced against the imperative to move. For example, it might be that the campaign is at the stage that the importance of integrating with non-military agencies requires both a change of location and structure. In order to enable such a move, or division, additional resources may need to be allocated, albeit temporarily.

365. **Splitting Headquarters.** There is unlikely to be a requirement to split JTFHQs in the traditional sense of having redundancy or the ability to leapfrog from location to location. With modern CIS systems it is feasible, and some times attractive, for an element of the JTFHQ to be detached from the main location and to be located more appropriately. For example, as operations transition, it might be necessary to prepare the way for the changed circumstances, perhaps by having the

JTFHQ initially located outside a country of interest, then moved into that country once initial objectives have been realised.

## SECTION V – CAMPAIGN TRANSITION AND TERMINATION

366. Campaign transition or termination is a difficult and complex aspect of military operations for which there are no clear rules or accepted practice. Invariably now, campaigns rarely conform to a traditional ideal of a ‘victory’ with the signing of treaties and memorial parades. However, visualising how the Campaign will end, i.e. the achievement of the operational end-state is as important as any other part of it, especially in coalition operations. Planning for this eventuality has to be accorded the same weight as planning for the more obvious military objectives, and is a cross-Government responsibility aimed at achieving a strategic end-state. Failure to anticipate what might come next can result in loss of public support, unnecessary loss of life, and a post-conflict vacuum may rapidly degenerate into a situation at odds with original objectives. The JTFC is required to retain responsibility for the situation for as long as his force remains in the JOA and his plans should recognise early the requirement for the transition either to a different posture for his own force or to a relief force. Experience has shown that any transition period can be very lengthy and can be rife with the potential for ‘mission creep’. It is an awkward time requiring careful handling, particularly in avoiding sending conflicting messages about military and political resolve.

367. A campaign can be terminated or suspended in a number of ways:<sup>50</sup>

- a. **Cease-fire.** A cease-fire temporarily suspends the use of arms, usually for specific purposes, but may set the conditions for a lasting settlement. It can be usefully employed as a ‘honourable way out’ for parties wishing to disengage from military action.
- b. **General Truce.** A truce usually recognises stalemate. Combat ceases, and while no formal end is achieved through a truce, the way is often prepared for a negotiated settlement.
- c. **Peace Settlement.** Where belligerents mutually resolve to cease hostilities a peace settlement usually follows. This usually, though not always, depends on the military outcome.
- d. **Capitulation.** Stipulations surrounding capitulation determine a point in time at which it comes into effect and the area and units it applies to. Capitulating units will conform to strict demands, specifically in giving up previously occupied territory.

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<sup>50</sup> Adapted from AJP-3, Chapter 6.

- e. **Transition.** Although no formal or informal end to hostilities takes place, there is a general transition to peace.

### Conclusion of the Campaign

368. It is likely that once the operational end-state of a campaign has been reached, effort will be directed at achieving increased security and stability as well as the hand-over of responsibility to regional organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations (IOs). Elements of the JTF might find themselves engaged on tasks designed to improve security and stability, even if other elements of the force are still engaged in combat. As military operations either draw down, transit to another phase or even evolve into another campaign with different objectives and end-state, the force is likely to change in posture to cope with:

- a. Acting as an occupying force.
- b. Facilitating the transfer of authority to civilian authorities as part of a wider political process.

369. **Transition to Civil Primacy.** Civil engagement will increase with time. The JTFC will need to seek early guidance from the Jt Comd about what his revised responsibilities and tasks are. In effect his emphasis moves to being one more akin to a supporting commander to the civilian primacy. The immediate priorities are:

- a. **Force Structure.** Dealing with the cessation of hostilities and providing fresh, perhaps differently configured units for a range of tasks (see subparagraph b.) will be a critical requirement. It is equally important that a vacuum should not be allowed to develop, for example, when forces change their posture from one generally geared to combat, to one generally postured to act as an occupying force. Important at this time is the continued application of Info Ops, hopefully underpinned by positive support from the media, as well as the continued application of the Joint Operational Enablers such as Operational Intelligence (OPINTEL) and the logistic functions.
- b. **Support to Governance.** The military will transition to supporting those civilian elements charged with the re-establishment of viable democratic governmental systems and procedures, including the **R**ule of Law, **E**ducation, **C**ommercial regeneration, **H**umanitarian and health, **I**nformation and an independent media, **M**ilitary, the **E**conomy and **D**iplomacy, administration and governance (RECHIMED).<sup>51</sup> The principal task laid upon the military will be to re-establish and maintain law and order (supporting police elements) and so provide a safe and secure environment for others to operate, for example by day and night framework patrols, observation posts and supporting

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<sup>51</sup> See JWP 3-50 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition) 'The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations' (due promulgation mid 2004).

Humanitarian Assistance (HA). The military must rigorously avoid creating a dependency culture and should only become involved when civilian agencies are genuinely incapable of fulfilling vital tasks, or if the immediacy of a situation dictates that action has to be taken. Other likely tasks include *inter alia*:

- (1) By their presence, providing reassurance and security to the population, particularly by preventing resurgence in conflict and preventing criminality.
- (2) Restoring civil infrastructure, concentrating on the major facilities such as airports, seaports and keeping roads open.
- (3) Assisting with wider HA tasks such as re-integrating displaced persons and organise the basic necessities of water, food and shelter.
- (4) Providing emergency medical care, particularly for women and children.
- (5) Removing and processing the dead.
- (6) Assist with marking and clearing unexploded munitions and some limited clearance of mines, particularly in the vicinity of military bases.
- (7) If necessary providing a basic facilities and networks for civilian governance, preferably working through locally respected bodies.
- (8) Facilitate the disarmament, demilitarisation and re-integration of warring parties.

c. **Provision of Humanitarian Assistance.** In the increasingly complex operating environment, military resources may be diverted at any stage to assist with HA either in the form of life saving or in life-sustaining aid. However, the JTFC must not be blown off course by the attractiveness of supporting HA objectives that do not accord with the principle military objectives he is to achieve. When appropriate, military commanders should take their overall 'lead' from the co-ordinating civilian authority and humanitarian agencies they are assisting. The principal organisations are:

- (1) The UN.
- (2) Regional government.
- (3) Regional organisations, alliances.
- (4) OGDs.

- (5) NGOs.
- (6) Others in the civil sector, including business.

370. **Multinational Aspects.** In theory the responsibilities that will be assumed once the operational end-state has been reached should be agreed by participating nations during the force generation process. These should then be factored into force structures and represented in the campaign plan. However, reality dictates that, as events unfold, nations will review their participation based on the complex relationship that exists between their perception, interest and expectation.

371. **Roulement of Forces.** Routine roulement operations<sup>52</sup> are not considered in this publication. However, roulement is a common technique enabling both the relief of forces in place as well as the introduction of differently configured forces. Hand-over, regardless of whether it is to UK or another nation's forces, can bring a period of discontinuity, for example when different nations enact their own exit plan, or if more capable forces are replaced by less capable ones. These problems can be mitigated by a variety of techniques such as staggering hand-overs, or by exchanging LOs as soon as possible.

372. **Surges in Activity.** Certain small population specialist functions such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) or Port and Maritime operators will inevitably be required to respond to bursts of high activity such as roulement periods, and consideration should be given to surging these capabilities in and out of theatre as required ensuring readiness states match these requirements.

### **Redeployment from the Joint Operations Area**

373. Redeployment from the JOA is not simply a case of reversing the deployment plan; it is a separate operation aimed at achieving an efficient and ordered exit from the JOA.<sup>53</sup> It should be recognised that planning for redeployment may start early in the operations, possibly even before the deployment phase is complete. A poor redeployment, conducted under full scrutiny may well become the lasting image of the campaign. The following principles apply:

- a. Deployment and re-deployment planning usually takes place as a discrete planning activity within overall campaign planning.
- b. The earliest possible decision about when forces are likely to move will help determine what and by when, which strategic movement assets are required.

<sup>52</sup> For example long-term defence tasks such as support to enduring UN operations like UNFICYP.

<sup>53</sup> The technicalities of redeployment are covered in JWP 4-00 'Logistics for Joint Operations', Chapter 9.

- c. Full settlement must be made with all agencies that have provided services, particularly host nations, and those who have provided ABO.
- d. Any residual commitment must be properly managed. Continued involvement may involve the provision of niche capabilities such as engineer or logistic personnel, or the deployment of Joint Regional Teams (JRT) which are used to help underpin long-term stability.

374. **Post Operational Reporting.** Commanders at every level are required to produce post-operational reports. The JTFC is required to produce a high-level ‘lessons’ report, indeed it is explicit in his Directive from the Jt Comd. In most cases this serves as his principal Post Operations Report (POR) and covers:

- a. Critical lessons of importance to the Jt Comd.
- b. Important issues requiring a wide airing.
- c. Lessons of significance to training establishments.

375. **Joint Lessons Identified.** Validating how military forces have performed is obviously a sensitive subject, particularly where it touches multinational aspects, and it is hugely influenced by the perspective of the individual making the judgement. A trusted and reliable method is to collect Joint Lessons Identified (JLIDs).<sup>54</sup> In addition, the JTFC should direct commanders at all levels to record performance and maintain war diaries for later analysis and review, particularly as lower level war diaries are important for providing additional context and granularity. As part of the process the COS should encourage an open and honest culture as the best way of ensuring a difference is made for the benefit of future operations.

376. **The Implementation of Joint Lessons Identified.** Data must be captured at all levels particularly where weakness or success has been widely acknowledged. Dialogue over perceived differences needs to take place before key lessons are submitted, though this is not an excuse for diluting or strengthening a lesson. Similarly, many lessons will have a relevance only to specific organisations, circumstances or operation. Nonetheless, every glitch or initiative should be recorded and grouped to allow commanders the chance to assess wider impact and to identify common themes. The reasons for this important process include:

- a. Immediately correcting and implementing simple lessons.
- b. Collecting, in priority order, what worked well and what did not.

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<sup>54</sup> In the UK these are collated on behalf of Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) by the Director of Operational Capability (DOC) who will draw in lessons from all involved organisations.

- c. Determining those lessons with the widest applicability, and establishing how they can be fixed.

377. **Reconciliation of Accounts.** Chapter 2 explains why normal peacetime financial procedures might be relaxed. However, on conclusion of an operation it will be necessary to reconcile both financial and logistic accounts, especially where any dispensation beyond normal peacetime accounting has been granted.

## ANNEX 3A – COMPONENT, JOINT AND COMBINED COLLECTIVE TRAINING

The UK has a centrally organised joint training regime that provides:

- a. Individual and collective joint training for potential Joint Task Force Components (JTFCs), component commanders (CCs) and their staffs.
- b. A system to monitor the readiness of potential JTFCs, CCs and their staffs.
- c. A suite of joint operational level courses developed for potential JTFCs, CCs and their staffs.
- d. A rolling 5 year programme of Tier 3 JTFC and Tier 2+ (CC) exercises for organising and validating component, joint and combined collective training. The tiered levels of training are:
  - (1) **Tier 1.** Training at the tactical level that prepares individuals and component elements to take their place in one of the 5 components.
  - (2) **Tier 2.** Training at tactical and operational levels that make a single component ready to take its place in a Joint Task Force (JTF). This is defined as 2 or more Services practising procedures in preparation for a military task, up to component level but below the JTF level. This is collective training that will include joint training and may include multinational joint training.
  - (3) **Tier 2(+).** Tier 2(+) training is that training at the operational level that aims to improve joint operability between components. The Front Line Commands (FLCs) retain responsibility for Tier 2(+) training except for specific PJHQ exercises.
  - (4) **Tier 3.** Training at the operational level and military strategic levels that make a JTF ready to conduct national and multinational operations. This is facilitated by national and multinational exercises at the JTF level involving the PJHQ, the JFHQ and other selected HQs. Such exercises are sponsored by the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) and PJHQ J7 are responsible for the conduct, planning and execution of all Tier 3 training.
  - (5) **Tier 4.** Tier 4 training is training at the military strategic level and above. These exercises involve NATO, allies, other possible partners, other government departments (OGDs) and international organisations (IOs).

- e. An operational Campaign Planning capability developed to include mission analysis, evaluation of factors, sequencing of Decisive Points and lines of operation, consideration of courses of action and post-estimate planning.
- f. An operational training and validation capability that is available to JTFCs and CCs at very short notice as well as a fully federated and confederated system that is capable of interoperability with the US, NATO allies and coalition partners, and with other agencies such as the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) and OGDs.

## ANNEX 3B - GENERIC JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS CAMPAIGN RHYTHM

Duration	Event	Aim	Attendance <sup>1</sup>	Remarks	
(-) 1 Hr	Shift Change	To brief the oncoming watch on the activities of the last 12 hours.	Watchkeepers	Conducted by individual cell leaders prior to the Comd's Brief.	
30 min	Commander's Morning Brief	To brief the JTFC in detail on the activities of the last 12 hours in detail and the next 24 hrs in outline.	All staff	Brief given by the outgoing watch. See Annex 3D.	
30 min	Jt Comd's VTC	To enable the JTFC to receive direction from the Jt Comd and discuss any concerns.	JTFC, COS	This VTC will be synchronised with the DCMC meetings.	
30 min	JFPG	To enable the JTFC to discuss the issues and plan accordingly.	COS, Cell Leaders J2, J1/J4, J3, SF, J5, J6, Ops Sp, Legal, POLAD	<b>J3/5 Current Plans (24 hours - 7 days) J2 Ch J3 Ops Sp J1/J4</b>	<b>J5 Plans (7 days and beyond ) J2 J5 Ops Sp J1/J4</b>
45 min	JEM1	To co-ordinate Operations Support activities within the campaign plan.	Ops Sp staff, CC LOs, J2, J3, J3/5, J5, POLAD, LEGAD, Jt Force Engineer	This meeting initiates a period of work between components and the JTFHQ to update guidance, priorities and target lists. It is held principally at SO2 level.	

<sup>1</sup> In this example, only the cell leaders of a JTFHQ which has not yet expanded out into a structure with additional branches and cells is shown. In practice, cell leaders will normally expect their own SMEs (such as Info Ops and Media Ops) to attend any appropriate meeting without further direction.

Duration	Event	Aim	Attendance <sup>1</sup>	Remarks
30 min	JF Comd Gp VTC	To enable the JTFC to give direction to his Component Commanders and discuss any concerns they may have.	JTFC, COS	
15 min	COS Gp	To enable the COS to issue direction to the staff for the next 96 hrs.	All staff	
45 mins	JEM2	To co-ordinate Operations Support activities within the campaign plan.	COS/ACOS J2/3/5, Ops Sp staff, CC LOs, J2, J3, J3/5, J5, POLAD, LEGAD, Jt Force Engineer	This meeting concludes a period of work between components and the JTFHQ to update guidance, priorities and target lists ready for presentation at the JCB for the JTFC's endorsement. It is principally at SO1 level.
1 hr	JCB	To Review JTFC's Guidance, Approve Apportionment Recommendations, and approve draft JIPTL.	JTFC, COS, JFCCs, SO1 J3 Ops Sp, SO1 J2, SO1 Legal, SO2 J3 Fires, SO2 C2W, POLAD	
(-) 1 Hr	Shift Change	To brief the oncoming watch on the activities of the last 12 hours.	Watchkeepers	Conducted by individual cells prior to the Comd's Brief.
30 min	Comd's Brief (as req)	To brief the JTFC in detail on the activities of the last 12 hours and in outline those of the next 24 hrs.	All staff	Brief given by the outgoing watch.

Duration	Event	Aim	Attendance <sup>1</sup>	Remarks
30 min	Jt Comd's VTC (as req)	To enable the JTFC to receive direction from the Jt Comd and discuss any concerns.	JTFC, COS	This VTC will be synchronised with the DCMC meetings.
30 min	JF Comd Gp VTC (as req)	To enable the JTFC to give direction to his components and discuss any concerns.		

(INTENTIONALLY BLANK)

## ANNEX 3C – JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS REPORTS AND RETURNS SCHEDULE

Serial	Report and Return	As At	Fwd By	From	To	Lead
01	DOWNREP	1600Z	1800Z	PJHQ	JTFHQ	PJHQ OT
02	ASSESSREP	1800Z	2000Z	CC HQs	JTFHQ	M/L/A 3
03	ASSESSREP	1800Z	2200Z	JTFHQ	PJHQ	J3
04	LOGREP	1800Z	2000Z	CC HQs	JTFHQ	M/L/A 1/4
05	LOGASSES SREP	1800Z	2200Z	JTFHQ	PJHQ	J1/J4
06	PERSREP	1200Z	1700Z	CCHQ s	JTFHQ	M/L/A 1/4
07	PERSREP	1200Z	2200Z	JTFIJQ	PJHQ	J1/J4
08	SINCREP	As Required	ASAP	CC HQs	JTFHQ	M/L/A 3
09	SINCREP	As Required	ASAP	JTFHQ	PJHQ	J3
10	OPRECREP	1600Z	2000Z	CC HQ s	JTFHQ	J3 Coord
11	OPRECREP	1 800Z	2200Z	JTFHQ	PJHQ	J3 Coord

**Note:**

Timings and/or the requirement for other reports and returns are illustrative and will be confirmed in the Jt Comd's and JTFC/NCC's Directives.

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## ANNEX 3D - OUTLINE FORMAT OF COMMANDER'S BRIEF

Serial	Title	Subject	Responsibility
1	Introduction	Administration and COS key points.	J3 Coord & COS
2	Meteorological	Forecast for the next 24 hours over the Joint Operations Area (JOA) and in detail over specified areas of interest.	
3	Intelligence	Intelligence developments over the last 12 hours and an assessment of future activity.	J2
4	Political	Political developments over the last 12 hours.	POLAD
5	Media	Highlight any media events and interest over last 12 hrs and next 24 hours.	Media
6	Current Ops	Outline the conduct of Mar, Land and Air Ops over the last 12 hrs. Included are any pertinent Special Forces (SF) operations.	J3 Current Ops/Component Reps
7	Ops Sp	Outline the conduct of the Ops Sp activities over the last 12 hrs, particularly regarding the development of the JEM.	J3 Ops Sp
8	Logistics	Any significant personnel, logistic or movement issues over the last 12 hrs.	J1/J4
9	Future Plans	Describe progress on branches and sequels and the development of future plans.	J3/5 Current Plans or J5 Plans
10	Communication	Important Communications and Information Systems (CIS) issues.	J6
11	Legal	Recent changes to Rules of Engagement (ROE) and reasons, any infringements and any ROE requests still pending. Ongoing investigations (war crimes, arrests).	J9 Legal/J3 ROE lead
12	Conclusion	JTFC/NCC key points.	

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## ANNEX 3E - MANAGEMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTS

3E1. This Annex considers aspects of battlespace management affecting the 3 environmental components not considered elsewhere in the publication.

### Maritime Battlespace Management

3E2. **Water Space Management.** Water Space Management (WSM) is required for any maritime operation. Essentially WSM is a set of specifically defined submarine and ASW force operating areas and attack rules. When fully activated, these procedures are implemented by the Submarine Operating Authority (SUBOPAETH) on behalf of the Maritime Component Commander (MCC). Its principal purpose is to allocate water space in terms of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) weapons control which in turn must permit:

- a. The rapid and effective engagement of the adversary's submarines.
- b. The prevention of inadvertent attacks on friendly submarines.

3E3. **Naval Control of Shipping.** Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping (NCAGS) covers measures to protect and control merchant shipping within a clearly defined geographic region or regions under Regional Naval Control of Shipping (RNCS). Participation is normally voluntary by ships' masters, operators or owners. However, governments may enforce compulsory NCAGS of their own flagged ships.

3E4. **Amphibious Objective Area.** The principles for Battlespace Management (BSM) involving amphibious operations are particularly important, governing as they do, potential and significant interaction with all the components.

### Land Real-Estate Management

3E5. The management of terrain is essential to ensure freedom of action for the land and/or amphibious component commander (CC). It is managed by the allocation of real-estate to a unit or formation, although not always for their exclusive use. Overall responsibility for real-estate management will normally be held at CC level although it may be delegated to a subordinate formation or formations who will manage it in accordance with their tactical requirements. Real-estate allocation for Joint Force Air Component (JFAC) elements must cater for their particular needs, such as suitable operating surfaces, local weather conditions, concealment and operating conditions, and Force Protection (FP) issues. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) and the FP threat assessment will identify additional constraints due to the terrain, routes and predicted adversary activity. The need to disperse valuable assets may be an essential requirement, in order not to present high value targets, although this must be balanced against the requirements of mutual support and the need to optimise support from finite Air Defence (AD) assets. The requirements of the Host Nation (HN) as

well as the location and movement of non-combatants must be considered when allocating real-estate. Although terrain management is primarily a JF Land CC (JFLCC), JF Amphibious CC (if appropriate) and JF Log CC (JFLogCC) task, the ground-based needs of all elements of the Joint Task Force (JTF) must be met.

### **Airspace Control<sup>1</sup>**

3E6. **Airspace Control Organisation.** Airspace Control is a specific responsibility of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC). However, it is normal for him to vest authority for these functions in the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The Joint Airspace Co-ordination Centre (JACC) that would normally be collocated with the JFAC HQ to achieve close co-ordination with the Joint Air Operations Cell (JAOC) is responsible for controlling and managing airspace for the entire JOA on a joint basis to utilise it efficiently in support of operations and reduce the risk of fratricide. The JACC Staff is provided from each of the components and provides the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) with the capability to plan centrally, integrate, co-ordinate and regulate the airspace control function. The ACA, in consultation with all Joint Force Component Commanders (JFCCs), will produce an Airspace Control Plan (ACP) for the entire JOA, specifying such considerations as:

- a. Airspace Control Measures (ACMs) specific to the joint campaign.
- b. The boundaries of the airspace control area.
- c. Integration of air defence operations, air defence and fire support measures with airspace applicability.
- d. The authority, purpose, duration and dimensions of any Subordinate Airspace Control Authorities (SACA).
- e. Existing civil and military air traffic control structures and transit and recovery procedures.
- f. Emergency and Identification, Friend-or-Foe (IFF) procedures.

3E7. Following approval by the JTFC, the ACA will promulgate the ACP to the entire joint force. Implementation of the ACP will be through the medium of an Airspace Control Order (ACO). The ACO will be issued to reflect the airspace requirements of the CCs and the ATO, in accordance with the ACP. The Component/Contingent Commanders are responsible for providing to the JACC their demands for airspace to enable the ACA to achieve complete co-ordination whilst remaining responsive to their needs.

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<sup>1</sup> Detailed guidance is contained in ATP 40(B), '*Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis and War*' and JWP 3-34.1, '*Joint Airspace Control*'.


**3E8. Air Defence and Airspace Control.** The Air Defence Commander (ADC) is responsible for the integration and co-ordination of the AD capabilities of all components. The ADC has no command authority per se and no apportioned air assets. The AD Plan is executed by the component commanders using their apportioned assets but is reliant on the JFACC's facilities for effective integration. Normally the AD boundaries will be coincident with the ASC boundaries and the ACP must provide for co-ordination between combat zone airspace control and area joint AD operations.

**3E9. Fire Support Co-ordinating Measures.** The Fire Support Co-ordinating Measures (FSCM) employed by land and amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces must be linked with the ACP.

**3E10. Close Air Support.** Because of the necessity to release lethal weapons in the proximity of friendly forces, Close Air Support (CAS), demands the most rigorous and detailed integration of each task with the (often confused) fire and movement of the supported forces, with GBAD units, and with other users of the air space in order to avoid fratricide and accurately engage fire. It should therefore only be conducted under the positive control of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) who has the necessary situational awareness.

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# ANNEX 3F – EXAMPLE SYNCHRONISATION MATRIX



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## **GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS**

The primary references for the terms and their definitions used in this Glossary are indicated in parentheses.<sup>1</sup> New terms and/or definitions introduced by this publication are annotated as '*New Term*' or '*New Definition*'. While every effort has been made to rationalise terminology and remove ambiguity or duplication, implicit in the Ratification of this version of JWP 3-00 is 'UK agreement' to the Terminology and to its future incorporation into JWP 0-01.1 '*The United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*'. Where appropriate, new terms and their definitions will be submitted by the UK Terminology Co-ordinator as candidates for incorporation in AAP-6 '*The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*' under the NATO Terminology programme.

### **Agency**

A distinct non-military body which has objectives that are broadly consistent with those of the campaign. (JWP 0-01.1)

### **Airspace Control**

A combination of airspace organisation planning procedures, the resulting control structure and co-ordinating functions to minimise risks and allow for efficient and flexible use of airspace by all elements involved in air, land and sea operations. (AAP-6)

### **Area of Operation**

1. At the operational level, the geographical area defined by the operational level commander within his JOA in which a commander designated by him (usually a component commander) is delegated authority to conduct operations.
2. At the tactical level, a geographical area, defined by lateral and rear boundaries, which is assigned to a commander by a higher commander. Within these boundaries the commander has authority to conduct operations in order to execute his mission. (JWP 0-01.1)

### **Area of Operations**

An operational area defined by a joint commander for land or maritime forces to conduct military activities. Normally, an area of operations does not encompass the entire joint operations area of the joint commander, but is sufficient in size for the joint force component commander to accomplish assigned missions and protect forces. (AAP-6)

<sup>1</sup> JWP 0-01 '*British Defence Doctrine*', JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*', JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*', JWP 0-01.1 '*The United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*', AAP-6 '*The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*'.

**Area of Responsibility**

1. The geographical area assigned to each NATO strategic command and to each regional command of Strategic Command Europe.
2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. (AAP-6)

**Campaign**

A set of military operations planned and conducted to achieve a strategic objective within a given time and geographical area, which normally involve maritime, land and air forces. (AAP-6)

**Campaign Effectiveness Analysis**

Analysis conducted at the strategic, operational and tactical level to monitor and assess the cumulative effects of military actions with respect to centres of gravity in order to achieve the overall campaign end-state. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Centre of Gravity**

Characteristic(s), capability(ies), or locality(ies) from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other grouping derive its freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight. (AAP-6)

**Combatant Command**

A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (US JP 1-02)

**Combat Identification**

The process of combining situational awareness, target identification, specific tactics, training and procedures to increase operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the incidence of casualties caused by friendly fire. *See also situational awareness.* (JWP 0-01.1)

**Command**

The authority vested in an individual for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces. (AAP-6)

**Commander's Intent**

A concise expression of the purpose of the campaign or operation, the desired results and how operations will progress towards the desired end-state. At the tactical level, the commander's intent should be focused on the effect that he wishes to achieve on the enemy. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Components**

Force elements grouped under one or more component commanders subordinate to the operational level commander. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Computer Network Operations**

Computer Network Operations (CNO) (Consisting of Computer Network Attack (CNA), Exploitation (CNE) and Protection (CNP)) seek to gain access to computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy their capability, or alternatively to intercept and utilise their capability, whilst protecting the capability of the JTF. Success in this aspect is directly proportional to the adversary's dependence on such systems. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**Contingents**

Force elements of one nation grouped under one or more multinational component commanders subordinate to the Joint Task Force Commander. *New Term* (JWP 3-00)

**Co-ordinating Authority**

The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for co-ordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement, he should refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (AAP-6)

**Co-ordinator of Supporting Command Functions**

When appointed by CDS as UK Co-ordinator of Supporting Functions (CSCF) for a particular operation, CJO is to assume responsibility for co-ordinating the deployment, sustainment and recovery of assigned UK forces, and is accordingly granted Co-ordinating Authority between all UK Commands. CJO will, in these circumstances, be primary national point of contact at the operational HQ level for dealings with NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) or their equivalents. Co-ordinating authority does not in itself carry any command authority, or affect the responsibility of the Supporting Commands to the UK COS. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Culminating Point**

An operation reaches its culminating point when current operations can just be maintained but not developed to any greater advantage. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Deception**

Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests. (AAP-6)

**Decisive Point<sup>2</sup>**

A point from which a hostile or friendly centre of gravity can be threatened. This point may exist in time, space or the information environment. (AAP-6)

**Defensive Information Operations**

Action taken to protect friendly decision makers including the maintenance of access to and effective use of information, information based processes, C2 systems and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict, and to protect Alliance information critical to achieving specific objectives. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Directive**

A military communication in which policy is established or a specific action is ordered. (AAP-6)

**Dynamic Target**

A Dynamic Target is a target identified within the current Air Tasking Order cycle that was previously unanticipated or newly detected, which is of significant importance to all components and should be struck within the Air Tasking Order period. These are generally dealt with by the components in the same manner as a time sensitive targets, but might require clearance by the Joint Force Commander. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**Emerging Target**

An emerging target is a target that meets sufficient criteria to be considered and developed as a target. The criticality and time sensitivity of this potential target is initially undetermined and may be subsequently dealt with as either a Time Sensitive Target, Dynamic Target or as a target planned in the deliberate cycle. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**End-state**

The political and/or military situation to be attained at the end of an operation, which indicates that the objective has been achieved. (AAP-6)

<sup>2</sup> The NATO definition tends to contradict UK usage of DPs and the UK interpretation of this definition is outlined in paragraph 227.

**End-state**

That state of affairs which needs to be achieved at the end of a campaign either to terminate or to resolve the conflict on favourable terms. The end state should be established prior to execution. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Establishing Authority**

The Establishing Authority is the authority that defines the support relationship between the Supported and Supporting Commander. The Establishing Authority should issue directives indicating the purpose in terms of the desired effect to be achieved and the scope of the action to be taken. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**Explosive Ordnance Disposal**

The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe, recovery and final disposal of unexploded explosives ordnance. It may also include explosives ordnance which has become hazardous by damage or detonation. (AAP-6)

**Fires**

The effects of lethal and non-lethal weapons. (US JP 1-02)

**Fire Support Co-ordination Line**

Within an assigned area of operations, a line established by a land or amphibious force commander to denote coordination requirements for fires by other force elements which may affect the commander's current and planned operations. The fire support coordination line applies to fires of air, ground or sea weapons using any type of ammunition against surface or ground targets. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate commanders and supporting elements. Attacks against surface or ground targets short of the fire support coordination line must be conducted under the positive control or procedural clearance of the associated land or amphibious force commander. Unless in exceptional circumstances, commanders of forces attacking targets beyond the fire support coordination line must coordinate with all affected commanders in order to avoid fratricide and to harmonize joint objectives. **Note:** In the context of this definition the term 'surface targets' applies to those in littoral or inland waters within the designated area of operations. (AAP-6)

**Force Protection**

All measures and means to minimise the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, equipment and operations to any threat and in all situations, to preserve freedom of action and the operational effectiveness of the force.  
(JWP 0-01.1)<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> This definition has also been submitted for consideration under the NATO Terminology Programme.

**Forward Mounting Base**

A base (also deployed operating base) established within the operational area, to support operations at forward operating bases. It will be resourced to a greater level than a forward operating base, including C2, logistics and administration support elements. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Framework Nation**

Forces designed under 'framework nation' arrangements are commanded by an officer from the framework nation. A significant proportion of the staff and headquarters support will also come from the framework nation; its working language is of that nation and also its staff procedures. However in practice, once command and staff teams are established, procedures may evolve to incorporate best practice from amongst the contributing nations. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**Full Command**

The military authority and responsibility of a commander to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. Note: the term 'command' as used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command or operational control. (AAP-6)

**Fully Integrated Forces**

Fully integrated forces are based on a 'proportional shares' basis with national components and a fully integrated headquarters, and often-fixed<sup>4</sup> infrastructure. Under these arrangements commanders tend to be appointed on either a rotational or *quid pro quo* basis. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**Humanitarian Advisor**

An individual appointed by the Department for International Development (DFID) to advise the JTFC on the civil and humanitarian aspects of ongoing operations and their implications on planning. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**Information Campaign**

Co-ordinated information output of all Government activity undertaken to influence decision-makers in support of policy objectives, while protecting one's own decision-makers. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Information Operations**

Co-ordinated actions undertaken to influence an adversary or potential adversary in support of political and military objectives by undermining his will, cohesion and decision making ability, including his information, information based processes and systems while protecting one's own decision-makers and decision making processes. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Information Superiority**

Possessing a greater degree of information about the battlespace, being able to exploit that information more rapidly and preventing the adversary from obtaining or exploiting information which would give combat advantage. (JWP 0.01.1)

**Information Superiority**

The capability to collect, process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. (US Joint Vision 2010)

**Joint**

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations in which elements of at least two services participate. (AAP-6)

**Joint Commander**

The Joint Commander, appointed by CDS, exercises the highest level of operational command of forces assigned with specific responsibility for deployments, sustainment and recovery. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Joint Co-ordination Board**

The Joint Co-ordination Board (JCB) is an operation synchronisation meeting used to promulgate the JTFC's guidance and objectives to component commanders. It is his method of ensuring unity of effort. The board will review the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List (JIPTL) to ensure that it reflects the JTFC's Campaign Plan and is in line with HMG objectives. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Joint Effects Meeting**

The Joint Effects Meeting is a staffing board whose role is to ensure that the Joint Fires process (which includes targeting) takes full account of the JTFC's prioritised objectives within the overall campaign plan. It is also responsible for the co-ordination and de-confliction of JTFC controlled assets. It will produce the daily Target Nomination List from the Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List for later approval by the Joint Co-ordination Board.

*New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**Joint Fires**

Joint Fires is defined as kinetic attack co-ordinated or directed at the operational level by the JTFC/NCC. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**Joint Force Planning Group**

The Joint Force Planning Group, attended by the Joint Force Commander and normally chaired by his COS, is the forum where progress against the Campaign Plan is analysed and measured. From this assessment will come direction on contingency planning that can be undertaken to capitalise on favourable developments or indeed help to offset or overcome setbacks. *New Definition* (JWP 5-00)

**Joint Force**

A force composed of significant elements of two or more Services operating under a single commander authorised to exercise operational command or control. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List**

A prioritised list of targets, approved by the Joint Task Force Commander and maintained by a joint task force, which includes the Component Commanders' requirements. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Joint Integrated Target List**

A list of strategic and operational targets, co-ordinated by the PJHQ, to meet the Joint Commander's objectives. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Joint Operations Area**

A temporary area defined by a NATO strategic or regional commander, in which a designated joint commander plans and executes a specific mission at the operational level of war. Note: It is defined in co ordination with nations and approved by the North Atlantic Council or the Military Committee as appropriate, in accordance with NATO's Operational Planning Architecture. A joint operations area and its defining parameters, such as time, scope of the mission and geographical area, are contingency or mission-specific and may overlap areas of responsibility. (AAP-6)

**Joint Operations Area**

An area of land, sea and airspace, defined by a higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Joint Task Force Commander**

The operational commander of a nominated joint force. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Joint Task Force Headquarters**

A purely national deployable joint headquarters of variable size commanded at the operational level by a Joint Task Force Commander. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Lead Nation**

A Lead Nation is one which assumes lead responsibility for the planning and execution of an operation, particularly retaining ownership of the Campaign Plan and Information Operations. The Joint Task Force Commander, staff, command, control, Communications and Information Systems structure, doctrine and logistic co-ordination of the force will be provided by one nation (the lead nation). Other nations can assign contributions to this force under a National Contingent Commander, with liaison officers, and might even fulfil some staff positions in the lead nation's staff.  
*New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

**Line of Operation**

In a campaign or operation, a line linking decisive points in time and space on the path to the centre of gravity. (AAP-6)

**Role Specialisation.**

The responsibility assumed by one nation to procure a particular class of supply or service for all or a part of the multinational force, subject to agreements between the parties involved on compensation and/or reimbursement. (MC 319/1)

**Main Effort**

A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Military Objective**

Objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. (Art 52, Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949)

**Multinational**

Adjective used to describe activities, operations and organisations, in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. (AAP-6)

**Operational Art**

The skilful employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organisation, integration and conduct of theatre strategies, campaigns, major operations and battles. (AJP-01(B))

**Operation**

A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission; the process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvres needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (AAP-6)

**Operational Art**

The orchestration of all military activities involved in converting strategic objectives into tactical actions with a view to seeking a decisive result. (JDP 01)

**Offensive Information Operations**

Actions taken to influence a potential adversary's available information, information based processes, C2 systems and CIS during peace, crisis or conflict, in pursuit of specific objectives or in reaction to a specific threat. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Operational Pause**

A periodic pause in operations while initiative is retained the in other ways. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Other Operations**

Other Operations are those that are conducted in situations other than war; it replaces 'Operations Other Than War' to reflect the need for similar combat capabilities in situations short of warfighting. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Sequencing**

The arrangement of activities within a campaign in the order most likely to achieve the elimination of the enemy's Centre of Gravity. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Situational Awareness**

The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander's (or staff officer's) mission (or task). (JWP 0-01.1)

**Supported Commander**

A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher NATO military authority and who receives forces or other support from one or more supporting commanders. (AAP-6)

**Supported Commander**

A commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by a higher authority. (JWP 0-01.1)

**Supporting Commander**

A commander who provides a supported commander with forces or other support and/or who develops a supporting plan. *See also supported commander.* (AAP-6)

**Supporting commander**

A commander who furnishes forces, equipment, logistics or other support to a supported commander, or who develops a supporting plan. *See also supported commander.* (JWP 0-01.1)

**Time Sensitive Targets**

Time sensitive targets (TST) are those targets requiring immediate response because they represent a serious and imminent threat to friendly forces or are high payoff, fleeting targets of opportunity. In practice, TSTs are specific target sets designated by the JTFC. *New Definition* (JWP 3-00)

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## GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABO	Access, Basing and Overflight
ABCA	American-British-Canadian-Australian
ACA	Airspace Control Authority
ACE	Allied Command Europe
ACM	Airspace Control Measure
ACO	Airspace Control/Co-ordination Order
ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
ACP	Airspace Control Plan/Allied Communications Publication
AD	Air Defence
ADC	Air Defence Commander
ALC	Air Logistic Cell
AML	Augmentation Manning List
AOO	Area of Operation
AOA	Amphibious Objective Area
AOD	Air Operations Directive
AOCC (M) (L)	Air Operations Co-ordination Centre (Maritime) (Land)
APOD	Air Ports of Debarkation
ARRC	ACE Rapid Reaction Corps
ASC	Airspace Control
ASSC	Air Standardisation Control Committee
ASSESSREP	Assessment Report
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATF	Amphibious Task Force
ATO	Air Tasking Order
AW	Amphibious Warfare
AWW	Above Water Warfare
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BDD	British Defence Doctrine
BSM	Battlespace Spectrum Management
C2	Command and Control
C2W	Command and Control Warfare
C3	Command, Control and Communications
C3I	Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
C4I	Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
CA	Combat Assessment
CATF	Commander, Amphibious Task force
CAO	Combat Air Operations
CAS	Close Air Support

CC(s)	Component Commander(s)
CCEB	Combined Communications – Electric Board
CCIRM	Collection, Co-ordination and Intelligence Requirements Management
CCIR	Commander’s Critical Information Requirement
CCIS	Command Control and Information System
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CEA	Campaign Effectiveness Analysis
CinCs	Commanders-in-Chief
CINCFLEET	Commander in Chief Fleet
CINCLAND	Commander in Chief Land
CINCSTRIKE	Commander in Chief Strike
Combat ID	Combat Identification
CIMIC	Civil-Military Co-operation
CIRs	Commanders Information Requirements
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
CJO	Chief of Joint Operations
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CJSOTF	Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force
CLF	Combined Landing Force
CNA	Computer Network Attack
CNE	Computer Network Exploitation
CNO	Computer Network Operations
CNP	Computer Network Protection
CoA	Course of Action
CoG	Centre of Gravity
COMSEC	Communications Security
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COS	Chief of Staff/Chiefs of Staff
CPT	Contingency Planning Team
CT	Counter Terrorism
CWC	Composite Warfare Commander
DAC	Defence Augmentation Cell
DCDS(C)	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments)
DCMC	Defence Crisis Management Centre
DCMO	Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DDP	Detailed Deployment Plan
DEWC	Defence Electronic Warfare Centre
DFID	Department for International Development
DIRLAUTH	Direct Liaison Authority
DIS	Defence Intelligence Staff

DLO	Defence Logistics Organisation
DNBI	Disease and Non-battle Injuries
DOA	Desired Order of Arrival
DOAST	Desired Order of Arrival Staff Table
DOB	Deployment/Deployed Operating Base
DOD	Desired Order of Departure
DP	Decisive Point
DPO	Defence Press Office
DSF	Director Special Forces
DT	Dynamic Target
DTIO	Directorate of Targeting and Information Operations
DTMA	Defence Transport and Movement Agency
ECM	Electronic Countermeasures
EMS	Electromagnetic Spectrum
EOB	Electronic Order of Battle
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EPM	Electronic Protection Measures
ESM	Electronic Warfare Support Measures
ET	Emerging Target
EU	European Union
EW	Electronic Warfare
EWCC	Electronic Warfare Co-ordination Cell
EWOS	Electronic Warfare Operational Support
EWMS	Electronic Warfare Mutual Support
FAC	Forward Air Controller
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FET	Force Element Table
FID	Force Instruction Document
FLC	Front Line Command
FMB	Forward Mounting Base
FN	Framework Nation
FOC	Full Operating Capability
FP	Force Protection
FSA	Fire Support Area
FSCM	Fire Support Co-ordination Measures
GAT	Guidance, Apportionment and Targeting
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HDRO	Humanitarian/Disaster Relief Operations
HMG	Her Majesty's Government

HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host-nation Support
HUMAD	Humanitarian Advisor
HQ	Headquarters
ICCL	Inter-Component Coordination and Liaison
ICLS	International Co-operative Logistic Support
ID	Identification
IER	Information Exchange Requirement
IM	Information Management
IMP	Information Management Plan/Procedures
IMS	Integrated Mission Support
Info Ops	Information Operations
IO	International organisation
IOC	Initial Operating Capability
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace/Battlefield
IR	Intelligence Requirements
IS	Information Systems
ISAF	International Security and Assistance Force
ISR	Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance
JACC	Joint Airspace Control Centre/Cell
JAOC	Joint Air Operations Centre
JAOP	Joint Air Operations Plan
JCB	Joint Co-ordination Board
JCG	Joint Command Group
JDOA	Joint Desired Order of Arrival
JEM	Joint Effects Meeting
JFAC(C)	Joint Force Air Component (Commander)
JFamphC(C)	Joint Force Amphibious Component (Commander)
JFCG	Joint Force Command Group
JFE	Joint Fires Element
JFET	Joint Force Element Table
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JFLC(C)	Joint Force Land Component (Commander)
JFLogC(C)	Joint Force Logistics Component (Commander)
JFMC(C)	Joint Force Maritime Component (Commander)
JFPG	Joint Force Planning Group
JFSFC(C)	Joint Force Special Forces Component (Commander)
JHC	Joint Helicopter Command
JIPB	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
JIPTL	Joint Integrated Prioritised Target List
JITL	Joint Integrated Target List

JLP	Joint Logistics Plan
JLID	Joint Lessons Identified
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JOP	Joint Operations Picture
JOPA	Joint Operations Personnel Administration
JOPC	Joint Operations Planning Course
JOPG	Joint Operations Planning Group
JRRF	Joint Rapid Reaction Force
JRT	Joint Regional Teams
JSCSC	Joint Services Command and Staff College
JSOR	Joint Statement of Requirement
Jt Comd	Joint Commander
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
JTL	Joint Target List
LCC	Land Component Commander
LEGAD	Legal Advisor
LO	Liaison Officer
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
LOC	Lines of Communication
LRSN	Logistic Role Specialist Nation
MA	Military Assistant
MCC	Maritime Component Commander
MCE	Maritime Co-ordination Element
Media Ops	Media Operations
MIC	Multinational Interoperability Council
MLE	Maritime Liaison Element
MNT	Mobile News Team
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOD TB	Ministry of Defence Targeting Board
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NCAGS	Naval Co-operation and Guidance for Shipping
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NCCHQ	National Contingent Commander's Headquarters
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
NFA	No Fire Areas

NFL	No Fire Lines
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NLO	National Liaison Officer
NRT	Near real-time
NSA	NATO Standardisation Agency
NSE	National Support Element
NTM	Notice to Move
OA	Operational Analysis
OAS	Offensive Air Support
OGD	Other government departments
OLRT	Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPINTEL	Operational Intelligence
OPSEC	Operational Security
OPT	Operational Planning Teams
Ops Sp	Operations Support
OPT	Operations Planning Team
ORBAT	Order of Battle
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OT	Operations Team
OTC	Officer in Tactical Command
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
POLAD	Political/Policy Advisor
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
PW	Prisoners of War
PWC	Principle Warfare Commander
QCJWC	Quadripartite Combined Joint Warfare Conference
QSTAGS	Quadripartite Standardisation Agreements
RFA	Restrictive Fire Area
RFI	Request for Information
RFL	Restrictive Fire Line
RNCS	Regional Naval Control of Shipping
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration
RSOM	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement
RT	Real-time

SA	Situational Awareness
SAG	Situational Awareness Group
SACT	Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SBMA	Senior British Military Advisor
SPOD	Sea Port of Disembarkation
SPOE	Sea Ports of Embarkation
SC	Strategic Commander
SF	Special Forces
SI	Support and Influence
SITREP	Situation Report
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SR	Surveillance and Reconnaissance
SSA	Shared Situational Awareness
STUFT	Ship(s) Taken Up From Trade
TACOM	Tactical Command
TACON	Tactical Control
Target ID	Target Identification
TAS PG	Target System Analysis Planning Group
TBMD	Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence
TCN	Troop Contributing Nation
TG	Task Group
TLAM	Tomahawk Land Attack Missile
TMD	Theatre Missile Defence
TMOG	Theatre Media Operations Group
TNL	Target Nomination List
TOO	Theatre of Operations
TST	Time Sensitive Target
TTP	Tactics Training and Procedures
UK DSG	UK Defence Strategic Guidance
UN	United Nations
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence staff
VTC	Video Teleconference
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WME	Weapons of Mass Effect

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